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A B S T R A C T
Millimeter-wave (mm-wave) communication systems achieve extremely
high data rates and provide interference-free transmissions. to over-
come high attenuations, they employ directional antennas that focus
their energy in the intended direction. Transmissions can be steered
such that signals only propagate within a specific area-of-interest. Al-
though these advantages are well-known, they are not yet available in
practical networks. IEEE 802.11ad, the recent standard for communica-
tions in the unlicensed 60GHz band, exploits a subset of the directional
propagation effects only. Despite the large available spectrum, it does
not outperform other developments in the prevalent sub-6GHz bands.
This underutilization of directional communications causes unneces-
sary performance limitations and leaves a false sense of security. For
example, standard compliant beam training is very time consuming. It
uses suboptimal beam patterns, and is unprotected against malicious
behaviors. Furthermore, no suitable research platform exists to vali-
date protocols in realistic environments. To address these challenges,
we develop a holistic evaluation framework and enhance the perfor-
mance and security in practical mm-wave communication systems.
Besides signal propagation analyses and environment simulations, our
framework enables practical testbed experiments with off-the-shelf
devices. We provide full access to a tri-band router’s operating sys-
tem, modify the beam training operation in the Wi-Fi firmware, and
create arbitrary beam patterns with the integrated antenna array. This
novel approach allows us to implement custom algorithms such as a
compressive sector selection that reduces the beam training overhead
by a factor of 2.3. By aligning the receive beam, our adaptive beam
switching algorithm mitigates interference from lateral directions and
achieves throughput gains of up to 60%. With adaptive beam opti-
mization, we estimate the current channel conditions and generate
directional beams that implicitly exploit potential reflections in the en-
vironment. These beams increase the received signal strength by about
4.4 dB. While intercepting a directional link is assumed to be chal-
lenging, our experimental studies show that reflections on small-scale
objects are sufficient to enable eavesdropping from afar. Additionally,
we practically demonstrate that injecting forged feedback in the beam
training enables Man-in-the-Middle attacks. With only 7.3% overhead,
our authentication scheme protects against this beam stealing and
enforces responses to be only accepted from legitimate devices. By
making beam training more efficient, effective, and reliable, our con-
tributions finally enable practical applications of highly directional
transmissions.
V

Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Kommunikationssysteme auf Basis von Millimeterwellen ermögli-
chen interferenzfreie Übertragungen mit besonders hohen Datenraten.
Signale können gerichtet ausgesehendet werden um der hohen Frei-
raumdämpfung entgegenzuwirken, so dass sie nur an bestimmten
Orten empfangen werden. Durch diese direktionale Kommunikation
ergeben sich Vorteile die derzeit noch keine Anwendung in prakti-
schen WLAN Systemen finden. Der aktuelle Standard für Kommuni-
kationen im lizenzfreien 60GHz Bereich macht von den Möglichkeiten
der Richtfunktechnik nur eingeschränkt Gebrauch. Trotz des großen
verfügbaren Frequenzspektrums werden nur geringfügig höhere Da-
tenraten als mit üblichen Verfahren im 2 - 6GHz Bereich erreicht.
Insbesondere das standardmäßig verwendete Trainingsverfahren für
die Antennenausrichtung führt zu Einschränkungen der Performanz
und Sicherheit solcher Systeme. Die zeitaufwändige Suche führt zu
keinen optimalen Ergebnissen und ist anfällig für Manipulationen. Er-
schwerend kommt hinzu, dass es derzeit keine geeigneten Werkzeuge
gibt, um die vielfältigen Eigenschaften in realistischen Umgebungen
analysieren zu können. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit stellen wir daher ein
umfangreiches Evaluationssystem zur Verfügung. Neben der Analyse
und Simulation spezifischer Signalausbreitung, ermöglicht unser Sys-
tem praktische Experimente. Um beliebige Trainingsalgorithmen und
Antennenkonfigurationen verwenden zu können, modifizieren wir
die proprietäre WLAN Firmware in handelsüblichen Geräten. Dieser
neuartige Ansatz ermöglicht es uns u.a. ein kompressives Verfahren
zu implementieren, welches den Trainingsaufwand um einen Faktor
von 2,3 reduziert. Anpassungen der Signalausrichtung auf der Emp-
fangsseite können Störungen unterdrücken und steigern damit den
Datendurchsatz um 60%. Ferner können wir durch eine genaue Kanal-
schätzung die Antennenausrichtung optimieren und die Signalstärke
am Empfänger um durchschnittlich 4,4dB erhöhen. Zwar erschweren
direktionale Übertragungen das Abhören der Kommunikation, jedoch
können kleinste Objekte in der Umgebung zu starken Reflektionen füh-
ren. In einem praktischen Aufbau belegen wir, dass diese ausreichen
um übertragende Informationen auszulesen. Ferner können mani-
pulierte Rückmeldungen im Trainingsverfahren sogenannte MITM
Angriffe ermöglichen. Um diesen entgegenzuwirken, stellen wir ein
Authentifizierungsverfahren vor, welches mit 7,3% Mehraufwand nur
legitime Antennenausrichtungen zulässt. Durch die Beiträge in dieser
Arbeit verbessern wir die Effizienz, Effektivität und Zuverlässigkeit
von auf Millimeterwellen basierten Kommunikationssystemen und
ermöglichen somit dessen praktische Anwendung.
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Part I
I N T R O D U C T I O N
We first introduce our goals and contributions in Chapter 1
and then present background information and related work
in Chapter 2.

1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Wireless communication technology has become pervasive with bil-
The wireless
communication
spectrum is almost
saturated.
lions of mobile devices worldwide. Due to the widespread use of
mobile phones and other personal gadgets, the demands on ubiq-
uitous connectivity raise. The wireless traffic annually increases by
about 46% [Cis18] and soon reach a level that cannot be handled by
current technologies anymore. Engineers address these demands by
developing new approaches to increase the spectrum utilization and
coding efficiency. Still, the available spectrum is almost saturated and
leaves little space for improvements.
Millimeter-wave (mm-wave) communication systems operate at high
Millimeter-wave
communications
provide a huge
bandwidth.
frequencies and offer new opportunities to address the aforementioned
demands. The unlicensed 60GHz band has an available spectrum
twelve times as large as those in both the prevalent 2.4GHz and
5GHz Wi-Fi systems. Additionally, next-generation cellular systems
may utilize more than 20GHz of spectrum in the range of 28GHz
to 100GHz [Rap+14]. This massive bandwidth available solves the
limited spectrum bottleneck and enables data rates of multiple Gigabit
per second.
Transmitting signals at high frequencies causes additional atten-
High frequencies
induce different
propagation effects.
uations due to free-space propagation losses and atmospheric ab-
sorptions [Rap+14]. In contrast to common communication technolo-
gies, mm-wave signals are less affected by scattering and diffractions
but strongly impaired by blockage. Only the line-of-sight or direct
reflections allow constructing a communication path. These quasi-
optical propagation effects lead to naturally decreased communication
distances and bounded coverage. To overcome these impairments,
mm-wave systems employ steerable directional antennas that focus
their signal power in the intended direction of communication. They
achieve a strong signal gain inside the designated beam, which signifi-
cantly drops in any other direction. With this directionality applied,
mm-wave communications not only improve wireless performance
but also enable emerging applications. For example, exploiting the Directional
transmissions enable
emerging
applications.
specific propagation effects facilitates a precise device localization,
gesture recognition, or “information showers” with location based
services [Rap+14]. Since the size of antennas is in the order of millime-
ters, inter-chip communications and cable replacements [RMG11] are
conceivable. Vehicular applications already utilize 77GHz transmis-
sions for automotive radars that may soon be adopted for signaling
and data transfer [KGH15]. In all these scenarios, narrow beams
facilitate spatial reusability with low interference among concurrent
3
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transmissions, thus increasing the overall performance in ultra-dense
networks. However, due to multiple reasons and current hardware
imperfections these great advantages are retained from practical use
and market availability. In the following, we state these issues and
motivate our work in Section 1.1. We define current challenges as well
as our goals in Section 1.2 and list our contributions in Section 1.3.
Finally, Section 1.4 provides an overview on the remainder of this
thesis.
1.1 motivation
Current mm-wave devices and enrolled applications only tap a slight
Current systems
underutilize the
advantages of
directional
communication.
fraction of the advantages of directional communications. For ex-
ample, IEEE 802.11ad, the first Wi-Fi standard for the 60GHz band,
achieves data rates that are not significantly higher than those in com-
mon sub-6GHz communication systems such as IEEE 802.11ac (Wi-Fi 5)
and IEEE 802.11ax (Wi-Fi 6). Despite the smaller spectrum, the latter
provides data rates of more than 1Gbps which still meets our current
demands. Moreover, the specific propagation effects of mm-waves
make it challenging to replace existing communication infrastructure.
Due to the high directionality, network deployments of base stations
and Access Points (APs) must consider environmental effects and po-
tential link outages. Indoor scenarios with mm-wave devices typically
require to place multiple APs in a single room to achieve coverage
as in sub-6GHz Wi-Fi systems. These effects demand a fundamental
rethinking of wireless networking and induce a new transition from
omnidirectional to directional communications.
Designing wireless communication systems that operate at very high
Communication at
high frequencies is
technically
challenging.
frequencies such as 60GHz is technically challenging. For instance,
electrical components must meet tiny tolerances, and phased antenna
arrays are hard to manufacture [Won+14; Niu+15]. Phase noise plays
a significant role [TCK15; Dha15] and typically impedes the signal
decoding. System designers often resort to sub-optimal solutions
to address these challenges efficiently. As a result, current systems
provide proper communication links but underutilize the advantages
of directionality in mm-wave communications.
To enhance the performance of wireless communication, researchers
Research platforms
with lower layer
access are not yet
available.
typically use designated development systems to evaluate their pro-
tocol designs. Despite that consumer-grade devices already use
IEEE 802.11ad, no existing research platform supports the mm-wave
frequency bands. Available off-the-shelf devices lack suitable features
to control the beam training and other lower layer parameters. The
firmware of the Wi-Fi chip in such devices is a black box [Nit+15a]
and hinders users from prototyping new protocols. Low-layer ac-
cess is possible only within the limitations of the provided interface
[LBW16]. Hence, many researchers either limit themselves to the-
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oretical approaches [MRM16; RVM12b; RVM12a] or use simplified
measurements to verify their solutions. Due to the lack of wide-spread
hardware, they base their work on prototyping platforms with di-
rectional horn antennas [Sur+15; Sur+16; HK16] or custom antenna
arrays [Ras+17]. Both exhibit different behavior than any practical
device. The low-cost components integrated with the latter cause im-
perfections and do not achieve the precision of laboratory equipment.
Most mm-wave applications implicitly assume a strong direction-
Attack possibilities
in practical scenarios
differ those in ideal
environments.
ality. Signals should be only receivable within a bounded coverage
area of the designated beam. Indeed, the IEEE 802.11ad standard spec-
ifies beamwidths as small as three degree [Nit+14] to compensate for
the high path loss and realize links at average Wi-Fi-scale distances.
Under ideal circumstances, mm-wave communication systems are
often asserted to be inherently resilient to eavesdropping and other
attacks. Signal interception is assumed infeasible if the attacker is
forced to locate itself within several degrees off the path between the
transmitter and the receiver [Fre13; Yan+15]. This assumption might
hold under laboratory conditions with perfect directionality but leaves
a false sense of security for practical deployments. In particular, most
development systems feature completely different radiation charac-
teristics than practical deployments with integrated antennas arrays
and do not encounter environmental propagation effects. Moreover,
the underlying beam training protocols such as the sector level sweep
in IEEE 802.11ad [Nit+14; IEE14] are unprotected against malicious
behavior. Finding the optimal antenna steering typically takes place
before any secure channel establishes.
1.2 challenges and goals
In the previous section, we identify the underutilization of direction-
We derive challenges
of applying direction
communications in
practical systems.
ality as the primary cause of low adaptation of mm-wave communi-
cations. To fully exploit the very specific spatial propagation effects
and turn emerging application scenarios into practice, we derive five
sub-problems and identify the most critical challenges in mm-wave
communications. Based on this, we define individual sub-goals as
well as the main goal of our work. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of this
separation.
spatial isolation. Early adopters of mm-wave communication
Strong directionality
isolates concurrent
transmissions and
enables spatial reuse.
claim to achieve high directionality with pencil beams and provide
strong antenna gains in the intended direction with low interference
on other communications. However, we find that practical phased
antenna arrays feature an imperfect directionality and expose a sig-
nificant amount of side lobes in their radiation patterns. These side
lobes might cause interference with transmissions of other devices
in proximity and, in addition to that, compensate the directional ad-
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Figure 1.1: Research problems, challenges, and goals.
vantages. Such aspects must be taken into account when aiming for
spatial isolation on concurrent transmissions. A strong directionality
is required to spatially isolate these transmissions, which is particu-
larly challenging with cost-efficient small size phased antenna arrays
as utilized in common off-the-shelf devices. We aim at maximizing
the signal gain towards the intended direction while minimizing the
side lobe level. When side lobes are unavoidable, we tend to align
the side lobes among multiple transceivers to improve the spatial
separation. Our goal is to spatially isolate concurrent transmissions
between different devices to enhance spatial reuse.
efficient beam training . Mm-wave communications enforce
Reducing the
number of probing
frames increases the
efficiency of beam
training.
beam steering to focus the transmitted signals in particular direc-
tions. In order to find the optimal steering parameters, beam training
techniques sense the current channel conditions by sending periodic
probing frames in different directions. This approach, as performed by
state-of-the-art beam training techniques (e.g., the sector level sweep
in IEEE 802.11ad) has a high overhead. Probing a large set of narrow
beams causes devices to spend a long time with frequent training.
Besides improving the frame format, as suggested in IEEE 802.11ay,
the number of required probing frames during the training sequence
should be minimal. Our goal is to find the optimal beam fast and
efficiently while achieving an accuracy as an exhaustive search.
1.2 challenges and goals 7
attack resistance . Featuring a high directivity and being sus-
Attack resistance
requires to identify
emerging attack
vectors first.
ceptible to blockage by objects, mm-waves are often assumed to be
hard to intercept. However, it is unclear how non-ideal radiation
characteristics of phased array antennas and low-layer beam training
protocols affect malicious attacks. The challenge is to identify specific
attack strategies that target the directionality by considering envi-
ronmental reflections and vulnerabilities in the beam training itself.
Mm-wave communications require amendments in lower layer proto-
cols to handle the directionality and perform the beam training. By
analyzing and identifying possible attack vectors, we aim at protecting
these protocol extensions against adversarial behavior. Our goal is to
obtain an understanding of the security aspects of directional com-
munications and achieve attack-resistant link maintenance to prevent
attackers from tampering with the directionality.
practical evaluation. One of the significant challenges in
Directional
communications
require a holistic
evaluation in
practical
environments.
developing novel communication protocols and applications is the
unavailability of proper development and evaluation systems. An
extensive evaluation of mm-wave communications with available sys-
tems is nearly impossible. On the one hand, current Software-Defined
Radio (SDR) based evaluation and development systems lack sophis-
ticated implementations above the link layer. Due to high expenses,
they are only affordable for single link setups. Consumer grade off-
the-shelf devices, on the other hand, typically come as black-boxes
and lack access to the lower layers of the communication stack. To
address all aspects of mm-wave propagation, we need a holistic full-
stack evaluation. The envisioned system provides access to all relevant
communication layers. It allows for optimizing the beam training men-
tioned above and directly comparing results with those of a standard
reference implementation. Moreover, an evaluation should also con-
sider realistic deployments and not be limited to single link scenarios.
In this regard, our goal is to set up a practical evaluation testbed with
standard compliance under realistic conditions.
reproducibility. Although many researchers investigate mm-
Reproducible
measurements and
results enable
continued use.
wave communications, only a few models and extensive data sets that
reveal the diverging communication paradigms of directionality are
publicly available. Most of these models cover very specific scenarios
[Mal10] without general applicability. Due to the lack of alternatives,
many research groups engineer custom prototyping systems from
scratch and use those to perform measurements in small office en-
vironments to base their studies. We find that this approach has a
limited reproducibility as it requires to assemble custom hardware
components to re-build the systems that are often poorly documented.
Moreover, this approach is an unnecessary repetition of existing work.
Publicly available data sets with extensive measurements and traces in
8 introduction
realistic scenarios would allow researchers to validate their theses and
approaches without the necessity to create yet another prototyping
system. To this end, we emphasize the release of tools and measure-
ments to build on existing results. In other words, our goal is to
generate reproducible results that allow for continued use.
main goal . The main goal of this thesis is to enhance the perfor-
Our goal is to
enhance the
performance and
security of practical
mm-wave
communication
systems.
mance and the security of practical mm-wave communication systems.
To achieve this, we follow a holistic approach that includes a profound
experimental evaluation and tackle the challenges of spatial signal
propagation in high-frequency bands as mentioned above. The diverse
aspects require a cross-layer consideration as the typical isolation of
layers in the network stack becomes inappropriate. For example, beam
training should consider the physical appearance of the antenna and
its steering capabilities. Moreover, the antenna steering should adapt
to the current environment and network aspects. By jointly achieving
spatial isolation, efficient beam training, and attack resistance, we pro-
vide the foundation to enable emerging applications that fully exploit
the spatial sparsity in mm-wave signal propagation. With our focus on
practical evaluation and reproducibility, we enable other researchers
to benefit from our findings and continue to study related aspects.
1.3 contributions
To address the challenges above in mm-wave communications, we
(1) propose a practical evaluation framework, (2) introduce performance
enhancements, (3) identify and address security aspects, and (4) provide
practical measurements and traces. Our contributions are described in
the following.
1.3.1 Framework
Our first contribution is a holistic framework that allows to analyze
the signal propagation and to conduct experiments with customized
and standard compliant protocols on commercial off-the-shelf devices
in large-scale deployments.
signal propagation analysis . Current mm-wave indoor prop-
We develop a channel
sounding platform
and a ray tracing
based simulation
environment.
agation analysis techniques rely on common channel models to predict
the signal propagation which has limited options when it comes to
more than one transmitter and receiver. Available models are rare and
often limited to simple applications in a conference room, living room,
or cubicle. Measurements are only available for concrete scenarios,
and experimental hardware with mm-wave transceivers is expensive.
To address this issue, we develop a channel sounding platform that
brings the advantages of SDRs to mm-wave applications and enables
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transmission of arbitrary waveforms over wireless links at 60GHz. It
supports variable data modulation schemes and adjustable frame for-
mats to implement custom protocols. Still, channel sounding does not
scale with large deployments and multiple transceivers. We present
a fast deterministic image-based ray-tracing simulation framework
for mm-wave propagation. It supports developing mm-wave specific
protocols and, in contrast to conventional statistical models, deals
with multiple transceivers. Our framework is written in MATLAB
and computes the channel impulse response by taking into account
the antenna radiation characteristic and alignment. The strengths
of our simulation constitute signal variations at different receivers
and interference of multiple transmitters which are crucial in dense
deployments.
testbed experimentation. Even though consumer-grade mm-
Our testbed
experimentation
platform consists of
off-the-shelf devices.
wave devices are commercially available, no suitable research testbed
exists that fully complies with IEEE 802.11ad by now. We present
our practical experimentation and evaluation platform that bases on
off-the-shelf devices. Using a commodity tri-band wireless router, we
achieve standard compliance with IEEE 802.11ad. Through software
adjustments, we provide full system access to the router’s operating
system and interface the protocol execution in the 60GHz Wi-Fi chip.
By patching the binary firmware that is running in the chip, we ob-
tain access to the beam training configuration and implement custom Firmware
modifications
integrate new beam
training features.
beam patterns on the phased antenna array. Doing so, we bare the
full potential of the integrated hardware components and provide a
low-cost alternative to expensive mm-wave evaluation systems. Us-
ing this hardware, we investigate the performance and security in
IEEE 802.11ad communications.
1.3.2 Performance
Achieving data-rates of multiple Gbps in mm-wave communication
State-of-the-art beam
training causes a
high overhead.
systems requires efficient and accurate beam training algorithms. To
find the steering direction on IEEE 802.11ad compatible devices, state-
of-the-art approaches sweep through a set of predefined antenna
sectors with generic beam patterns. This approach is robust and
straightforward but causes a high training overhead and provides
only sub-optimal antenna beams. The antenna modules typically de-
ployed in such devices are capable of generating much more precise
antenna beams. We provide sophisticated approaches and optimize
the beam training for commercial off-the-shelf devices. In particular,
we (1) increase the efficiency with compressive sector selection, (2) mit-
igate lateral interference in antenna side lobes, and (3) improve the
directional antenna gain with adaptive codebook optimization.
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compressive sector selection. To improve the efficiency of
Compressive sector
selection reduces the
training time.
beam training on IEEE 802.11ad devices, we adopt compressive path
tracking for the sector selection in off-the-shelf devices. In contrast
to existing solutions, our compressive sector selection tolerates the
imperfections of low-cost hardware, tracks beam directions in spherical
dimensions, and does not rely on pseudo-random beams. We select
the best sector based on measured radiation patterns and sweep only
through a subset of probing sectors.
mitigating lateral interference . To minimize the interfer-
We steer beams away
from interference
directions.
ence from lateral directions, we present an adaptive beam switching
mechanism. Our mechanism steers receive beams to maximize the sig-
nal gain but also to minimize interference via both their main and side
lobes. Doing so, we enable efficient parallel operation of incompatible
standards such as WiGig and IEEE 802.11ad.
adaptive beam optimization. To improve the accuracy of se-
Optimized beams
adapt to the channel
and maximize the
signal strength.
lected beam patterns, we adaptively adjust the sector codebook to
optimize the transmit beam patterns for the current channel. Isolating
the phase and magnitude from individual antenna elements in the
array, we extract the full Channel State Information (CSI) and dynam-
ically compute a transmit beam pattern that maximizes the signal
strength at the receiver. Thereby, we automatically exploit reflectors in
the environment and improve the received signal quality.
1.3.3 Security
Our security consideration includes (1) the feasibility of eavesdropping
on reflections, and (2) attack vectors in the beam training that allow
attackers to tamper with the beam selection.
eavesdropping on reflections . Featuring a high directivity
Reflections facilitate
eavesdropping from
distant locations.
and being susceptible to blockage by objects, mm-waves are often
assumed to be hard to intercept. However, mm-waves reflect on
a variety of objects which might have a significant impact on the
security. With practical experiments using our framework, we reveal
that small-scale objects within the beam cause reflections and enable
eavesdropping from remote locations. In contrast to large blocking
obstacles, we consider objects that are sufficiently small not to impede
the communication between the intended transceivers. Still, they are
sufficiently large to enable an eavesdropper to decode a reflected
signal. With this approach, we practically demonstrate the vast impact
that inconspicuous objects have on mm-wave security.
1.3 contributions 11
beam stealing . The low layer amendments in IEEE 802.11ad to
Attackers may
tamper with the
beam training.
handle directional communications lack proper security mechanisms
and disclose unprecedented attack possibilities. Distant attackers
might tamper with the beam training and literally ’steal’ the beam
from other devices. We investigate the threat of such beam stealing
attacks that intercept the sector level sweep. Injecting forged feedback
forces victims to steer their signals towards the attacker’s location.
Using our framework, we evaluate the impacts on eavesdropping
and acting as a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM). To protect against this We propose an
authentication
scheme to protect the
beam selection.
kind of attack, we discuss possible detection metrics. We extend
the prevalent sector level sweep with an authentication scheme to
ensure that devices only accept the feedback from their intended
peers. Thereby, we emphasize the threat of beam stealing on mm-wave
networks and propose an authentication to counterfeit such an attack.
1.3.4 Measurements
To complement our findings and allow other researchers to build
on our work, we conduct measurements campaigns and process our
results for integration in future work. In particular, we provide (1) the
antenna radiation patterns of predefined and custom beams along with
the array factor of individual antenna elements and (2) performance
traces in practical deployments.
antenna radiation patterns . Using our testbed system, we
Measurements in an
anechoic chamber
reveal the radiation
patterns.
precisely measure the predefined beam patterns of commercial off-the-
shelf hardware in an anechoic environment. Our results show irregular
shapes that lead to significant side lobe levels but cover the whole
area around the device. Moreover, we measure the antenna array
factor that reveals the phase difference of individual antenna elements
in various directions. Our measurements allow to design and shape
custom beam patterns with arbitrary directionality and implement
them for communication on the devices in practical environments.
To illustrate the possible gains in directionality, we also measure
exemplarily generated beam patterns that expose a strong main-lobe.
practical deployment. The practical impact that is achievable
We perform practical
measurements with
28 devices in an
open atrium.
with optimized beam pattern enables new applications. To highlight
the performance differences of generic beam patterns and highly di-
rectional beams, we perform an extensive measurement campaign
in an atrium with 28 distributed devices. Between these devices, we
measure the signal strength and the CSI and investigate the through-
put that is achieved with different beam configurations. Operating
multiple links in parallel, we reveal the limitations of spatial-reuse.
With directional beams, side lobe suppression, and multi-cast patterns,
our experiment highlights the advantages of beamforming on off-the-
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shelf mm-wave hardware. Our obtained dataset allows to analyze
the impacts of custom beam steering on the network performance
in post-processing. We reprocess our data-set for easy integration in
custom studies.
1.4 outline
The remainder of this work is structured as follows and illustrated in
The contents of this
thesis are separated
in different parts.
Figure 1.2. In Chapter 2, we state background information on mm-
wave communications and summarize related work. Part ii covers our
evaluation framework for signal propagation analysis in Chapter 3
and practical testbed experimentation in Chapter 4. Part iii describes
performance improvements. We propose our compressive sector se-
lection in Chapter 5 and mitigate lateral interference in Chapter 6.
Our adaptive beam optimization approach is described in Chapter 7.
Part iv addresses security aspects. We practically investigate eaves-
dropping on reflected signals in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 considers beam
stealing attacks and proposes corresponding countermeasures. Our
measurements and traces in Part v cover the antenna radiation patterns
in Chapter 10 and practical deployments in Chapter 11. In Part vi,
we discuss our findings. Chapter 12 states specific applications and
directions for future work. Finally, Chapter 13 concludes this thesis.
1.4 outline 13
Fr
am
ew
or
k
3) Signal Pro-
pagation Analysis
4) Testbed 
Experimentation
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
5) Compressive 
Sector 
Selection
7) Adaptive
Beam 
Optimization
6) Lateral
Interference
Mitigation
Se
cu
ri
ty
8) Eavesdropping 
on Reﬂections
9) Beam Stealing
10) Antenna Radiation
Patterns
11) Practical
Deployment
11) Discussion 
and Outlook 12) Conclusions
In
tr
od
uc
tio
n
1) Introduction 2) Backgroundand Related Work
M
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
D
is
cu
ss
io
n 
an
d 
C
on
cl
us
io
ns
Figure 1.2: Structure and overview of contributions and chapters in this
thesis. Annotations indicate the use of framework components.

2
B A C K G R O U N D A N D R E L AT E D W O R K
In this chapter, we provide background information on mm-wave
communication systems and state related work. Section 2.1 describes
the characteristics of the mm-wave channel, measurements, and prop-
agation models. Details on the current Wi-Fi standardization within
IEEE 802.11ad/ay are provided in Section 2.2. Recent performance
improvements for beam training and maintenance are described in
Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we review related security aspects and,
finally, summarize existing testbed and evaluation systems in Sec-
tion 2.5.
2.1 channel characteristics
The channel characteristics of mm-wave communication systems are
fundamentally different from those in the prevalent sub-6GHz bands.
In the following, we state recent work on channel measurements and
propagation models that encounter this aspect.
2.1.1 Measurements and Analyses
Early measurements of mm-waves in the 60GHz band are taken by
Mm-waves have
different propagation
characteristics than
lower frequency
signals.
Smulders and Wagemans in [SW92]. On short distances, weather
effects and atmospheric absorptions have little effect [MMI96], but hu-
man blockage can be severe [Sin+09]. While small objects cause diffrac-
tion [Jac+12; Kle+12], its effects are less relevant for mm-waves than in
lower frequencies [Mal+10b]. Several works analyzed how mm-wave
signals reflect on building materials and indoor structures [LLH94;
Ahm+09; Sat+97]. Their findings imply that reflections should not be
neglected in indoor environments. Most of these reflections enable
communication via indirect line-of-sight paths. Ansari et al. [Ans+15]
confirm that mm-wave transmissions are feasible when the reflec-
tions are direct. Polarization of signals is analyzed by Maltsev et
al. in [Mal+10c] and turns out to be important due to low multi-
path effects. Interference is a strong limiting factor in mm-wave
networks [SF15]. Especially consumer grade antenna arrays exhibit
several side lobes [Nit+15a] that potentially distort concurrent trans-
missions. All these works outline the fundamentally different aspects
of mm-waves that need to be considered in realistic propagation anal-
yses.
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2.1.2 Propagation Models
Simulations of mm-wave propagation can be performed with statistical
or deterministic models. While the former use measured statistics
from particular scenarios, the latter draws on physical theories.
statistical channel models . Statistical models allow for fast
Statistical models
enable fast
computations but are
limited to scenarios
of the underlying
measurements.
computation. They typically utilize statistics obtained from physical
measurements in concrete scenarios. A seminal statistical model was
investigated by Saleh and Valenzuela in [SV87] and assumes that
multi-path components of the channel arrive in clusters. Amplitudes
of the signal within each cluster follow a Rayleigh or Rician distri-
bution. In either case, the phases of received signals are uniformly
distributed. The channel models for IEEE 802.11 [IEE04] adopt statis-
tical predictions to Wi-Fi-based Multiple-Input and Multiple-Output
(MIMO) communication systems in the 2.4GHz band. Their MATLAB
implementation [Mat] provides a fundamental design and analysis
tool for low layer Wi-Fi aspects. The indoor simulation tool SIRCIM
of Rappaport, Seidel, and Takamizawa [RST91] predicts statistical
channel impulse responses in line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight sce-
narios. It is designed for mm-waves at 60GHz but also works for lower
frequencies. Their model produces realistic multi-path channel charac-
teristics with high precision. A complete statistical channel model for
indoor environments is established in [Mal+10b], confirming the quasi-
optical nature of mm-waves and negligibility of diffraction. The model
in [Mal10] specifically predicts the channel statistics for IEEE 802.11ad
systems. This approach is similar to earlier IEEE 802.11 models [IEE04]
but also considers directional antennas, variable beamwidth, and an-
tenna orientation. Its implementation [ML10] makes these insights
directly accessible for a variety of MATLAB simulations. Unfortunately,
statistical propagation models are limited to scenarios similar to those
in the underlying measurements. Detailed empirical analyses are
required to simulate the channel in complex environments.
deterministic propagation models . Deterministic models
Ray tracing is a
practical
approximation of
quasi-optical
characteristics.
are based on the theory of electromagnetic wave propagation that
could be solved with Maxwell’s equations. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach is impractical because of the high computational requirements.
However, as mm-wave propagation behaves quasi-optically [Mal+09],
ray tracing becomes a practical approximation. Ray tracing is typically
applied for image generation in computer graphics and effectively
models reflections and attenuations. In wave propagation analytics, it
predicts the received signal strength at a specific position in a given
environment.
Ray tracing can be divided into Shooting and Bouncing Rays (SBR)
and image-based methods. SBR methods intuitively launch rays in
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Channel 1 Channel 2 Channel 3 Channel 4
58.32 GHz 60.48 GHz 62.64 GHz 64.80 GHz
Figure 2.1: Available IEEE 802.11ad channels in the 60GHz band.
many directions. They are reflected by objects and eventually hit the
receiver. With a high number of rays, SBR methods achieve a high
precision and in addition to that encounter diffraction and scattering.
However, only a small fraction of computed rays contribute to the
received signal; most of them never reach the receiver. In contrast,
image-based ray tracing only considers direct reflections between the
transmitter and the receiver. Receivers’ locations are mirrored on the
objects surfaces to derive the reflection paths.
The feasibility of mm-wave ray tracing to identify clusters of arrivals
Image-based ray
tracing exposes only
small inaccuracies.
is verified by Neekzad et al. in [Nee+07]. Comparisons with measure-
ments in this work indicate that ray tracing provides precise results
for scatter-free line-of-sight scenarios. Their approach exhibits slight
inaccuracies only with heavy scattering in non-line-of-sight paths. For-
tune et al. [For+95] propose an SBR-based ray tracing tool for 2GHz
and 900MHz bands. Measurements of Xu, Kukshya, and Rappa-
port in [XKR02] confirm that image-based ray tracing can determine
the majority of multi-path components in mm-wave transmissions.
Calculations of first- and second-order reflections are sufficient for
line-of-sight applications [XKR02]. A hybrid approach leveraging both,
SBR- and image-based methods, is proposed by Peter, Keusgen, and
Felbecker in [PKF07]. Their approach is verified with practical mea-
surements and reveals only small deficits in time domain predictions.
In all these works, image-based ray tracing provides an efficient tool
for coarse-grained channel modeling.
2.2 wi-fi standardization
IEEE 802.11ad [Nit+14; IEE14] standardizes the usage of mm-wave
IEEE 802.11ad
specified mm-wave
communication for
Wi-Fi application.
communication for Wi-Fi networks in the unlicensed spectrum between
57GHz and 66GHz. The standard was ratified in 2012 and specifies
amendments for wireless IEEE 802.11 networks to operate at such
extremely high frequencies with directional links. As illustrated in
Figure 2.1, it splits the available spectrum into four channels separated
by 2.16GHz each. Since operating at high frequencies requires narrows
beams to compensate the high attenuation, the standard integrates
a couple of new extensions. In the following, we highlight the most
critical specifications in IEEE 802.11ad and summarize the antenna
model, frame format, and beam training.
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mcs modulation coding rate sensitivity data rate
1 π/2-BPSK 1/2 −68 dBm 385.0 Mbps
2 π/2-BPSK 1/2 −66 dBm 770.0 Mbps
3 π/2-BPSK 5/8 −65 dBm 962.5 Mbps
4 π/2-BPSK 3/4 −64 dBm 1155.0 Mbps
5 π/2-BPSK 13/16 −62 dBm 1251.3 Mbps
6 π/2-QPSK 1/2 −63 dBm 1540.0 Mbps
7 π/2-QPSK 5/8 −62 dBm 1925.0 Mbps
8 π/2-QPSK 3/4 −61 dBm 2310.0 Mbps
9 π/2-QPSK 13/16 −59 dBm 2502.5 Mbps
10 π/2-16-QAM 1/2 −55 dBm 3080.0 Mbps
11 π/2-16-QAM 5/8 −54 dBm 3850.0 Mbps
12 π/2-16-QAM 3/4 −53 dBm 4620.0 Mbps
Table 2.1: Supported single-carrier modulations and coding schemes in
IEEE 802.11ad [IEE14].
2.2.1 Antenna Model
Operating at high frequencies requires directional antennas that are
Directional antennas
can be steered in
different sectors.
steerable in different directions. IEEE 802.11ad abstracts this aspect
and separates the coverage of an antenna into sectors that cover only a
specific area in one angular direction. Each of these sectors is defined
by a steering direction and a beamwidth. At maximum 128 sectors are
supported. Thus, sectors can be as narrow as 2.8° to achieve 360° cover-
age. Moreover, IEEE 802.11ad introduces quasi-omnidirectional sectors
with beams that exhibit low gain variations over a wide angular range.
Such beams are applied whenever the direction of communication is
unknown. Since omnidirectional communication is inefficient at high
frequencies, at least one of the transceivers should select an antenna
sector with a directional beam.
2.2.2 Frame Format and Modulation Schemes
Communicating over directional links requires new physical layer
IEEE 802.11ad
introduces a new
DMG frame format
for directional
transmissions.
frame formats. The IEEE 802.11ad standard specifies three different Di-
rectional Multi-Gigabit (DMG) frame formats for control, single-carrier,
and low-power transmissions. In the initial version, it specified an
additional frame format for multi-carrier transmissions that mean-
while became obsolete. Only control and single-carrier frames and
mandatory to implement, the low-power mode is optional. Control
frames are used for signaling and apply the most robust Modulation
and Coding Scheme (MCS). Other frames carry an arbitrary payload
and support different data rates. The standard specifies a bandwidth
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Figure 2.2: Mutual beam training in the IEEE 802.11ad sector level sweep
between an initiator and responder.
of 1760MHz and defines different MCS that provide single-carrier
data rates from 385Mbps to 4620Mbps. Table 2.1 summarizes the Single-carrier
transmissions
achieve data rates of
up to 4620Mbps.
supported combinations of modulations and coding rates. Each frame
consists of a preamble, header, data, and an optional training field.
The preamble uses a Short Training Field (STF) for frame detection
and Automatic Gain Control (AGC). An additional Channel Estima-
tion (CE) field enables receivers to estimate the channel and correct
frequency offsets. Both fields are constructed mathematically from
Golay sequences and achieve good auto-correlation characteristics.
The header contains general information such as the used modula-
tion, the data length, and a checksum. It has a length of 64bit for
single-carrier and 40bit for control frames. The data field encodes a
payload with variable length. The training field is used to adapt the
beam configuration during transmission.
2.2.3 Beam Training
The IEEE 802.11ad standard proposes a two-phase beam training ap-
Beam training is
performed with a
sector level sweep
and a beam
refinement.
proach [Nit+14]. First, the sector level sweep determines an initial
coarse-grained antenna sector configuration. Then, the beam refine-
ment phase fine-tunes the selected sectors to obtain a well-aligned
pair of directional beams.
The sector level sweep performs a beam training with predefined
sectors. In obtains the steering direction for the antenna by sweeping
through all available sectors while sending probing frames. The
training is performed mutually between an initiator and responder,
where both either determine their best transmit or receive sectors.
A responder sweep directly follows that of an initiator. The typical
sequential operation is illustrated in Figure 2.2. In the transmit sector
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sweep, as depicted on the left in Figure 2.2, devices send probing
frames on different sectors while the receiver is listening in quasi-The sector level
sweep probes
predefined antenna
sectors.
omnidirectional mode. Each frame is marked with a specific ID such
that the best sector can be identified. During the receive sector sweep,
the transmitter uses a fixed directional beam—the one that performed
best during the transmit sweep—while the receiver sweeps through
different receive sectors as shown on the right in Figure 2.2. The
optimum Signal-to-Noise Ratios (SNRs) and, in case of a transmit
sweep, the IDs of the best sectors are reported to the other device. The
feedback from the initiator is carried in all frames during the responder
sweep, while the responder feedback is only transmitted once in
a specific feedback frame at the end of the sequence. Finally, the
sweep acknowledgment completes the sector training and negotiates
parameters of an additional beam refinement.
The beam refinement phase optimizes the antenna weights and
Beam refinement
continuously adjusts
the antenna
steerings.
fine-tunes the beam alignment between transceivers. This operation
is independent of the sectors mentioned above that have a specific
geometrical shape. Using the training fields specified in the DMG
frame format, devices evaluate alternative beam configurations during
regular data transmission. Doing so, devices continuously adapt their
antenna configuration to compensate for mobility and small chan-
nel distortions. Devices need to change their antenna configuration
rapidly as multiple settings are probed within a single frame. How-
ever, due to the complexity, beam refinement is optional to implement
on standard compliant devices. Most of them only train their transmit
sectors and use a quasi-omnidirectional beam for receiving.
2.2.4 Future Enhancements
For a low number of sectors, the sweep completes in a reasonable
IEEE 802.11ay
introduces several
enhancements for
efficient beam
training and a new
frame format.
amount of time. However, since its complexity increases linearly with
the number of probed sectors, it leads to high overhead in case of
frequent beam sweeping. Current devices keep the number of sectors
low and prefer wide sectors to handle the training overhead. Opti-
mizations are likely to appear as part of the upcoming IEEE 802.11ay
standard [Gha+17]. It introduces several refinements to make beam
training more efficient. Besides a short frame format for fastened
sectors sweeps [EC16], it defines an enhanced-DMG frame format.
Additional extensions cover support for multiple antennas which en-
able directional MIMO over multiple spatial streams. Furthermore,
throughput enhancements are possible by channel bonding that com-
bines the bandwidth of multiple channels for a single transmission.
Besides these advantages, researchers develop novel ideas for beam
management not limited to Wi-Fi networks as described in the next
section.
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2.3 beam management
Optimal algorithms for sector selection and beam maintenance in mm-
wave communication systems are heavily discussed in the research
community. In the following, we present selected approaches for
efficient training and adaptive tracking.
efficient beam training . The simplest beam training method
Hierarchical beam
structures reduce the
training complexity.
is to probe all possible steering combinations which cause a high
overhead. Several protocols and improvements have been proposed
that allow devices to steer their antennas more efficiently. Phased
array antennas that are used in many devices achieve beamforming by
weighting individual antenna elements. Combining the characteristics
of these elements enables new training concepts [KS16]. Junyi Wang
et al. [Jun+09] found that the optimal number of probing beams must
be only twice the number of antenna elements to efficiently estimate
the path direction [Jun+09]. Hierarchical codebook structures of beams
with different beamwidths allow to refine the beam training accuracy
iteratively [Hur+13; Alk+14a; Alk+14b; NZL17; AH16]. For instance, a
hierarchical beam-search [Hur+13] probes sectors with wide beams
first and then continues with sub-sectors of narrower beams. Orga-
nizing beam patterns in a tree hierarchy achieves logarithmic search
complexity. However, it introduces an additional communication over-
head due to the required feedback for each of the multiple probing
rounds.
Compressive sensing based path tracking protocols as proposed
Compressive sensing
approaches derive the
optimal antenna
steering from a few
random probes.
in [MRM16; RVM12a; RVM12b] achieve the same complexity but only
require a single training round. They derive the CSI from magnitude
and phase measurements of pseudo-random probing beams. As phase
information are seldom accessible on practical systems, Rasekh et
al. [Ras+17] propose a variant that only relies on non-coherent signal
strength measurements. Despite lacking phase information, Rasekh
et al.’s approach achieves high accuracy for line-of-sight and direct
reflection paths but cannot distinguish multi-path components.
adaptive beam tracking . Efficient training alone is insufficient
Environmental
changes and mobility
require adaptive
approaches.
to handle mobility and blockage. Adaptive beam maintenance ensures
connectivity in scenarios with changing environmental conditions.
Duan et al. [Dua+15] demonstrate the feasibility of device tracking and
obtain the angle-of-departure and angle-of-arrival of communication
links. Algorithms such as BeamSpy, proposed by Sur et al. [Sur+16],
improve resilience to blockage by instantaneously predicting the avail-
ability of alternative paths. Zhou, Zhang, and Ma [ZZM17] consider
the mobility of devices and correlate channel profiles at nearby lo-
cations to reconstruct the path when devices start to move. Their
proposed protocol continuously realigns the links of mobile devices
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without explicit channel probing. To reduce the risk of disconnections
due to mobility, Haider and Knightly [HK16] adaptively control data-
rates and beamwidths during communications. Their approach allows
to widen the beam and lower the data rate before an outage occurs.
Likewise, Sur et al. [Sur+15] study the possibility of switching to a
wider sector when a blockage is detected to recover a communication
link. In [WZZ17], Wei, Zhou, and Zhang sense the environment and
trace the line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight paths between devices. By
applying common ray tracing techniques, their approach determines
the most significant reflections in the paths. It predicts the quality
of different links and optimizes the deployment of APs. Inserting
additional pilot tones, Araújo et al. [Ara+14] increase the channel esti-
mation accuracy with low overhead. Tracking link directions without
any probing overhead is possible by explicitly generating multi-lobe
beam patterns as shown by Loch et al. [Loc+17]. Their mechanism
detects if devices move out of the beam’s coverage area and adjust
the steering accordingly. The approaches in [An+09; Gen+10] sug-
gest learning mechanisms to detect a suitable non-line-of-sight path
when the direct path is blocked. Sur et al. [Sur+16] instantaneously
predict the signal quality and discover an alternative beam when the
primary link fails. In cases where the receiver is unreachable through
any reflections, an indirect connection could be established through
intermediate devices [Sin+09; YDX15].
assisted beam steering . Beam steering algorithms also benefit
Lower frequency
systems can provide
a coarse steering
direction.
from multi-band connectivity. Wi-Fi connections in the 2.4 and 5GHz
bands can assist mm-wave link adaption [Sur+17]. Angular estima-
tions of the communication direction in lower frequencies already
provide a coarse antenna steering direction for the mm-wave beam
[Nit+15b]. Ali and Heath [AH17] follow a similar approach combined
with compressed sensing techniques to keep track of the optimal beam
steering direction.
multi-antenna systems . In multi-antenna scenarios, additional
Using multiple
antennas with
individual RF-chains
enables spatial
multiplexing.
performance gains are expected. MIMO systems drive multiple an-
tenna arrays with individual Radio Frequency (RF) signals and trans-
mit independently in multiple directions. Hybrid beamforming facil-
itates such scenarios and enables parallel channel measurements to
increase the estimation accuracy. Approaches such as [MG09; SR14;
SR15; Aya+12a; Aya+12b] serve different users at the same time and im-
prove spatial reusability. Structured compressive sensing approaches
such as [GDW16; Gao+16] estimate the wireless channel of massive
MIMO systems with few probes efficiently. Choi [Cho15] choose beams
for multiple users with low interference. Theoretical considerations of
the advantages of compressed sensing in multi-path sparsity have been
formalized by Bajwa et al. [Baj+10]. The coding based beamforming
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scheme from Tsang, Poon, and Addepalli in [TPA11] allows in-packet
training and continuously switches the beams during transmissions.
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, no available device supports
multiple RF-chains or hybrid beamforming in practice.
2.4 security aspects
Typical mm-wave applications implicitly assume that signals only
Despite of high
directionality,
mm-waves expose
the same challenges
as any other wireless
communication
system.
propagate within a bounded area. The spatial propagation effects of
mm-waves make eavesdropping and other attacks more challenging
than in lower frequency bands. The wire-like connections are harder
to intercept than omnidirectional transmissions [Dai+13; KHK17;
Zhu+17; Zhu+16]. An attacker must typically reside in the cover-
age of the beam to infer the transmission. Nevertheless, mm-wave
communication systems operate on a shared medium that guarantees
neither confidentiality, integrity, nor availability. They are exposed
to the same security challenges as any other wireless communication
system.
Lower-layer protection schemes have been proposed to secure mm-
Lower layer
protection schemes
ensure that signals
can only be decoded
at specific locations.
wave communications. With many antennas and different carrier
frequencies, the secrecy rate of transmitted signals can be increased to
impede eavesdropping [Zhu+17; Zhu+16]. Antenna subset modulation
[VLH13; Elt+16] protects mm-wave communications on the physical
layer against attackers at a single position [RGH15]. This approach ran-
domizes the antenna selection and symbol modulation to cause fluctu-
ations in the antenna’s side lobe intensity. While the intended receiver
maintains a constant signal gain, potential eavesdroppers are distorted
by random signal variations and, thereby, prevented from decoding.
Forman and Young [FY10] extract symmetric keys from an mm-wave
channel impulse response. Their experiments show that moving ob-
jects and people in the environment cause significant changes in the
channel which increase the key quality. Unfortunately, none of these
protection schemes protects existing IEEE 802.11ad systems. Applying
common lower-layer protection schemes to mm-wave communications
has a low impact when the antennas are perfectly aligned. Thus,
existing schemes from lower frequencies cannot be directly applied.
Novel mechanisms to protect mm-wave communication based on the
unique propagation characteristics are necessary [Yan+15].
2.5 testbed systems
While millimeter-wave research is well advanced, wide-spread practi-
Many researchers
build their own
evaluation platforms.
cal testbed and evaluation systems are rare. Available IEEE 802.11ad
modules expose a single RF-chain, provide limited control, and only
allow to extract a few low-layer parameters [LBW16; Nit+15a]. As a re-
sult, researchers tend to create evaluation platforms that are equipped
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with directional horn antennas [HK16; Sur+15; HK18; Sur+16] or
custom phased antenna arrays [Ras+17; Zha+16]. Due to the high
amount of hardware customization, such platforms exhibit different
behavior than commercial devices. They typically lack IEEE 802.11ad
compliant implementations and provide limited features. Since most
of these systems are poorly documented, they additionally complicate
the reproducibility of results. Commercial prototyping platforms,
such that used in X60 by Saha et al. [Sah+17], allow evaluating differ-
ent protocols on the lower layers but are hardly affordable for large
deployments.
The firmware that is running in some specific sub-6GHz Wi-Fi mod-
Implementing
custom protocols in
the Wi-Fi firmware is
only possible on
specific chips.
ules can be modified to support custom MAC-layer protocols [Ber+16;
Ber+14; SWH17] or extract the CSI [Hal+11]. Unfortunately, such
approaches require community projects and a detailed understanding
of the wireless chip. Even for common Wi-Fi systems that have been
around for decades, only a few chipsets to date provide accessible
CSI. Manufacturers of commodity Wi-Fi equipment typically keep
their systems closed. As of now, no such access is available for any
IEEE 802.11ad device.
Recent work has shown that some low-layer statistics can be ob-
Recent mm-wave
devices only provide
limited features.
tained from wireless docking stations operating at 60GHz [LBW16;
Nit+15a] but the features are strongly limited. In [Sur+17; WZ17],
the authors perform practical evaluations with commodity routers
and modify the device driver to capture extended statistics. Still, all
works on commodity devices lack encompassing access to low-layer
parameters, which is required to evaluate advanced beam training
protocols.
Part II
F R A M E W O R K
In this part of the thesis, we propose our framework and
methodology to investigate practical aspects of mm-wave
communications. Chapter 3 describes our channel sound-
ing platform and environment simulation for signal prop-
agation analysis. In Chapter 4, we present our practical
testbed evaluation platform that is based on off-the-shelf
IEEE 802.11ad devices with custom software modifications.

3
S I G N A L P R O PA G AT I O N A N A LY S I S
In mm-wave communications, the signal propagation effects funda-
We develop a
channel sounding
platform and a
simulation tool.
mentally differ from those in prevalent wireless communication tech-
nologies at sub-6GHz frequencies. As directional links are required,
reflections and blockage in the environment have a substantial impact
on the received signal quality. To acquire a profound understanding
of these effects in practical setups, we propose our signal propagation
analysis framework that consists of (1) a channel sounding platform
and (2) an environment simulation tool. Our channel sounding plat-
form, described in Section 3.1, allows to transmit arbitrary signals and
to measure the received signal strength with 60GHz transceivers. To
investigate deployments with multiple devices in complex environ-
ments, we propose our simulation tool in Section 3.2. It simulates
wireless communication channels for arbitrary environments and al-
lows to assess the impacts of blockage, reflections, and various antenna
characteristics. In Section 3.3, we describe specific applications such
as signal strength mapping, interfering transmissions, and common
network problems to highlight the benefits of our system. Our channel
sounding platform, as well as our simulations, are used throughout the
contributions of this thesis to obtain an understanding of propagation
effects under specific conditions.
3.1 channel sounding platform
Software-Defined Radios (SDRs) have significant advantages in pro-
SDRs enable rapid
prototyping of
wireless
communications.
totyping wireless communication systems. They typically use Field-
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) that are connected to radio front-
ends to transmit and receive arbitrary signals. The FPGA processes
the digital signal with high reconfigurability and flexibility. SDRs
that use this architecture efficiently allow evaluating custom protocols
and signal processing techniques. For common wireless communica-
tions standards, such as IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n, predefined reference de-
signs [WARP+] exist, which support interoperability with off-the-shelf
devices. Unfortunately, this is not the case for mm-wave communica-
tion systems. Existing solutions such as [Sah+17] are expensive and
limited in configurability. In our mm-wave channel sounding plat- Our channel
sounding platform
brings SDR
capabilities to
mm-wave
communications.
form, we combine the advantages of a wide-spread SDR platform with
commercial 60GHz radio transceivers. We enable the transmission
and the reception of arbitrary waveforms over wireless links at 60GHz
in a well known and easy-to-use SDR environment. Our platform
provides full access to the physical layer and supports adjustable data
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Figure 3.1: Channel sounding platform with 60GHz transceivers and SDRs.
modulation schemes and frame formats. The hardware of our plat-
form is composed of an SDR, commercial 60GHz radio transceivers
and custom interconnections. A typical setup is shown in Figure 3.1.
In the following, we describe the hardware and the operation of our
platform.
3.1.1 Hardware Setup
The hardware components in our platform consist of SDRs, 60GHz
Our platform uses
WARP SDRs and
commercial 60GHz
radio transceivers.
radio transceivers, and custom interconnecting circuits as illustrated
in Figure 3.2. We use a pair of SDRs from the Wireless Open Access
Research Platform (WARP) [WARP] and 60GHz radio transceivers
from the Pasternack/VubIQ 60GHz development system [Pas]. To
match the Input/Output (I/O) specifications of both systems, addi-
tional circuits filter and amplify the baseband signal. MATLAB scripts
generate the transmitted and process the received signals. The detailed
architecture and assembly of the components in our channel sounding
platform is described as follows.
warp sdr . WARP [WARP] is an SDR platform for rapid prototyping
WARP SDRs process
raw IQ samples of
analog baseband
signals.
of wireless communication systems, developed at RICE University in
Houston and maintained and distributed by Mango Communications,
Inc. It provides excellent benefits for research on wireless communica-
tion systems in the 2.4GHz and 5.0GHz bands with direct access to
the physical layer of the communication stack. Thereby, it allows gen-
erating arbitrary signals and to raw sample processing. Samples are
represented by complex numbers with In-phase and Quadrature (IQ)
components. A WARP SDR instantiates each transceiver in our system.
To adapt the WARP to the 60GHz band, we use extension boards1 with
Digital-to-Analog (D/A) and Analog-to-Digital (A/D) converters to
provide in- and outputs for analog baseband signals. Moreover, we
utilize the WARPLab framework that enables direct interaction and
control of the WARP SDR from a single MATLAB instance via Ethernet.
1 The WARP Analog Board v1.1 with baseband in- and outputs is available at https:
//warpproject.org/trac/wiki/HardwareUsersGuides/AnalogBoard_v1.1.
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Figure 3.2: Hardware setup showing the interconnection of WARP SDRs and
mm-wave transceivers.
WARPLab is a pre-configured firmware image that runs on the FPGA
for buffered sample processing. A MATLAB script creates a single
carrier signal, transfers it into the buffers of the transmitting SDR, and
triggers the transmission. Other transceivers store the received signals
in their buffers, such that they can be processed in off-line analyses.
Since WARP is designed for common Wi-Fi systems, it samples the
signal at 40MHz, which is sufficient for basic encodings and channel
sounding at 60GHz as well.
radio transceivers . The Pasternack/VubIQ 60GHz develop-
The radio
transceivers use horn
antennas with
different beam
widths.
ment system consists of a transmitter and a receiver with exchangeable
horn antennas and baseband I/O connectors. They internally convert
the baseband signal to an Intermediate Frequency (IF) first and then
to a Radio Frequency (RF) in the 60GHz band. All mixers for the sig-
nal conversion can be configured to use an internal or external clock
source. Waveguide connectors allow mounting external horn antennas,
which are available with different beam widths. Additional amplifiers,
attenuators, and filters enable fine-grained control of the analog signal
processing chain. Throughout our experiments, we use the horn an-
tenna with the narrowest available beamwidth of seven degrees and
share the clock signal among both transceivers. To mechanically steer
the signal, we mount the transmitter on an electronically controllable
rotation-head. This setup enables us to orient the transmitting antenna
into particular directions and investigate the impacts of antenna mis-
alignment. Unfortunately, the I/O specifications of the transceivers do
not match those of the WARP and vice versa. Thus, additional signal
adjustments are required.
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Figure 3.3: Average SNR and BER with our channel sounding platform using
BPSK and QAM encodings and a 7° antenna. The transceivers
are placed at 2m distance while the transmitter takes different
orientations.
interconnections . The output signals of the WARP are biased
Signal adjustments
are required to match
the I/O
specifications.
and more powerful than the input specifications of the 60GHz radio
transceivers allow. By adjusting the signal levels, we protect the hard-
ware and optimally use the dynamic range. At the transmitter side,
our adjustments convert the single-ended output of the WARP to a
differential signal and attenuate the magnitude. At the receiver, the
signal is amplified again to obtain the maximum resolution at the
WARP’s A/D converters. An additional low-pass filter suppresses mir-
ror frequencies and prevents aliasing effects. For all these adjustments,
we utilize common differential operational amplifiers (‘op-amps’) and
passive electronic components mounted on custom circuit boards. Do-
ing so, we achieve interoperability between the radio transceivers and
the WARP and, thus, create our mm-wave SDR for channel sounding
and signal propagation analysis.
3.1.2 Platform Operation
Our implementation incorporates basic data encoding and decoding.
Our implementation
uses single-carrier
transmissions with
BPSK and QAM
encodings.
It supports single-carrier transmissions with Binary Phase-Shift Key-
ing (BPSK) or Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM). Transmitted
frames contain a pre-known BPSK encoded preamble for delay detec-
tion and channel equalization. Receivers compute a signal strength
indicator from the received preamble and determine the Bit Error Rate
(BER) by decoding all data symbols in the frame. Figure 3.3 shows
the achievable Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and BER as experimentally
obtained by placing the transceivers 2m apart. In this setup, we first
measured the noise floor at the receiver while keeping the transmitter
disabled. The presented SNR is the received signal strength relative to
this reference. While rotating the transmitter, we track the SNR during
the transmission. Under perfect antenna alignment, our platform
provides an SNR of 23.3 dB. The shape of the measurements visualizes
the directionality of the transmitted signal and matches the stated
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characteristics of the horn antenna with a beamwidth of about seven
degrees. Evaluating the transmitted data, we obtain a BER of 0.002
for BPSK encoding. With 4-QAM and 16-QAM the BERs increase to
0.044 and 0.171, respectively. In all encodings, impairments occur for
alignment offsets larger than ten degrees. High phase-noise in the
transceivers limit the data rates, such that the BERs do not match the
beamwidth and saturate at the values stated above. Nevertheless, our
setup is suitable for channel sounding of a single link and allows
to investigate the propagation effects with reflections and blockage.
Simultaneous transmissions between multiple devices and complex
environment are considered by our simulation in the next section.
3.2 environment simulation
Using ideal horn antennas, our channel sounding platform, described
Channel sounding is
inappropriate to
analyze complex
environments.
in the previous section, provides highly directional mm-wave trans-
missions. Signals are steered directly to their destination with low
overshoot and enable communication. However, using a channel
sounding platform to analyze challenging scenarios is inappropriate.
Practical environments expose many different link characteristics that
are infeasible to measure one-by-one.
Comprehensive propagation models are required to assess the prac-
High directionality
requires precise
propagation models.
ticality of mm-wave communication in arbitrary setups. The statistical
channel model of Maltsev [Mal10] provides a foundation to investigate
mm-waves propagation according to the IEEE 802.11ad specifications.
It predicts statistical channels between two nodes in well-defined se-
tups, such as a conference or living room, but have shortcomings
in complex environments with distinct reflections and blockage. It
neither handles specific obstacles nor considers multiple transceivers,
which are crucial for most applications. Hence, we need better models
to predict mm-wave propagation in such environments and dense
networks. Ray tracing techniques can handle multiple transceivers
as well as obstacles easily. Indoor channels strongly depend on the
precise layout of the environment [Nee+07]. This issue becomes es-
pecially critical for signals with short wavelengths, which reflect on
most surfaces and behave quasi-optically [XKR02]. Even though effi-
cient techniques exist [PKF07], no practical mm-wave ray tracing tool
that focuses on different antenna settings and multiple transceivers is
available to date.
In the following, we propose mmTrace, an mm-wave ray trac-
We simulate the
signal propagation
with reflecting and
blocking obstacles.
ing simulation tool implemented in MATLAB. Simulations with mm-
Trace predict the Channel Impulse Response (CIR) between multiple
transceivers in line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight scenarios. By ap-
plying the image-based ray tracing approach with different antenna
configurations, mmTrace enables the analysis of interference and
location-dependent signal characteristics. It supports a variable num-
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Figure 3.4: Simulation scenarios with multiple transmitters or receivers.
ber of reflecting and blocking obstacles in various two-dimensional
environments. Modeling interfering signals, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.4a, becomes a simple addition of two signals. Similarities and
differences between two receivers that overhear the same signal on
independent paths, as sketched in Figure 3.4b, are also measurable.
As the effects in such situations highly depend on the antenna ori-
entation and environment, they cannot be obtained from statistics.
With mmTrace, we achieve a precision to predict the signal strength
and delay spread comparable to that of common statistical models.
Additionally, it adapts to various environments and handles multiple
transceivers in parallel.
The simulation of the channel effects in mmTrace is separated into
mmTrace traces the
paths between
transceivers, derives
channel models, and
characterizes the
channels.
three stages. First, mmTrace traces the paths between all transceivers
in the environment by applying image-based ray tracing. Second,
it models the channel for individual paths between the transceivers
by taking into account the antenna gain, reflection coefficients, and
path attenuation. The third stage, finally, characterizes the derived
channel and determines the CIR, and Power Delay Profile (PDP). This
independent processing allows for comparison of intermediate results
with other models. In the following, we describe the processing stages
in detail and validate our approach by comparing our results with
those of an existing statistical model.
3.2.1 Image-based Ray Tracing
Including image-based ray tracing, mmTrace determines the multi-
Paths are determined
by projecting the
transceivers’
locations in
reflecting surfaces.
path channels between transceivers over multiple reflections. Due to
computing direct paths over projections, the image-based ray trac-
ing approach is more efficient than the usually known Shooting and
Bouncing Rays (SBR) technique. It considers the position, orientation,
and antenna characteristics of transceivers placed in a two-dimensional
environment with reflecting and blocking obstacles. Figure 3.5 exem-
plary considers two transceivers TX and RX, and two reflecting walls
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Figure 3.5: Derived paths between a transmitter (TX) and receiver (RX) with
image-based ray tracing.
represented by the edges e1 and e2. After finding the first order im-
ages RX’1 and RX’1 of RX in e1 and e2, we determine the second-order
image of RX’1 in e2 resulting in RX”. The paths are constructed using
edge intersections towards the images. Paths that miss the reflecting
edge are ignored. In doing so, the image-based approach obtains the
first order reflection paths p2 and p3, and the second-order reflection
path p4 in addition to the line-of-sight path p1. In mmTrace this is Signal paths are
reconstructed
geometrically.
recursively implemented. Polygons represent the walls and obstacles
in the room as a set of reflecting edges. In each recursion step, our
implementation filters valid reflectors that are not entirely blocked to
decrease the computation time. Thus, mmTrace constructs the paths
between two transceivers as a pure geometrical problem.
3.2.2 Channel Modeling
The channel representation is obtained by assigning each path a com-
Channels are affected
by antenna gains,
reflections, and
attenuations.
plex amplitude and delay based on the environmental properties.
mmTrace computes the delay as τ = d/c0, where d is the length of the
complete path and c0 the speed of light. The complex amplitude hk
of path k is compound from multiple properties: (1) the antenna gain
of the transmitter and the receiver, (2) the reflection coefficients for all
reflections on the path, and (3) the attenuation due to the length of the
path. In the following, we describe these properties in detail.
antenna gains Antenna radiation patterns describe the gains of
a signal that radiates in particular directions. mmTrace implements We implement
directional and side
lobe affected antenna
patterns.
the three different radiation patterns shown in Figure 3.6a: (1) an omni-
directional pattern, (2) a directional pattern, and (3) a side lobe pattern.
The omnidirectional pattern with a constant gain in all directions is
the simplest model and typically applied in lower frequency systems.
The directional pattern steers the radiation in a particular direction to
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Figure 3.6: Radiation patterns implemented in mmTrace.
achieve a very high gain. We implement this as specified by Maslen-
nikov and Lomayev [ML10] in dependency of the beamwidth. Further,
mmTrace models the maximum gain according to Maltsev [Mal10].
This approach leads to varying gains with different directionality as
illustrated in Figure 3.6b. The side lobe pattern describes an exem-
plary, non-ideal antenna that exposes a main lobe in the indented
direction, a back lobe in the opposite direction, and several side lobes
in other directions. We integrate this as the sum of multiple direc-
tional radiation patterns with random strength and angular offset.
To be independent of specific antenna models, mmTrace additionally
supports the integration of custom radiation patterns such as those
obtained from physical measurements.
reflection coefficients . Assuming that each object has a
Reflections are
characterized by the
angle-of-incidence
and the reflectors
permittivity.
constant permittivity, we compute reflections using Fresnel’s equa-
tions [Bas+09] as a function of the permittivity and the angle-of-
incidence. The reflection coefficient is the product of the phase shifts
and attenuations that affect the signal through all reflections on a path.
As Peter, Keusgen, and Felbecker [PKF07] already revealed, making
realistic model assumptions and characterizing reflections on partic-
ular surfaces is challenging. Providing realistic models that exactly
match physical environments is beyond the scope of this work. We
propose mmTrace as a framework that supports different reflection
characteristics with arbitrary permittivity.
path attenuation. Besides the effects of antenna radiation and
Attenuation is
considered as path
loss in the open
space.
reflection loss, signals are affected by attenuation and phase shift
while propagating through the open space. This attenuation can
be described by the Free-Space Path Loss (FSPL). It defines the gain
of a received signal dependent on the propagating distance d, and
wavelength λ. The phase shift is considered as a rotation of the signal
by d/λ in the complex plane.
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3.2.3 Channel Characterization
From the channel representation in the previous stage, we extract
A channel is
described by its CIR,
PDP, and delay.
metrics that describe different characteristics of the channel shown in
Table 3.1. In particular, we derive the CIR, which is the most common
model to describe channel effects in the time domain. It is the sum of
Dirac impulses, representing the delay, and power of all multi-path
components. The PDP is the squared CIR magnitude and describes
the distribution of the channel power over time. The mean delay
describes the average time of arrival of the earliest significant multi-
path component, while the Root Mean Square (RMS) delay spread
expresses its variation. The cumulative channel power is the sum of
the channel powers of all multi-path components.
3.2.4 Model Validation
To validate our ray tracing based propagation model and ensure that
We validate mmTrace
in well-defined
conference and living
room environments.
our simulations are correct, we compare simulated channels with
those obtained from an existing statistical model. For the latter, we
use the MATLAB implementation [ML10] from Maslennikov and Lo-
mayev of Maltsev’s statistical model [Mal10]. By neglecting reflections
on the floor and ceiling, this model adapts to our two-dimensional
environment. We rebuild the empty 4.5m× 3.0m conference room
and the 7.0m× 7.0m living room environments from this model in
our simulation. In the conference room, transceivers are located ran-
domly on a 2.5m× 1.0m table in the center with a distance of 2m.
The living room represents a typical scenario for wireless entertain-
ment systems, as the receiver is located close to the middle of one
wall—a common place for a TV screen. The transmitter takes an
arbitrary location, 4m away from the receiver. To characterize wall
reflections, we use the permittivity of 2.26− 2.4je-4 as experimentally
channel characteristic mathematical expression
Channel Impulse Response (CIR): h (τ) =
K∑
k=1
hkδ(τ− τk)
Power Delay Profile (PDP): p(τ) = |h (τ) |2
mean delay: τ¯ =
∑K
k=1 |hk|
2τk∑K
k=1 |hk|
2
RMS delay spread: τrms =
√∑K
k=1(τk− ¯tau)
2|hk|
2∑K
k=1 |hk|
2
cumulative channel power: P =
∑K
k=1 |hk|
2
Table 3.1: Applied metrics for channel characterization.
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Figure 3.7: Simulated power delay profiles with mmTrace and the statistical
model in the conference room scenario at 10 random positions.
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of the RSS in dependency of the order of reflections.
determined by Lu et al. [Lu+14]. All antennas use the directional
radiation pattern with a beamwidth of 60° or 20° and take 64 different
orientations. In the conference room, we distinguish between line-of-
sight and non-line-of-sight scenarios. All simulations are repeated
1000 times and provide the median and 95% confidence intervals. By
characterizing the channels obtained from both, the statistical model
and mmTrace, we validate the feasibility of ray tracing for mm-wave
channel modeling in the following.
power distribution. First, we investigate the power distribution
The statistical model
exposes smoother
impulse due to
scattering effects.
in the conference room scenario with antennas of both transceivers
directly oriented towards each other. In this setup, we simulate the
CIRs and extract the PDPs shown in Figure 3.7. At first sight, both
results significantly differ. Only the high power peak without delay
perfectly matches. For higher delays, the CIR of mmTrace exhibits
only single impulses that correspond to specific reflection paths. The
statistical model has smoother impulses which come from clustering
effects and scattering that is not encountered in mmTrace. Especially
the paths with 30ns delay show that mmTrace predicts the intensity
of channel paths similarly to the statistical models.
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Figure 3.9: Channel characteristics with rotating transmitters in the con-
ference room scenario with line-of-sight paths and different
beamwidths. The shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence
intervals as obtained in 1000 simulations.
Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of received power over the reflec-
mmTrace considers
fourth order
reflections by default.
tion order in mmTrace. In line-of-sight scenarios (Figure 3.8a), more
than 99% of the received power comes over the direct path. Reflections
take a minor part in the power contribution. In non-line-of-sight sce-
narios (Figure 3.8b), multi-order reflections obtain increased relevance.
First order reflections provide 79% of the received power, while 17%
come over second-order reflections. Reflection paths with a higher
order than four barely contribute to the received power. While the sta-
tistical model considers up to two reflections, we limit the maximum
number of reflections to four in the default configuration.
feasibility. Analyzing the conference room scenario with line-of-
The cumulative
channel powers
perfectly matches.
sight path and a beamwidth of 60° as shown in Figure 3.9a confirms
the feasibility of mmTrace. The cumulative channel power perfectly
matches within the half-power beamwidth. Only for misaligned anten-
nas, the statistical model exposes slightly higher confidence intervals.
Instead of statistical probabilities, we use distinct path characteristics
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Figure 3.10: Channel characteristics with rotating transmitters in the confer-
ence and living room scenario with line-of-sight and non-line-of-
sight paths and a beamwidth of 60°. The shaded areas indicate
the 95% confidence intervals as obtained in 1000 simulations.
that lead to these observations in all experiments. Moreover, we ob-
serve a lower bound for the received signal strength that is caused
by a constant side lobe level in the applied radiation pattern. The
mean delay and RMS delay spread also match within the beamwidth.
For small misalignments, mmTrace slightly underestimates the delay.
When the transmitter orientates its antenna to the opposite direction, it
approximates the statistical model again. Nevertheless, the differences
are marginal.
Narrowing the beamwidth to 20°, as shown in Figure 3.9b, mainly
Narrow beamwidths
decrease the mean
delay and delay
spread.
decreases the mean delay and the delay spread in both models. Only
for a strong misalignment, a high delay remains recognizable. In
this situation, mmTrace slightly overestimates the parameters, but the
median still falls into the statistical model’s confidence intervals.
blockage . In non-line-of-sight scenarios, where the direct path is
blocked, we obtain the results shown in Figure 3.10a for a beamwidth
of 60°. The channel power is significantly lower than in line-of-sight
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scenarios and remains almost independent from the antenna orien-
tation. While the statistical model provides smooth transitions of all We identify power
peaks for distinct
reflection paths.
three parameters, our results exhibit narrow power peaks that corre-
spond to the concrete reflection paths. For antenna misalignments,
mmTrace predicts a lower mean delay and delay spread. With aligned
antennas, both parameters significantly grow, which is not observable
for the statistical model. Only the delay spread exceeds the confidence
intervals of the statistical model.
increased distances . With increased distances, as in the living
mmTraces achieves
similar results than
the statistical model.
room scenario, we identify significantly higher delays than in the
conference room scenario as shown in Figure 3.10b for a beamwidth of
60° and line-of-sight paths. This effect comes from the longer reflection
distances. Due to the receivers position and the larger room, similarly
powered reflections arrive from multiple directions that contribute to a
higher delay. In summary, these validation results show that mmTrace
successfully adapts to the situation: channel power, mean delay, and
RMS delay spread are very close to the statistical channel model.
3.3 application scenarios
In the previous section, we validate mmTrace in comparison to the
We exemplary
analyze specific
application
scenarios.
statistical approach and demonstrate comparable results with only a
few discrepancies. Next, we focus on the advantages of mmTrace and
exemplary present specific application scenarios that are impossible to
investigate with statistical channel models. After describing our simu-
lation environment, we map the achievable signal strength at different
positions in a room and consider multiple interfering transceivers.
Finally, we discuss the impact of common network challenges on
mm-wave communications.
3.3.1 Simulation Environment
The environment of our following simulations comprises a room of
Simulations consider
a typical indoor
environment.
size 5.0m× 3.0m with a blocking and reflecting wooden obstacle. We
use the permittivities taken from Lu et al. [Lu+14] of 2.26− 0.24je-3
for concrete walls and 2.8− 4je-2 for wooden objects. Two transmitters
are placed and oriented in parallel to cause interferences. Received
signals are obtained on a grid throughout the room. Unless noted
otherwise, all antennas use the directional radiation pattern with a
beamwidth of 60°. In total, the simulations cover 540 locations with
64 different antenna orientations. All receivers are assumed to flexibly
adjust their antenna orientation and steer it for optimal results. We
analyze the signal reception as well as the interference with ideal and
more realistic side lobe antenna patterns.
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Figure 3.11: Signal strength with ideal radiation patterns and a beamwidth
of 60°.
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(b) patterns with custom sidelobes
Figure 3.12: Interference of two transmissions with ideal and sidelobe af-
fected radiation patterns.
3.3.2 Signal Strength Mapping
Figure 3.11a shows the map of reception capabilities with optimal
mmTrace maps the
received signal
strength throughout
the environment.
antenna alignment for the first transmitter which is marked in red.
The background color indicates the achievable signal strength while
the arrows indicate the optimal antenna orientation. At all positions
roughly inside the signal beam, receivers directly steer their antennas
towards the transmitter. At locations behind the blocking objects or
far out of the beam, they are oriented towards the first-order reflec-
tions. We identify very sharp transitions between certain areas, at
which small distances between the receivers lead to entirely different
orientations. A small location offset can have a significant impact on
the channel.
3.3.3 Interfering Transmissions
For the second transmitter, we observe a similar situation shown in
The impacts of
interference are
location dependent.
Figure 3.11b. Only the shadow region moves to the other side of the
obstacle. The signal of this transmitter represents the interference. The
Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) calculates as sir = PTX1/PTX2, where
PTX1 and PTX2 are the received signal strengths from both transmitters
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(a) hidden node problem
(b) concurrent transmissions (c) nomadic eavesdropping
Figure 3.13: Illustration of network scenarios with multiple transmitters and
receivers.
respectively. The SIRs in optimal antenna orientation are shown in
Figure 3.12a. Receivers aim at steering their antennas towards the first
transmitter but away from the second one. Even some receivers in
line-of-sight of the first transmitter misalign their antennas to suppress
the interference. The optimal orientation might change from the non-
interfering scenario. Receivers are affected differently: some regions
still exhibit a suitable signal quality while receivers at others get
strongly distorted.
So far, we only considered the ideal directional radiation pattern
Interference with
antenna side lobes
leads to unexpected
steering directions.
with a single lobe. The side lobe pattern defined in Section 3.2.2 leads
to different signal strength mappings. In the interference scenario in
Figure 3.12b receivers not only try to steer their main lobe towards
the first transmitter; they also aim at keeping away their side lobes
from the interfering signal. This can have interesting effects even
on the receivers behind the object that blocks the interfering signal:
receivers tend to orientate their antenna completely away from the
transmitter to overcome interference in the side lobes. In the shadow
region, antenna orientations appear random. This shows that in case
of interference, antenna orientations for best SIR do not necessarily
correspond to the line-of-sight direction even though a direct path
exists. We revisit this scenario in Chapter 6 and propose an adaptive
beam switching mechanism to mitigate interference in antenna side
lobes.
3.3.4 Network Scenarios
To demonstrate the possibilities of mmTrace, we consider three well-
known problems of wireless networks and analyze their impact. In
particular, these are (1) the hidden node problem with two transmit-
ters that cause interference at a single receiver, (2) the problem of
concurrent transmissions, where multiple transceiver pairs distort
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each other, and (3) the threat of nomadic eavesdroppers that aim to
overhear transmissions from arbitrary positions. Figure 3.13 illustratesFinding the optimal
antenna alignment
can be challenging.
these scenarios. Simulations with mmTrace show that the hidden
node problem becomes superficial for narrow beams and perpendic-
ular node arrangement. Concurrent transmissions lead to various
interference levels and only appear manageable with low beamwidth.
The success of nomadic eavesdropping depends on the environment
and antenna settings but generally becomes more challenging than
in conventional wireless networks. Detailed simulation results un-
der angular alignment dependencies in these network scenarios are
provided in [SCH16a]. Our findings empathize the advantages of
mm-wave communications but also outline the challenges in finding
optimal antenna alignment, which is vital for reliable and efficient
communication.
3.4 discussion and summary
Predicting mm-wave network behavior is challenging as propagation
Channel sounding
allows for analyzing
reflections and
blockage.
effects are different to those of conventional wireless networks. We
propose a signal propagation analysis framework that consists of a
channel sounding platform and an environment simulation tool. Our
channel sounding platform combines the advantages of SDRs with
mm-wave transceivers. It operates in the 60GHz band and enables
to transmit arbitrary signals with modulations of up to 4-QAM. In
typical indoor scenarios transmissions with low error rates are possi-
ble. This efficiently allows investigating reflections and blockage on
single communication links. In larger deployments, statistical channelSimulations reveal
environment and
location specific
propagation effects.
models are the state-of-the-art to predict propagation effect. However,
they reach their limits when dealing with highly directional communi-
cation. Steerable antennas and distinct reflections on environmental
objects lead to significant channel variations. Such properties that
were negligible for omnidirectional communications take an essential
role for mm-waves. At high frequencies, ray tracing is suitable to
predict the signal propagation. We present an analysis tool that uses
image-based ray tracing to simulate channel properties for specific
antennas and environments with multiple transceivers. Validation re-
sults reveal only low discrepancies with existing statistical models and
demonstrate that our simulation provides a valuable benefit for situa-
tions in which channel sounding is inappropriate. It allows adapting
to different physical scenarios and considers multiple transmissions
in parallel.
The channel sounding platform proposed in this chapter is applied
to measure the signal propagation with environmental reflections in
Chapter 8. Additionally, our simulations provide a foundation to
understand specific propagation effects. They motivated our investi-
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gation of interference in antenna side lobes in Chapter 6 and nomadic
eavesdropping in Chapter 8. The evaluations in [Che+17; ZGP18;
Loc+17] use our framework as well. To support the community and
allow others to benefit from our work, we release the source code
of our environment simulation tool on our public project page2 (see
Section A.5).
2 The source code of mmTrace, our environment simulation tools, is available at:
https://github.com/seemoo-lab/mmTrace
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T E S T B E D E X P E R I M E N TAT I O N
Our previously presented channel sounding platform and simulation
Our testbed system
consists of common
off-the-shelf
IEEE 802.11ad
devices.
environment for signal propagation analysis allow understanding how
signals traverse environments and identifying the limitations of mm-
wave signal propagation. This toolset is beneficial for propagation
analytics but cannot evaluate the performance of mm-wave networks
in practical scenarios with high-speed data transmission. Until now,
no suitable mm-wave research platform exists that fully comply with
the IEEE 802.11ad standard. In this section, we present our testbed
experimentation framework which enables practical evaluations on
off-the-shelf IEEE 802.11ad devices with high configurability. Our
framework provides full access to the devices’ operating system and
their wireless interface drivers. By patching the firmware that is Custom software
modifications provide
high configurability.
running on the IEEE 802.11ad Wi-Fi chip, we obtain control over the
beam training and antenna steering properties. Without any hardware
modifications, we turn cheap consumer-grade devices into alternatives
to expensive mm-wave evaluation systems.
In the following, we describe the platform architecture in Section 4.1.
Section 4.2 details how we achieve accessibility to internal operations.
Advanced antenna control is covered in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 de-
scribes the automation of large-scale experiments. Finally, we summa-
rize the features and application of our testbed platform in Section 4.5.
4.1 platform architecture
Currently, only a few off-the-shelf devices support IEEE 802.11ad. One
The Talon AD7200
features a phased
antenna array and
IEEE 802.11ad
compatibility.
of these is TP-Links Talon AD7200 tri-band router that contains a
Qualcomm QCA9500 60GHz Wi-Fi module, depicted in Figure 4.1.
The QCA9500 features a chip for baseband processing and is connected
Phased antenna array
with 32 elements 
Figure 4.1: Talon AD7200 tri-band router with a 32-element antenna array.
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to an external phased antenna array. It achieves beam steering by
individually adjusting the signal on each antenna element in the array.
According to IEEE 802.11ad, the 60GHz Wi-Fi interface supports single
carrier modulations with up-to 16-QAM and achieves a theoretical data
rate of 4620Mbps. With about $250, the hardware of this platform is
significantly cheaper than any other mm-wave evaluation system.
Unfortunately, the full control over the hardware’s capabilities is
Firmware
modifications provide
control over the
beam training and
allow implementing
custom beam
patterns.
encapsulated in the closed source firmware. Manufacturers typically
distribute their Wi-Fi interface as black-boxes with limited access to the
internal operations. We replace the router’s vendor-supplied operat-
ing system with a Linux based OpenWrt variant and patch additional
features directly into the binary firmware that runs on the Wi-Fi chip.
Thus, we open the platform for testbed driven experiments and make
the full potential of the hardware accessible to researchers. Adopting
the Nexmon firmware patching framework from Schulz, Wegemer,
and Hollick [SWH17] to the architecture of the QCA9500 Wi-Fi chip
allows extending the beam training and adjusting internal configura-
tions with custom patches written in C. Besides, we obtain control over
the phase and gain adjustments of the antenna array which enables us
to implement arbitrary beam shapes and instant switching between
them during runtime. To automate research experiments and mea-
surements in large deployments, we develop an automation system
that controls devices over the network via simple Python scripts.
Our testbed experimentation framework consists of the following
mutable components:
• an OpenWrt system image for the Talon AD7200,
• a modified QCA9500 firmware with beam training control,
• an extended interface driver to handle the modifications, and
• an experiment automation system to handle large deployments.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the application of these components. All compo-
Our testbed platform
consists of multiple
components.
nents in our framework are independent of each other, can be easily
ported to other architectures, and address various purposes. For ex-
ample, the customized Wi-Fi firmware also runs in other devices than
the Talon AD7200 that incorporate a QCA9500 chip. We provide our
reconfigurable tools as open-source software to enable the integration
of additional features. The build-chain for the OpenWrt system can
fetch and install additional software packages. The adapted Nexmon
framework for the QCA9500 architecture facilitates various customiza-
tions of the firmware that are not limited to the beam training access
as done in our work. It allows other researchers to build upon our
work and further improve the device’s MAC and PHY mechanisms.
In the following, we reveal how we achieved the open-access to the
closed-source software components.
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Figure 4.2: Components of our testbed experimentation platform.
4.2 software modifications
To make the full potential of the Talon AD7200 accessible, we first
Software
modifications make
the full potential of
the hardware
accessible.
open up the router’s operating system to control the wireless interface.
To bypass the limitations of this interface in the operating system
and obtain direct access to the internal operations on the Wi-Fi chip,
we jailbreak the proprietary Wi-Fi firmware. Doing so, we integrate
binary firmware patches that interface the beam training and extract
the signal strength measurements of individual beam patterns. Next,
we outline our detailed approach to achieve this accessibility.
4.2.1 Open System Access
The router’s system image shipped with the Talon AD7200 allows very
Porting OpenWrt to
the specific hardware
architecture provides
open access to the
operating system.
little access to the 60GHz interface. Configuration is only possible via
a web interface, and modifications are limited to basic parameters for
the Access Point (AP) mode. An open-source operating system with
full root access to the device gives us more control over the system and,
especially, over the 60GHz interface. Thus, we replace the router’s
vendor-supplied system image with a Linux based OpenWrt [Open-
Wrt] variant. Unfortunately, the hardware architecture of the Talon
AD7200 is not supported in the official OpenWrt version. Therefore,
we reconstruct the device tree definition, which specifies the com-
ponents of the Talon hardware including the CPU, memory layout,
buses, and peripherals. To gather the required information, we enable
the serial console on one of our devices by adding a solder bridge
between the serial pins and the connection to the main System-on-a-
Chip (SoC). Reading the logged information of the bootloader on the
serial output, we reconstruct the memory layout as well as the image
file format. Fortunately, the Talon AD7200 uses hardware components
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similar to those in an Archer C2600, which is already supported by
LEDE, a fork of OpenWrt. Consequently, we use this architecture as
a reference and adjust the parameters for the specific memory seg-
mentation, I/O pin-configuration, and Ethernet interfaces. As the
60GHz interface is not present in the Archer C2600, we additionally
integrate the latest wil6210 driver of the Linux Kernel for communi-
cating with the QCA9500 chip. The QCA9500 is accessible on the PCI
Express bus, whose controller requires additional adjustments to be
handled correctly under load.
Enabling the IEEE 802.11ad Wi-Fi interface requires the wil6210
The wil6210 driver
and binary firmware
files are required to
enable the interface.
driver to load the firmware on the QCA9500 chip. This firmware
must be present in the local file system and consists of two binary files,
“wil6210.fw” and “wil6210.brd”. The former contains the code and data
partitions, whereas the latter carries device-specific configuration and
calibration data. For this work, we initially used firmware files ex-
tracted from the Windows driver for Acer TravelMate Notebooks that
also contain the QCA9500 chip. These firmware files are labeled with
the version number “3.3.3.7759”. After Qualcomm officially released
the firmware binaries in the public linux-firmware repository [LFW] in
May 2017, we switched to this variant with the version label “4.1.0.55”
that incorporates various stability and feature improvements.
In full control over the operating system and having access the
The interface
supports the AP,
station, and monitor
mode.
QCA9500 chip via the wil6210 driver, we establish IEEE 802.11ad con-
nections as any other Wi-Fi link. The embedded Linux supports
operating the interface in AP, station, and monitor mode. To achieve
control of the internal IEEE 802.11ad operations requires firmware
modifications which are described in the following.
4.2.2 Firmware Extensions
The Linux system uses the wil6210 driver to control the IEEE 802.11ad
The firmware does
not allow to control
the beam training by
default.
Wi-Fi interface and access the QCA9500 chip. It implements a Wireless
Module Interface (WMI) and sends specific WMI commands to the
chip which, in turn, responds with corresponding WMI events. All
commands and events carry a specific identifier. The driver uses the
WMI to control the interface and request connection statistics. For
example, it sends specific WMI commands to change the operation
mode, set the channel frequency, and scan for APs in range. Moreover,
the wil6210 driver creates auxiliary files in the Linux debug file system
that amongst others provide raw memory access and obtain detailed
statistics on established connections. These debug interfaces also allow
to read the selected sector but still cannot control the beam training.
To control the beam training and access other internal features,
We adopt the
Nexmon firmware
patching framework.
we extend the operation of the Wi-Fi chip. Full control over all
IEEE 802.11ad operations and the frame processing is encapsulated in
the proprietary firmware running on the QCA9500 baseband chip. This
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Figure 4.3: Memory layout of the QCA9500 IEEE 802.11ad Wi-Fi chip with two
ARC600 processors (ucode and firmware) that have separate write-
protected code and writable data memories at low addresses.
chip consists of two ARC600 processor cores for real-time (ucode pro-
cessor) and other operations (firmware processor), as well as a shared
memory. Using the Nexmon firmware patching framework [SWH17],
we modify the firmware running on both processors and integrate
custom features. The Nexmon framework enables writing binary
patches in C instead of an assembly language which eases the patch
development. By providing new attributes and pragmas as a GNU
Compiler Collection (GCC) plugin, it defines where functions and
variables should be placed in the patched firmware. We place patches
in the unused memory of the firmware and redirect specific branch
instructions to invoke our patches that jump back to the original code
after execution. We extend the Nexmon framework for interoperability
with the ARC600 instruction set and processor peculiarities. Using The chip contains
two processors with
independent memory
regions.
ARC600 processors complicates the patch creation because they con-
tain separate read-only code and writable data regions (see Figure 4.3),
while Nexmon assumes that the whole patched memory is writable.
Fortunately, the code memory is also accessible at different addresses.
With an additional address offset the code regions are writable and
can be used to place patches.
Before writing patches, we first have to understand how the original
Understanding the
firmware operations
is required to develop
custom extensions.
firmware works to identify the parts handling the information we
want to extract and modify. Without any source code and function
name strings in this firmware, this was a very tedious process. We
started our analysis on firmware version “3.3.3.7759” and later ported
our findings to the firmware versions available in the public Linux-
firmware repository. After obtaining a rudimentary understanding of
the firmware operations, we hooked the initialization methods of both
processors and implemented a printf function that writes arbitrary
strings and values into a ring buffer. In the debug file system of
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Figure 4.4: Responder sector level sweep with firmware extensions to access
the received signal strength and select custom sectors from user
space. White boxes indicate the extended functions, gray boxes
the original behavior.
the wil6210 driver, we create a new entity that reads the ring buffer
and serves as console output for each of both processor cores. These
“uc-console” and “fw-console” features print custom log information
during runtime—a very simplistic yet powerful debugging feature forWe implement a
printf function for
basic debugging and
runtime analysis.
closed-source binary analysis. Gradually gaining knowledge on the
internal operations, we finally identified the code segments that are
responsible for handling the beam training. In the upcoming section,
we describe the firmware patches necessary to influence the handling
of sector sweep frames and extract the signal strength.
4.2.3 Signal Strength Extraction
The default firmware does not allow to control the beam training. It
Our patches access
the sector sweep
information and
select custom sectors
for communication.
neither provides access to sector sweep information nor does it allow
to select a particular sector. Our patches aim at enabling both features
from the user space. Sector sweeps are handled in the ucode firmware
which is hard to analyze due to the lack of information such as strings
that indicate what functions do. To find the code segments handling
the sector level sweep, we match the specific patterns of IEEE 802.11ad
frames in the firmware memory. Figure 4.4 illustrates the original
sector level sweep handling in gray and our extensions to it in white.
The original firmware determines the Received Signal Strength Indi-
cator (RSSI) and SNR for all received sector sweep frames and selects
the sector with the highest signal strength. Our modified firmware
extracts both, the RSSI and SNR, measurements for each sweep into
a ring buffer that can be read from the user space using our driver
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modifications. Since firmware version “4.1.0.55” the SNR is processed
to select a sector. In the initial firmware version (“3.3.3.7759”), sectors
cannot be selected for transmission directly. Instead, we manipulate
the selected sector ID in the feedback frames that are exchanged at
the end of a sweep, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. To this end, we add a
switch that allows to either use the sector ID selected by the original
algorithm or overwrite it with a custom value. The latter is controlled Switching between
the original behavior
and custom sector
selections is possible.
from the user space by sending a custom WMI command. In either
case, the sector ID is set in the sector sweep frames. It is copied into
the sector sweep feedback field of the acknowledgment frames sent by
the responder and the feedback frames sent by the initiator. As this
feature allows us to assess and modify the feedback in all frames, we
can control the sector selection at both the initiator and responder and
obtain the signal strength for all sectors individually.
4.3 advanced antenna control
The QCA9500 Wi-Fi chip in the Talon AD7200 performs analog beam-
The antenna allows
using custom beam
patterns.
forming using a phased antenna array with 32 elements that are
individually controllable in phase and amplitude. All these antenna
elements are connected via a weighting network of amplifiers and
phase shifters to a single RF-chain. This type of beamforming is widely
used in off-the-shelf IEEE 802.11ad hardware since more advanced ar-
chitectures such as digital or hybrid beamforming are not cost-efficient.
However, the control over the antenna is fully encapsulated in the
firmware of the QCA9500 chip, and only limited access is exposed to
the host operating system and device driver. Using the signal strength
extraction as described above and tampering with the antenna config-
uration, we recover the structure of the antenna weighting network.
In knowledge of this structure, we adjust the steering parameters and
generate arbitrary beam patterns without requiring any hardware
modifications. In the following, we describe the architecture of the
utilized antenna module, how we obtained control over the beam
steering, and generate custom beam patterns.
4.3.1 Phased Antenna Array Module
To adjust the antenna steering parameters, we need to obtain a thor-
Antennas and an
RFIC are mounted on
an external module.
ough understanding of the antenna and its configuration capabilities.
The QCA9500 chip consists of two modules. First, a baseband IC takes
care of the signal and frame processing with the two ARC600 processor
cores. Second, an external antenna module with an RFIC drives the
antenna elements and controls the radiation characteristics. Both mod-
ules, the baseband IC and the antenna, are connected with a coaxial
cable for bi-directional transfer of modulated data, control, and clock
signals, as well as the power supply for the antenna module. This
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name description
psh_hi phase shift values for antenna chains 15 to 0
psh_lo phase shift values for antenna chains 31 to 16
etype0 edge amplifier bit 0 for all antenna chains 31 to 0
etype1 edge amplifier bit 1 for all antenna chains 31 to 0
etype2 edge amplifier bit 2 for all antenna chains 31 to 0
dtype_swch_off distribution amplifier values (3 bits each) and
X16 switch value (8 bits)
Table 4.1: Antenna steering configuration parameters.
modular design allows to flexibly place the antenna module at proper
locations inside a device chassis to minimize radiation impairments.
In transmit mode, the antenna chip mixes up the modulated data
Individual antennas
are controllable by
amplifiers, phase
shifters, and an
antenna switch.
signal from IF to the desired RF channel in the 60GHz band. On the
receiver, the RF signal is mixed down to IF again. All antenna ele-
ments in the array are driven by an antenna weighting network which
is adjusted by the external control signal. This antenna weighting
network consists of an antenna switch, eight distribution amplifiers,
32 edge amplifiers, and 32 phase shifters. All of these are controllable
from within the firmware running on the baseband chip. For antenna
steering, the six 32-bit parameters psh_hi, psh_lo, etype0, etype1, etype2,
and dtype_swch_off, as listed in Table 4.1, are available. A discrete
configuration of the antenna with these parameters refers to a so-
called sector. The current firmware, in version “5.2.0.18”, supports
up to 64 different transmit sectors, out of which 35 are defined and
used in beam training. Additionally, it defines a single receive sector.
Definitions of these sectors are stored in codebook in the firmware.
The codebook with individual sector configurations can be either
The firmware stores a
codebook of different
antenna
configurations.
changed statically in the memory of the firmware image or dynam-
ically adjusted during runtime. For the latter, the driver exposes
specific netlink vendor commands. By changing the antenna parame-
ters in the sector configurations, we can change the radiation patterns
and gains. However, to generate arbitrary beam patterns, we need
to understand the internal structure of the antenna as well as the
impact of configurable parameters. In the following, we reconstruct
the antenna weighting structure.
4.3.2 Antenna Layout Reconstruction
At the time of writing, no public documentation for the antenna mod-
We experimentally
reconstruct the
antenna layout.
ule or the baseband chip was available. We first had to analyze the
internal structure of the antenna elements experimentally to control the
antenna weights properly. By iterating over all pairwise combinations
of distribution and edge amplifiers and setting all other configura-
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Figure 4.5: Experimentally reconstructed weighting network in the antenna
module, which consists of an antenna switch, eight distribu-
tion amplifiers (dtype), 32 edge amplifiers (etype) and 32 phase
shifters (psh) to drive 32 antenna elements.
tions to zero, we found that each distribution amplifier drives four
edge amplifiers. An antenna is only active if both the corresponding
distribution and edge amplifier are set to non-zero. Similarly, we
verified which phase shifter bits belong to which antenna chain by
changing single values and monitoring the received signal strength at
an unmodified device. The resulting antenna weighting structure as
revealed in our experiments is shown in Figure 4.5. Each phase shifter
in the weighting network is driven by two consecutive bits from either
psh_hi or psh_lo. The edge amplifiers use a single bit from each of
etype0, etype1, and etype2, while the distribution amplifiers consume
three consecutive bits from dtype_swch_off. The most significant bits
in dtype_swch_off are used to drive the antenna switch.
By disassembling the antenna from the device and shielding all
We identified the
physical locations of
antenna elements.
except one element, we reconstructed the three-dimensional layout
of the array as well as the physical element positions as shown in
Figure 4.6. In the array 12 patch antennas are located on the front
surface of the module in a 2× 6 matrix shape. On the back side, there
are six patch antennas and the RFIC that blocks the rest of the surface.
The remaining 14 are dipole antennas and oriented towards the sides
of the Printed Circuit Board (PCB). The three-dimensional layout and
its asymmetric assembly, lead to irregular beam patterns, as measured
in Chapter 10.
This know-how of the antenna layout and the capability to control
Exploiting the
antenna structure
enables advanced
beam steering.
the weighting network is crucial for creating custom beam patterns
on the devices. It is also a valuable resource for other researchers
using this platform and optimizing the beam steering accuracy. In
the following, we describe the process of designing custom antenna
patterns and implement them in the firmware.
54 testbed experimentation
18 322224 28 27
3 1458 16 10
21
4
11
19 20 13
input
Front surface
12 visible patch antennas
Back surface
6 patch antennas and RFIC
Figure 4.6: Disassembled phased antenna array of the Talon AD7200 with
identified antenna elements. Fourteen additional dipole antennas
are invisible from the surface.
4.3.3 Customized Beam Patterns
The knowledge about the structure of the antenna obtained in the pre-
Antenna
configurations can be
adjusted at runtime.
vious sections allows us to generate arbitrary antenna beam patterns.
For each of the antenna elements, a phase shift value (2 bit) and an
edge amplifier gain (3 bit) can be set. Moreover, we can configure the
distribution amplifiers and the antenna switch. As the configuration
for the antenna switch is typically constant, we omit it in the following
description. A developed parser extracts the antenna settings and
converts the gain and phase parameters for all antenna elements to the
configuration registers in the codebook. We either write the codebook
directly into the brd-file that hosts the default antenna configuration
or update them during runtime by using the WMI commands. Take
note that the latter is only available since firmware version “4.1.0.55”.
Version “3.3.3.7759” does not allow to change the sector definition at
runtime and requires the configuration in the static brd-file.
The number of selectable sectors depends on the firmware. Full
Codebooks with up to
64 sectors are
supported.
support of 64 sectors is only available in firmware version “5.2.0.18”.
This version allows selecting specific sectors for beaconing and the
sector sweep by issuing specific WMI commands. By doing so, we
set the sector definitions in the codebook and enable the sectors to be
used during the sector sweep dynamically at runtime. With previous
firmware versions, we stick to the sectors that are enabled by default
and only change their definitions. Using this approach of configuring
custom sectors in the codebook, we generate optimized directional
beam patterns in Chapter 7.
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Figure 4.7: Architecture of our testbed experiment automation system.
4.4 experiment automation
To perform distributed experiments with multiple devices in specific
Our testbed
automation system
controls multiple
devices in parallel.
topologies, we present our lightweight framework for interaction with
the Talon AD7200 and similar OpenWrt or Linux-based devices. Our
framework facilitates experiment-driven research and reduces the
effort that is required to set up and configure testbeds. It allows
controlling a large number of devices from a single point of control
with low organizational overhead. It remotely accesses the features in
the OpenWrt system and our extended Wi-Fi firmware as mentioned
above. In the following, we describe the architecture of our frame-
work comprising our system model, components, as well as the user
interaction.
system model . Our system model consists of multiple distributed
We consider nodes
that implement
modules and a single
controller.
testbed devices and a single controller to run and coordinate the
experiment. To work with the testbed, we distribute the software
components and proper configuration files to the devices. Features
that are required in the experiments are encapsulated in modules at
the devices and are accessible remotely. Devices run a node service
to expose modules as specified in the configuration. The controller
interacts with all devices and is instantiated with a testbed-specific
device configuration. This configuration lists available nodes in the
network and describes how they can be reached. The controller
consolidates access to remote features allowing to perform various
distributed experiments. Figure 4.7 illustrates this system model
comprising the controller, nodes, and modules.
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The software is fully implemented in Python to supported by many
operating systems and hardware platforms. Due to its flexibility and
the large set of available libraries, Python is the ideal candidate to
handle research experiments. To keep our system simple and easyOur tool and scripts
are implemented in
Python.
to deploy, we connect to the devices directly without using a ded-
icated management server. Connections are established via simple
TCP/IP sockets to remain independent of specific network topolo-
gies; the testbed can spread over multiple subnetworks. Secure Shell
(SSH) access to the devices is only required for deployment. Python’s
interactive mode enables dynamic handling of testbed experiments
with “real-time” interaction, which is particularly beneficial for live
demonstrations. We encapsulate the configuration of testbed topology
in order to separate it from the experiment description and simplify
reproducibility.
components . The architecture of our framework consists of mul-
tiple components that are distributed among the testbed network. It
specifies and distinguishes between (1) modules that expose specific
features available on the devices, (2) nodes that represent the devices in
the testbed, and (3) a controller that manages the testbed, connects to
the nodes, and interfaces the modules. In the following, we describe
these components in detail.
Modules encapsulate the features that are available on the dis-
Modules implement
features that are
available on testbed
devices.
tributed devices. All modules are Python objects, can have a state,
store internal properties, and can be initialized with parameters. Mod-
ules can implement arbitrary Python code, include other libraries, and
invoke systems calls. We provide a module to handle the configuration
of the IEEE 802.11ad interface. They control the beam training and
obtain verbose debugging information. Specific modules set the IP and
MAC address of Wi-Fi interfaces and read properties such as the num-
ber of received packets and error rates. These features are achieved by
integrating additional Python libraries (e. g. PyRIC [PyRIC]) or invok-
ing respective system commands. Moreover, we provide modules that
wrap common system commands such as ping and iperf. Modules are
instantiated and executed locally on the devices and, thus, indepen-
dent from the actual testbed topology. With its modular concept, our
framework supports the integration of new features easily: custom
modules can be simply added to the framework.
Nodes represent devices in the testbed and handle multiple modules
Devices run a node
service that exposes
their modules.
that are exposed to the network. A node is a service that binds to a
specific TCP/IP port and exposes the available modules via Remote
Procedure Calls (RPCs). RPCs invoke methods or procedures on other
hosts as if they were local ones. For each remote method, the caller
creates a local stub. This stub binds to the remote method, forwards
all arguments to invoke the method on the host, and transfers the
result back again. In particular, the stub implements the same list of
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arguments, serializes them, and sends them over the network. At the
remote location, the requested method is executed, and the return
value serialized and transmitted back. To achieve this, we implement
the Pyro library [Pyro]. As all arguments and results need to traverse
the network, we keep our exposed methods as simple as possible and
omit complex data structures. The node itself provides only limited
features and acts as a gateway to access the modules. Available
modules are configured in a node configuration file that specifies their
properties. They are identified in the network by Unique Resource
Identifiers (URIs) that consist of the host address and port as well as
the module’s name. The node itself exposes a list of available modules.
The controller orchestrates the testbed and coordinates the network
The controller
coordinates the
network
experiments.
experiments. It establishes the connection to all nodes and provides
direct access to the modules. A user instantiates the controller in the
local user space. Available nodes are listed in a device configuration
that specifies the host address and port at which the node service can
be reached. Default parameters can be provided globally to be valid
for all nodes in the testbed. The controller connects to the nodes and
queries all available modules. For each node, it creates a local stub
that binds and forwards all method calls to the remote location such
that the modules are accessible as Python objects. As a result, our
framework abstracts the distribution of devices and consolidates all
features locally.
interaction. To interact with the testbed, the user installs the
Users only interact
with the controller
and provide a
configuration.
distribution package of our framework on the devices and instantiates
the controller with a specific device configuration. The controller
then queries the nodes and exposes the features in the modules to be
directly accessible. This makes distributed network experimentation
very convenient and straightforward as features can be accessed with
only a few lines of code. It also allows to dynamically interact with
network devices by using an interactive Python shell.
4.5 discussion and summary
Despite first commercial consumer-grade products being available on
No other testbed
with standard
compliant beam
training exists.
the market, researchers struggle with inappropriate mm-wave testbed
systems. Such systems only allow for signal-level measurements or
use antenna setups with different behaviors than commercial off-the-
shelf devices. None of them fully complies with IEEE 802.11ad to allow
realistic network evaluations.
In this chapter, we propose our practical testbed experimentation
Firmware
modifications
customize the beam
training.
platform that bases on off-the-shelf devices. Our system provides
full access to the Linux-based operating system and the wireless in-
terface driver of the Talon AD7200. This device is one of the few
that fully support IEEE 802.11ad and comes with an antenna array
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of 32 individual elements. It establishes links in the 60GHz band
with up to 4620Mbps. Unfortunately, the full control over the hard-
ware’s capabilities is encapsulated in a closed-source firmware and
not exposed to the user. To open the platform for testbed experiments
and make the full potential accessible to researchers, we replace the
router’s vendor-supplied firmware with a customized OpenWrt vari-
ant. Since the hardware architecture of the Talon AD7200 was not
supported in OpenWrt, we had to adapt the hardware specifications
and memory layout manually in order to boot properly. Moreover, we
integrated the latest wil6210 driver from the Linux Kernel to interface
the IEEE 802.11ad chip. Using binary firmware patches, we modify
the sector sweep algorithm and allow implementing new beam train-
ing protocols. By reconstructing the antenna weighting network, weCustom beam
patterns can be
implemented on the
antenna array.
obtained control over the phase and gain of each antenna element.
Adjusting the codebook of transmit and receive sectors with these
parameters enables the implementation of custom beam-shapes. Our
platform supports instant switching between sectors of the codebook
at runtime. To provide flexibility of deployments and simplicity of
use, we propose an experimentation automation framework with a
minimalistic yet powerful design written in Python.
Research with practical mm-wave systems is in its beginnings, and
Our platform is a
low-cost alternative
to expensive
evaluation systems.
we hope that our Talon AD7200 research platform encourages other re-
searchers to explore the boundaries of off-the-shelf hardware and con-
duct own experiments. With only about $250 for the whole hardware,
our platform provides a low-cost alternative to expensive mm-wave
evaluation systems.
The testbed experimentation platform proposed in this chapter, is
applied in Chapter 5, 7, 6, 9, 10, and 11. Additionally, [Bie+18; Sah+18;
Ass+18] make use of our tools as well. To support the community and
allow others to benefit from our work, we release the relevant source
code on our public project page1 (see Section A.1).
1 The Talon Tools project page is available at: https://www.seemoo.de/talon-tools/
Part III
P E R F O R M A N C E
This part of the thesis covers performance enhancements
for mm-wave communication systems. Chapter 5 presents
our a compressive sector selection mechanism that reduces
the beam training overhead. In Chapter 6, we mitigate
lateral interference in antenna side lobes by adaptively
switching the receive beam. Finally, Chapter 7 describes
our adaptive beam optimization scheme that increases
the directionality of transmit beams based on the current
channel conditions.

5
C O M P R E S S I V E S E C T O R S E L E C T I O N
Due to the high directionality in mm-wave communications, trans-
Compressive sensing
exploits spatial
similarities in
different beam
patterns.
ceivers perform beam steering to focus their energy in the intended
direction. Phased antenna arrays allow adjusting the gains and phases
of single elements to change the beam pattern. However, searching
all beam combinations results in a huge search space. Thus, practical
IEEE 802.11ad systems only use a set of predefined beam patterns, so-
called sectors. The sector level sweep then selects the optimal sector to
connect to another device. As described in Section 2.2.3, it performs an
extensive search, which is very time-consuming as all sectors require
probing. To improve the performance, compressive sensing techniques
[Ras+17; MRM16; RVM12b; RVM12a] do not evaluate all available
antenna settings. Due to spatial similarities in different antenna sectors,
these algorithms only probe a subset of sectors and determine the best
selection by correlating the probes.
We propose a new compressive sector selection protocol that ex-
Our compressive
sector selection
integrates existing
compressive sensing
approaches into the
sector level sweep.
tends existing compressive path tracking solutions. It accounts for
the imperfections of low-cost hardware elements and performs a
three-dimensional sector selection that is required for practical phased
antenna arrays. Instead of using random beams and abstract beam
patterns based on geometrical antenna layouts, we use the already
well-performing beam patterns defined in the default IEEE 802.11ad
chip’s firmware. With our testbed experimentation framework from
Chapter 4, we access the signal strength measurements of received
frames and overwrite the sector selection in the feedback. Thus, we
do not limit ourselves to theoretical approaches or idealistic prototyp-
ing platforms, but take into account the imperfections and non-ideal
behavior of commercial off-the-shelf devices. With precise three di-
mensional measurements of the default beam pattern, we optimally
tune the sector selection to the hardware. Integrating our compressive
sector selection in the sector level sweep protocol, we directly imple-
ment it for practical evaluation. Our protocol minimizes the number
of probed sectors that are required to find the best antenna steering.
In the following, we first describe the protocol design of our com-
pressive sector selection in Section 5.1. Then, we present the results of
our practical evaluation in realistic environments in Section 5.2 and,
finally, discuss and summarize our findings in Section 5.3.
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5.1 protocol design
In our approach, we adopt an existing compressive path tracking
algorithm for optimized sector selection on commodity devices. In the
following, we state existing solutions, design the compressive sector
selection protocol, and describe the integration with the sector level
sweep on IEEE 802.11ad devices.
5.1.1 Existing Solutions
To determine the best sectors for the communication between two
The sector level
sweep is
inappropriate for a
high number of
sectors.
devices, the IEEE 802.11ad standard [IEE14; Nit+14] employs the sector
level sweep algorithm. It works with predefined beam patterns, so-
called sectors as described in Section 2.2.3. In this algorithm, two
stations mutually exchange probing frames to determine the received
signal strength per sector. They choose the one with maximum signal
strength pn for communication. The selected sector nˆ out of N probed
sectors is feedback to the transmitter with
nˆ = argmax
n
pn. (5.1)
As this approach scales linearly with the number of sectors in a
training set, it becomes inappropriate for a high number of sectors.
To lower the training complexity, compressive path tracking [Ras+17;
Compressive path
tracking reduces the
search space and
achieves a
logarithmic
complexity.
MRM16; RVM12b; RVM12a] reduces the search space to a subset of
sectors and thereby provides higher efficiency with lower time over-
head and a search complexity of logN. Instead of probing all sectors,
compressive path tracking as proposed by Rasekh et al. in [Ras+17]
pseudo-randomly varies phase shifts of the antenna elements to pro-
duce random beam patterns. The receiver chooses the most dominant
path to the transmitter by correlating the received signal strength with
the expected beam patterns. Additional phase information also en-
ables multi-path estimation with multiple reflections [MRM16]. Such
compressive algorithms achieve high efficiency and accuracy especially
for antenna arrays with hundreds of elements.
Nevertheless, such solutions cannot directly be integrated into com-
Channel sensing is
typically not
supported by
commodity devices.
modity devices which contain low-cost array antennas with a limited
number of antenna elements. Due to the placement in a device chassis,
surrounding materials may impair radiation. Manufacturers need
to calibrate their antennas and already provide a preselected set of
beam patterns with good radiation characteristics. Our preliminary
experiments to apply random phase shifts substantially reduced the
link quality between our devices under test, thus severely limiting the
communication range. Given the minimum signal strength require-
ments that are necessary for proper signal reception, choosing random
phase shifts results in less accurate measurements on our low-cost
hardware. Additionally, predicting paths between devices only in a
5.1 protocol design 63
two-dimensional environment is insufficient. The placement of com-
municating nodes in practical setups is seldom limited to such simple
constellations. Hence, for this work, we extend existing compres-
sive path tracking algorithms to cope with realistic three-dimensional
setups.
5.1.2 Compressive Selection
To cope with the limitations of commodity IEEE 802.11ad devices, we
We use non-coherent
path tracking with
predefined beam
patterns.
adopt the non-coherent path-tracking approach provided in [Ras+17].
Instead of relying on random beam patterns, we use the beam pat-
terns defined by sectors that perform well with our device’s antenna.
Moreover, we extend the search space to three-dimensional patterns
to accommodate realistic environments. Our approach works in two
steps. First, it takes a random subset of M out of N sectors supplied by
the antenna to find the path a signal takes towards a receiver. Then it
determines the best of the original N sectors that optimizes the signal
strength in the estimated direction. Probing all M sectors results in
M received signal strength values pm with m ∈ [1,M]. Then, we
find the sector with the highest expected signal strength according
to expected three-dimensional beam patterns x⃗m(ϕ, θ), for azimuth
angles ϕ and the elevation angles θ. We correlate a normalized vector Correlations of
measurements and
expected beam
patterns reveal the
angular direction.
of all received signal strength values p⃗ with a normalized vector of
the corresponding expected beam pattern x⃗(ϕ, θ) with
W(ϕ, θ) =
⟨
p⃗
||⃗p||
,
x⃗(ϕ, θ)
||⃗x(ϕ, θ)||
⟩2
, (5.2)
where ⟨u⃗, v⃗⟩ indicates the inner product of two vectors v⃗ and u⃗ and
||u⃗|| is the norm. To estimate the path taken by a signal to arrive at
the receiver, we determine the angle of arrival by maximizing the
correlation W(ϕ, θ) with
ϕˆ, θˆ = argmax
ϕ,θ
W(ϕ, θ). (5.3)
In a discrete grid of ϕ and θ, the angles ϕˆ and θˆ with maximum
correlation are found numerically. Finding the best out of all N The sector with the
highest expected gain
in the measured
direction is selected.
sectors, we use the estimated angles ϕˆ and θˆ to select a sector with ID
nˆ that provides the strongest gain according to the measured beam
patterns xn(ϕ, θ) with n ∈ [1,N]:
nˆ = argmax
n
xn(ϕˆ, θˆ). (5.4)
Thus, the number of available sectors N can be significantly larger
than the number of probing sectors M.
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5.1.3 Sector Level Sweep Integration
Integrating our compressive sector selection into the sector level sweep
Our firmware
modifications allow
integrating the
compressive selection
into the sector level
sweep.
of commodity IEEE 802.11ad devices requires our modifications to the
Wi-Fi chip’s firmware as described in Section 4.2.3. First, we need to
gain access to the signal strength measurements of received sector
level sweep frames, determine the optimal sector, and then insert the
selected sector ID in the sector level sweep feedback field. Additionally,
precise knowledge of the beam patterns of all available sectors is
required. Since these are device-dependent and unique for the Talon
AD7200 platform, existing measurement campaigns characterizing
mm-wave propagation cannot be used. Instead, we perform extensive
measurements to determine the antenna gains in all three dimensions
of all of the available beam patterns that are predefined in the device.
Using our practical testbed platform, we evaluate the signal strength
Measurements from
the firmware are
imprecise and exhibit
several outliers.
in every sector level sweep during the regular operation of the device.
Unfortunately, our measurements occasionally tend to be imprecise,
fluctuate, and exhibit several outliers. Especially when observing low
gains, the signal strength deviates and sometimes the firmware does
not report any measurement at all. This behavior is also observable
with the unmodified firmware. It impairs the original sector level
sweep algorithm and causes fluctuations in the sector selections.
Averaging over multiple measurements is, however, not feasible
Combining RSSI and
SNR measurements
reduces deviations.
as sector selection algorithms must react quickly to changes in the
environment and adjust the selected sector accordingly. To cope with
the effects of measurement fluctuations in our path tracking protocol,
we decided to use not only Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) measurements
of the sector level sweep frames but also the Received Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI). Both parameters are provided by the firmware and
extractable with our modified device driver. Internally, they seem
to be differently acquired as fluctuations are not observable in both
values at the same time. Nevertheless, the average SNR and RSSI are
correlated. Thus, we extend the calculation of the estimation of the
angle of arrival presented in Equation 5.3 by considering correlations
with both parameter values:
ϕˆ, θˆ = argmax
ϕ,θ
Wsnr(ϕ, θ) ·Wrssi(ϕ, θ). (5.5)
This approach effectively tolerates outliers and increases the robust-
Compressive
selection inherently
compensates outliers
in the measurements.
ness against measurement deviations in either value. By probing only
a subset of antenna sectors, we have a huge advantage over the origi-
nal sector level sweep algorithm: we naturally compensate missing or
wrong measurements effectively. Assuming that the firmware misses
reporting the signal strength of the best sectors, the sector level sweep
algorithm would choose a less optimal one. With compressive path
tracking, we still have good chances to find the optimal sector despite
a decreased set of probing values.
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Figure 5.1: Schematic setup of our experiments with two Talon routers and
a rotation head controlled by a computer over an additional
management network.
5.2 practical evaluation
In the following, we present our evaluation results to demonstrate
We compare
compressive sector
selection with the
default sector level
sweep.
that our compressive sector selection algorithm is feasible for off-
the-shelf IEEE 802.11ad devices and decreases the training time in
comparison to the prevalent sector level sweep. After describing our
setup, we analyze the angular estimation accuracy, the impacts of
sector selections and evaluate the overhead reduction and throughput.
5.2.1 Testbed Setup
For evaluation purposes, we use a setup with two Talon routers and
Our evaluation
comprises typical
indoor scenarios
with one device
mounted on a
rotation head.
take measurements in a lab environment and a conference room. As
shown in Figure 5.1, one device is mounted on a custom rotation head
equipped with a step-motor with microstepping support to obtain a
high rotation precision in the azimuth plane. In the lab environment,
we place the second device at a distance of three meters facing the
rotating one; in the conference room, both devices are six meters apart.
The conference room contains a couple of potential reflectors such as
white-boards so that we can expect reflections and multi-path effects.
Experiments in both the lab environment and the conference room
constitute typical indoor line-of-sight scenarios for IEEE 802.11ad com-
munication. Both devices establish a connection and transmit pings
for 20 s to trigger sector level sweeps and keep the connection alive.
Using our firmware patches introduced in Section 4.2.3, we extract the
received signal strength regarding SNR and RSSI. A 2.4GHz network
connects all devices to control the testbed remotely and to start the
experiments. The step-motor in the rotation head is controlled over
USB and achieves ranges of ±60°. In the lab environment, we manually
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Figure 5.2: Exemplary beam patterns of three sectors predefined on the Talon
AD7200 routers.
tilt the rotation head in steps of 2° from 0° to 30° and use an azimuth
resolution of 2.25°. In the conference room, we do not change the ele-The rotation head is
steered in different
azimuth and
elevation directions.
vation angle, but increase the resolution of azimuth angles to 1.3°. A
combination of Python and MATLAB scripts automate the experiments
and collect the measurement data. The two devices perform sector
level sweeps frequently and record the SNR and RSSI for each sector.
With off-line analyses in MATLAB, we evaluate the performance of our
compressive sector selection algorithm and the original sector level
sweep. To assess the desired behavior of compressive estimation with
a limited number of probing sectors, we only consider a variable num-
ber of random measurements in each sweep. Based on this outcome,
we set the corresponding sector in the sector level sweep feedback to
force devices to use our selection for data transmission.
Knowing the radiation patterns of the sectors is crucial to make
We additionally
measure the
radiation patterns in
an anechoic
environment.
an optimal selection using a path-tracking algorithm. The shapes of
antenna patterns highly depend on the antenna’s geometries and ob-
jects in the surrounding. Further, the packaging and placement of the
antenna inside a device influence the radiation characteristics. Hence,
to obtain device specific radiation patterns, we performed measure-
ments with two Talon AD7200 device in an anechoic chamber to omit
disturbing reflections and multi-path effects. Figure 5.2 exemplary
shows four out of 36 different beam patterns of the predefined sectors
on the Talon AD7200. Measurements for the remaining sectors are
provided in Chapter 10. In the following, we describe our evaluation
results regarding the performance of our compressive sector selection.
5.2.2 Path Estimation Error
As our compressive sector selection approach relies on the path an
Compressive sector
selection depends on
accurate path
estimations.
mm-wave signal takes to arrive at its destination, we first evaluate
the accuracy of the angle-of-arrival estimation by calculating the es-
timation error in azimuth and elevation direction. This error is the
difference between the physical orientation and the estimated one.
From the setup of our experiments, we know the physical orientation
of the device mounted on top of our rotation head. To determine the
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Figure 5.3: Angular estimation errors with compressive sector selection in
the lab environment and conference room.
estimated path, we perform our protocol as presented in Section 5.1.2
by computing the correlation according to Equation 5.5 and estimating
the direction with Equation 5.3. Both errors in azimuth and eleva-
tion direction are handled independently from each other since we
measured them with different resolution and accuracy.
Our results for both evaluation scenarios are shown in Figure 5.3,
With only a few
probing sectors, we
achieve a high
estimation accuracy.
where boxes indicate the 50%, whiskers the 99% confidence bounds,
and the dash the median of all our measurements. A suitable ap-
proximation of the azimuth direction is achieved with only a few
probing sectors. For example, with ten probing sectors in the lab
environment, the error stays with 99% confidence below 5.8° and
expresses a maximum median of 1.3°. With 20 probing sectors, the
upper bound decreases to 3.6°, and the median becomes as precise
as 0.9°. In the conference room, the errors we observe are slightly
higher due to worsened environmental conditions. A higher distance
between the devices and stronger multi-paths make the correlation of
measurements and estimated patterns less accurate. However, with
ten probing sectors, the azimuth estimation error still achieves a me-
dian of 2.1° that decreases to 1.3° by using 20 probing sectors. In the
Manually tilting the
rotation head causes
inaccuracies.
elevation axis, the errors in both environments are below 15° with
ten probing sectors and below 8.4° with 20 probing sectors. Given
that we obtained the beam patterns in elevation direction with half
the resolution than in azimuth direction, higher errors such as those
are expected. Moreover, elevation errors in the conference room are
lower than in the lab environment. We expect some of the errors to be
caused by manually tilting the rotation head. Despite using a digital
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Figure 5.4: The selection stability illustrates the time spent in the most promi-
nent sector. Plotted results are averaged over all evaluated direc-
tions in the conference room.
mechanic’s level, we could not achieve a sub-degree precision. Since
we did not measure different elevation direction in the conference
room, the elevation error rate gets low for a sufficient number of
probing sectors. In summary, a suitable approximation of the signal
path becomes possible with at least 12 probing sectors.
5.2.3 Sector Selection Accuracy
Based on the path directions that are evaluated in the previous section,
The SNR-loss and
selection stability
indicate the accuracy
of sector selections.
our mechanism selects the sector with the highest gain in the path
direction from our measurements. To investigate the accuracy of this
selection, we consider the SNR-loss and the selection stability. The
following states these for both algorithms our compressive sector
selection and the sector level sweep.
The selection stability represents the time an algorithm spend in one
The time spent with
the most prominent
sector represents the
selection stability.
particular sector. We determine this rate by evaluating the selection of
our protocol and the sector level sweep for each captured sweep in
the conference room. For each physical path direction, we identify the
sector that is selected most and count the occurrences. This number
divided by the total number of evaluated sweeps provides the selection
stability. In the assumption that each sweep has the same duration,
the selection stability directly corresponds to the time spent in one
particular sector. Spending more time in one sector indicates higher
stability in the static environment.
Figure 5.4 shows the measured stabilities averaged over all evaluated
With at least 13
probing sectors, we
achieve a higher
stability than the
sector sweep.
path directions. For the sector level sweep, the results are constant as
this algorithm always use the maximum number of probes. It achieves
a stability of 73.9% meaning that its outcome is mostly one constant
sector. In 26.1% of the occasions, the sector level sweep results in
inconsistent selections. The sector level sweep tends to switch between
sectors due to measurement deviations. Multiple sectors with similar
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Figure 5.5: Average SNR-loss in compressive sector selection and the sector
level sweep in dependency of the number of probing sectors.
gains might be alternating for the highest measurement. With at least
13 probing sectors, compressive sector selection achieves a higher
selection stability than the sector level sweep. Applying all probing
sectors that are available, we stay on average in 94.7% of the time
in one particular sector. This result demonstrates that compressive
sector selection not only achieves the stability of the sector level sweep
with fewer probing sectors but also reduces the number of alternating
sector selections.
However, the selection stability does not represent the quality of the
The SNR-loss
represents the
relative quality of
selected sectors.
selected sectors. To catch up on this, we additionally investigate the
loss in SNR achieved by compressive sector selection and the sector
level sweep in comparison to the optimal achievable SNR. Doing so,
we determine not only the sector selection but also the SNR value in
each sweep. The optimal SNR is taken from the sector with the highest
measurement as reported in the current and previous measurements.
The SNR-loss is determined as difference towards this value. We
average the SNR-loss of all evaluated directions and plot our results
in dependency of the number of probing sectors in Figure 5.5. In
this comparison, the sector level sweep achieves a reasonable SNR
on average just 0.5 dB below the optimum. Our protocol already
achieves considerable results with only a few probing sectors: six
probes are sufficient to find a sector with an average of 2.5 dB below
optimum. This gain might be insufficient to achieve high data-rates
but already allows for simple data exchange. Greater values than
those of the sector level sweep are achieved with at least 14 probing
sectors. With about 20 probing sectors the achieved SNR approaches 14 probing sectors
are sufficient to
achieve an SNR as
high as the default
operation.
the optimal one quite well. These values exhibit high variations
over different directions that are not encountered in the averaged
results. Nevertheless, 14 probing sectors are sufficient to make a sector
selection that provides the same SNR as the one obtained by the sector
level sweep.
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Figure 5.6: Required time to perform a mutual beam training in dependency
of the number of probing sectors.
5.2.4 Overhead Reduction
With at least 14 probing sectors, compressive sector selection achieves
Compressive sector
selection reduces the
training overhead by
a factor of 2.3
a low estimation error as well as an SNR and selection stability in the
order of that of the sector level sweep. Based on these results, we
evaluate the overhead reduction. The training time directly depends on
the number of probing sectors. As experimentally obtained, training
transmit sectors in both directions using the sector level sweep takes
on average 1.27ms. From this time 18.0µs are required for each sweep
frame and additional 49.1µs for initialization and feedback frames.
Figure 5.6 illustrates the resulting training time for our compressive
selection in dependency of the number of probing sectors. Specifically,
with only 14 probing sectors, the time to complete a mutual training of
transmit sectors could be performed in 0.55ms. In comparison to the
original sector level sweep that takes 1.27ms, this effectively speeds
up the beam-training by a factor of 2.3.
5.2.5 Throughput Improvement
To assess the throughput that is achievable with compressive sector
Higher stability
slightly increases the
TCP performance.
selection, we determine the selected sectors for each sweep as done
before. With this sector selected in the feedback field, we generate
random TCP payload and measure the application-layer data-rate by
running iperf3 [iPerf]. Even in static scenarios, the devices trigger
the beam training approximately once every second. Our measured
throughput values are taken within a 10 s interval and averaged over
all selected sectors to take into account the impacts of suboptimal selec-
tions. In the conference room measurements, the rotation head steers
to −45°, 0° and 45°. As shown in Figure 5.7, the expected through-
put of compressive sector selection is with 1.48Gbps, 1.51Gbps, and
1.50Gbps only slightly better than that of the original sweep. In prac-
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Figure 5.7: Throughput gain from increased stability in compressive sector
selection with 14 probing sectors in comparison with the sector
level sweep.
tice, these differences might barely be recognizable but yet show the
additional performance gain we achieve from higher stability.
Theoretically, a decreased training time leaves more time for data
transmission and thereby increases the throughput. This aspect is
not covered in our evaluation. The provided throughput comparisons
are performed with equal sweep duration. We leave adjusting the
duration of the sector level sweep for future work.
In this evaluation, we demonstrated the feasibility of compressive
With compressive
sector selection
probing 14 out of 34
beams is sufficient to
find the optimal
sector.
sector selection on IEEE 802.11ad off-the-shelf devices. In our protocol,
14 out of 34 probing sectors are sufficient to outperform the sector
level sweep. Compressive sector selection estimates the path direction
with high accuracy and an error of only a few degrees. The achieved
signal strength and throughput are in the same order as those of the
sector level sweep. With our approach, we increase the stability of
sector selections, thus spend more time transmitting in the optimal
sector. By using only 14 probing sectors, compressive sector selection
reduces the mutual training time from 1.27ms to 0.55ms. However,
we support a variable number of sectors, so that our system adjusts to
various requirements.
5.3 discussion and summary
Our compressive sector selection algorithm is the first working im-
Efficient beam
training is
mandatory to handle
mobility.
plementation of compressive path tracking that runs on off-the-shelf
mm-wave hardware. With only two devices, the possible gain in
throughput is low. However, in dense mm-wave deployments, we
need to keep in mind that each sector level sweep performed by a pair
of devices pollutes the whole mm-wave channel in all directions. This
reduces the benefit of using mm-wave hardware to communicate with
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many stations in parallel over directional links. In mobile setups, users
need to be tracked over time. The shorter the sweeping time, the more
often a sweep can be performed without degrading the throughput.
Hence, our approach is best suited to increase the performance and
frequency of sweeping in emerging mm-wave applications.
While current mm-wave devices use only a few different sectors,
Our approach scales
well with a high
number of supported
sectors.
future generations are likely to demand a higher directivity and more
fine-grained beam control. Such requirements could be addressed by
increasing the number of implemented and predefined sectors. The
phased antenna array in the Talon AD7200 with 32 individual antenna
elements already suffices to refine the beams. However, increasing the
number of sectors adds additional overhead to the training process.
With few sectors, the sweep completes in a suitable time, but with
a large set of probing sectors, it becomes inefficient. Solutions such
as our compressive sector selection overcome this limiting factor and
scale well with a high number of sectors. For example, with our
approach, we could significantly increase the number of available
sectors while keeping the number of probes as low as in the current
sweep. As a result, more precise beam patterns could be efficiently
selected without adding additional training time overhead.
Moreover, our approach allows for adaptively controlling the num-
Adaptively
controlling the
number of probing
sectors could become
beneficial for varying
scenarios.
ber of sectors that are probed in the sweep. In static scenarios, few
probes are sufficient to validate the current antenna settings. When-
ever a node starts moving, the number of probes may increase to
keep track of the movement. Instead of applying a random selection,
predefined probing sectors might provide further benefits. Given an
approximate signal direction, sectors with low gain or similar gains in
that direction are unlikely to perform efficiently. Choosing the most-
efficient probing sectors turned out to be highly context-specific. Still,
compressive sector selection is suited for such scenarios by keeping
the number of probes as well as the selection of sectors variable.
We implemented our compressive sector selection protocol that
We increase the
efficiency of beam
training on practical
devices.
integrates with the sector level sweep on off-the-shelf IEEE 802.11ad
devices. Using our testbed experimentation platform (Chapter 4), we
integrate precisely measured radiation patterns (Chapter 10). Our
implementation estimates the signal direction in practical environ-
ments with low error. Thereby, we significantly decrease the number
of sectors that need to be probed in order to perform an optimal sector
selection. Experimental results show that probing only 14 out of 34
possible sectors is sufficient. The time to search for the optimal sec-
tor in a mutual beam training scenario can be reduced from 1.27ms
needed for a complete sector level sweep to only 0.55ms. Hence,
we speed up the beam training on off-the-shelf devices by a factor
of 2.3. Since our system design directly integrates with the sector
level sweep, it operates orthogonally to other MAC and network layer
optimizations.
6
M I T I G AT I N G L AT E R A L I N T E R F E R E N C E
Using pencil-shaped beams in mm-wave networks to achieve “pseudo-
Consumer-grade
phased antenna
arrays expose
significant side lobes.
wire” behavior is a myth. The reason is that real-world antenna arrays
suffer from significant side lobes [Nit+15a]. This is particularly notable
in the case of consumer-grade hardware such as the Talon AD7200
due to its cost-efficient design. As a result, interference becomes a
problem despite the use of directional communication. Faulty nodes or
parallel operation of incompatible standards which distort the channel
may cause significant interference not just via main lobes but also via
side lobes. As already revealed in Section 3.3, the best beam pattern
for a receiver may not be the one whose main lobe most accurately
points towards the transmitter but the one whose side lobes do not
capture any interference. Due to the sparse multi-path environment,
interference is one of the main reasons for link instability in quasi-
static scenarios. As such impairments are highly direction depended,
mitigating interference in mm-wave networks pose a challenging task.
The straightforward approach to identify the most suitable beam
Interference may
change frequently.
pattern in order to address interference is performing a receive beam
sweep (see Section 2.2.3). However, the duration of the sector level
sweep in the IEEE 802.11ad standard is in the order of a few mil-
liseconds [EC16; Nit+14]. Since interference may be intermittent and
change very often, triggering a sweep each time such a change occurs
would strongly impact the performance—nodes would spend a long
time sweeping. The key challenge when it comes to avoiding interfer-
ence is the small timescale at which interference events take place. In
contrast, other events which require beam pattern adaptation, such as
blockage and device movement, take place at the timescale of seconds.
To date, mm-wave networks lack efficient mechanisms to address this
order-of-magnitude difference regarding the timescale of interference.
We present an adaptive beam switching mechanism that adapts
Our beam switching
adapts to varying
interference in
antenna side lobes.
receive beam patterns timely and efficiently to changing interference.
Our mechanism does not require any location information and only
needs limited information regarding the beam pattern shape. Specif-
ically, the intuition behind our mechanism is as follows. Instead of
performing a full sector level sweep whenever interference changes,
we only probe the beam patterns which are most likely to result in
good performance. To this end, we keep track of the probability of
interference-free transmission for each beam pattern. Nodes initialize
those probabilities based on full sweeps at comparatively large, fixed
intervals. Interference changes trigger the aforementioned individual
beam pattern probes. The key feature of our mechanism is that, when-
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Figure 6.1: Adaptive beam pattern switch example. The beam pattern in case
(b) mitigates interference because the interference signal falls into
a beam pattern minimum.
ever a node sends such an individual probe, it does not only update
the probability for that beam pattern. It also updates the probability
of similar beam patterns at zero cost. Basically, we adjust the proba-
bilities of other beam patterns based on the correlation of their lobes
with the lobes of the probed beam pattern.
Our algorithm exploits similarities of antenna side lobes based on
We exploit
similarities in beam
pattern shapes.
preliminary simulations with our channel models from Chapter 3. Us-
ing our testbed experimentation platform from Chapter 4, we evaluate
the practical performance of adaptive beam switching with real-world
measurements. Our results show that side lobes play a critical role
regarding interference on commercial devices. In the following, we de-
scribe the protocol design in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 states the results
of our practical evaluation, and, finally, we summarize our findings in
Section 6.3.
6.1 protocol design
Our adaptive beam switching mechanism detects and avoids inter-
Our mechanism
monitors the
stability and finds
alternative beams.
ference by adjusting side lobes in the receive beam patterns. With
neither location nor detailed beam pattern information, it monitors
the stability of the link and determines alternative beam patterns with
minimal search overhead. In the following, we provide a protocol
overview and describe the algorithm behind this approach in detail.
6.1.1 Adaptive Beam Switching
The general idea of our protocol is to continuously monitor a sta-
bility metric that represents changes in the received signal quality.
Under low stability, it probes the channel conditions more often. It
probabilistically selects beam patterns for probing that are similar
to the currently selected one but exhibit different gaps in the beam
pattern shape. This probing approach allows finding beam patterns
that mitigate interference and still provide a suitable signal gain at
each transceiver independently.
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Figure 6.1 shows an example of our mechanism. In Figure 6.1(a), the
Steering the beam
patterns’ minima
towards the
interference direction
mitigates the
distortions.
receiver RX is receiving data from transmitter TX. To this end, it uses a
receive beam pattern whose main lobe points towards TX. During the
communication, a nearby node starts transmitting. Although the node
is not aligned with the main lobe, RX still receives interference via
one of its side lobes. Our mechanism at RX detects these distortions
and switches to a similar beam pattern as shown in Figure 6.1(b).
While the main lobe still points roughly towards TX, the interfering
signal falls into a minimum of the beam pattern, thus mitigating
its impact. Moreover, RX also increases the probability of using the
beam pattern in Figure 6.1(c) since its side lobes are similar to the one
in Figure 6.1(b). All in all, the design of our mechanism has some
significant advantages compared to traditional beam sweeping. With
each probe, our mechanism learns about many beam patterns. This
approach reduces the overhead dramatically. Our mechanism does
not require full beam pattern information but only a beam pattern
correlation matrix and operates in a fully distributed manner. No
coordination or knowledge from other nodes in the network is needed.
6.1.2 Protocol Specification
In general, our protocol consists of multiple steps. First, it performs
an initialization. Then it monitors the system stability and derives
probing probabilities. Based on this, it either probes the channel or
continues with data transmission. The flow chart in Figure 6.2 depicts
this operation. Details of each processing step are as follows.
initialization Each transceiver has a set of N predefined receive
A complete sweep is
performed once for
initialization.
beam patterns it can choose from to maximize the signal quality for
a respective communication partner. All these beam patterns with
n = 1 . . .N exhibit main lobes and side lobes in different directions.
In our adaptive beam switching, we keep track of the beam nˆ that
provides the highest Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR)
over time. At time t = t0, the selected beam nˆ is initialized by
performing a complete sweep:
nˆ = arg max
n=1...N
γn. (6.1)
The corresponding SINR is stored in γˆ and initialized by γˆ = γnˆ
at time t0. We set up the stability s with the maximum value of
s = 1. Note that a complete beam sweep is required only during the
initialization phase (i.e., at t = t0).
system stability. We assume a locally time slotted system, simi-
Transceivers probe
alternative beams.
lar to IEEE 802.11ad. At each time slot t, a transceiver either (i) probes
the channel or (ii) transmits data with the best-known beam pattern
from the previous slot t− 1. To make this decision, we use a stability
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Start
Initialize γˆ, nˆ, s
by beam sweep
choose random r ∈ [0,1]
r ⩽ s
select beam k = nˆ
transmit data frame
and determine γk
compute β = |γk−γˆγˆ |
update and store γˆ = γk
update stability
s(t) = fs(s(t 1),β)
for m =
[1, ...M]
update probing
probabilities δn for
n = 1 . . .N and
select a random beam k
probe channel condition
and determine γk
γk > γˆ
update and store
nˆ = k and γˆ = γk
increase stability
s(t) = fs(s(t 1),1)
false
true
false
true
end
loop
Figure 6.2: Flow chart of our adaptive beam switching algorithm for interfer-
ence mitigation in antenna side lobes.
parameter s ∈ [0, 1]. Given a random value r from a uniform random
distribution with r ∈ [0, 1], transceivers continue transmitting data if
r ⩽ s or initiates probing otherwise. As channel conditions change
over time, the stability s is continuously updated.
probing probabilities . Each beam pattern n is assigned a prob-
Each beam pattern
has a probing
probability.
ing probability δn according to the current beam pattern selection
nˆ and their similarities in beam pattern shape. Let u and v be a
pair of beam patterns with u, v = 1, . . . ,N but u ̸= v. Every beam
pattern n features a unique antenna radiation pattern Wn(Θ) for
Θ ∈ [−π,π]. We determine the correlation between two beams by their
cross-correlation coefficient with zero lag with
cu,v =Wu ⋆Wv[0] =
∫π
−π
W∗u(Θ) ·Wv(Θ)dΘ , (6.2)
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where W∗u(Θ) is the complex conjugate of Wu(Θ). Next, the algorithm
also determines the correlation of the minima in beam pattern shapes
to find beam patterns with similar gaps as
c¯u,v =
1
1+Wu
⋆
1
1+Wv
[0]. (6.3)
At runtime, our protocol does not need detailed information on the
beam pattern shapes. Only the correlations cu,v and c¯u,v of beam pairs
are required. These values can be determined in device calibration
once and stored for later use. With this approach, we also encounter
for varying hardware inaccuracies in radio circuits among different
devices.
To overcome interference or signal jamming, we aim to search for an
Alternative beam
patterns should have
a high correlation
with the current one.
alternative beam pattern that (i) maximizes the antenna gain towards
the intended direction and (ii) minimizes the impact of interference.
Specifically, an alternative beam should have a high correlation with
the currently used beam pattern but different zeros to steer the antenna
away from the interference direction. Therefore, the probability of
probing for beam pattern n given the current beam pattern nˆ is
δn = cnˆ,n · (1− c¯nˆ,n) . (6.4)
channel probing . Channel probing determines if, under the
A subset of available
beams is used for
channel probing.
current channel condition, beam switching is beneficial. It is per-
formed in the form of a burst of M control frames. Each frame probes
an individual beam pattern. For each m = 1, . . . ,M our algorithm
selects a random beam pattern k based on the corresponding δn for
n = 1, . . . ,N. With the chosen beam pattern we measure the SINR γk
and update the internal state. The measured value γk is compared
to that of the previously used beam pattern γnˆ. If γk > γnˆ, the
algorithm updates the current beam pattern and its corresponding
SINR to nˆ = k and γnˆ = γk, respectively. Doing so, the probed beam
pattern gets selected when it provides better quality than the current
one.
Lastly, after probing all M selected beam patterns, the stability value
Probing increases the
stability.
increases. A function s = fs (s,β) updates the current stability based
on the previous one and an update parameter β. We implement this
update function as moving average with:
fs (s,β) = α ·β+ (1−α) · s | α = 0.1. (6.5)
This function and especially the adjustment parameter α is replaceable
for general applicability of our protocol. In preliminary experiments,
we revealed that our implementation with α = 0.1 provides good
results. More sophisticated update strategies may take into account
packet delivery and error rate to adaptively control the stability. How-
ever, such strategies are future work. To increase the stability after
probing, we set β = 1 and s = fs (s, 1).
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Figure 6.3: Exemplary beam patterns of two sectors with different side lobes.
Both exhibit similar gains at −50°, but strongly differ in other
directions.
data transmission procedure . If the stability is high so that
Data is transmitted
under high stability.
r ⩽ s, the algorithm continues transmitting data with the same beam
pattern used before. It selects the beam pattern as k = nˆ and transmits
a data frame. Still, it updates the stability as the signal quality might
change. The relative change in the channel conditions affects the
stability. Specifically, the stability update is determined by β = |γk−γˆγˆ |,
and thus updates to s = fs (s,β). We use the same update mechanism
as for probing in the previous paragraph. The instantaneous SINR is
stored as γnˆ = γk.
Whenever the SINR in the current data transmission drops, the
decreasing stability increases the probability of channel probing in the
upcoming time slots. Still, the moving average of stability monitoring
ensures that our algorithm does not overreact on rare outliers and
temporary outage.
6.2 practical evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm in a prac-
tical environment. To this end, we utilize our testbed experimentation
framework from Chapter 4. The Talon AD7200 routers allow control-
ling the selected beam pattern and switch between receive beams.
The following first describes our testbed setup and then provides the
performance results of our interference mitigation approach.
6.2.1 Testbed Setup
Interference may be caused due to parallel operation of incompatible
Parallel operation of
incompatible
standards causes
interference.
standards. For this reason, we utilize two Talon AD7200 routers that
communicate with IEEE 802.11ad and a WiHD transmitter-receiver pair
that is based on the older WiGig standard. The latter does not perform
clear channel assessment, and thus causes interference on the former.
The routers use the predefined beam patterns which are configured
in the interface firmware and select them for reception. Figure 6.3
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Figure 6.4: Practical experiment setup with an interfering WiHD
transceiver (a) and a Talon router (b). The solid line shows the
location of the router at +45◦ and the dashed line at −45◦.
exemplary illustrates the shape of two of these beam patterns that
allow for interference mitigation. While both patterns exhibit similar
gains in the direction of −50°, their lobes completely differ at 60°.
All the predefined beam patterns complement each other to provide
strong gains in all directions. Still, they feature different beam-widths
and main-lobe directions. Switching between those patterns might
mitigate the interference.
Figure 6.4 shows our practical setup. One of the Talon routers is
All devices are
deployed on a
semi-circle.
placed in the center of a semicircle and configured in IEEE 802.11ad
station mode. The second router is located on the semicircle at 45°
or −45° and configured as an Access Point (AP). Additionally, we
place the WiHD transmitter on 18 evenly distributed locations on the
semicircle, and the WiHD receiver in the center of the semicircle close
to the station. As a result, the station receives both the intended
transmission of the AP and the interference of the WiHD transmitter
from different angles. For our experiment, we set the beam pattern of
the AP to point to the center of the semicircle. This ensures that signal
quality fluctuations are not due to switching beam patterns. At the
receiver, we measure throughput and SNR for each possible receive
beam pattern and each location of the interfering WiHD transmitter.
All of our experiments are performed in a large and empty sports hall.
For each measurement, we generate TCP traffic from the AP to the
station using iperf3 [iPerf].
6.2.2 Interference Mitigation
Our first experiment analyzes whether the intuition sketched in Fig-
We study the
feasibility of
interference
mitigation.
ure 6.1 holds. That is, we study if switching to a receive beam pattern
that has lower gain towards a transmitters helps mitigating lateral
interference. Our results are depicted in the heat map in Figure 6.5. It
shows the throughput that is achieved for each possible receive beam
pattern and each location of the interfering WiHD node. The row
marked with an arrow indicates the best pattern when the interfering
node is off; the dashed line indicates the best pattern when the inter-
80 mitigating lateral interference
ference is switched on. While the former remains constant, the latter
changes for each location of the interfering node. This validates that
(a) deviating from the best pattern helps in case of interference, and (b)
choosing an alternative pattern is not straightforward. Since practical
beam patterns are highly irregular [Nit+15a], the best alternative may
be any of the available beam patterns and not just the neighboring
sectors. Thus, an efficient probing scheme such as ours is needed.
Figure 6.6 shows the throughput gain that we achieve when selecting
Alternative beam
selections increase
the throughput in
case of interference.
the sector with less interference. Our results are averaged over all
possible locations of the interfering node. The gain is computed
relative to the best sector highlighted in Figure 6.5 and to the default
behavior of the router. The latter refers to the case when the router
is not forced to use a specific receive sector. Compared to the best
sector, our selection achieves an average throughput gain of about
60%. For individual locations of the interfering node the gains range
up to 2- and 8-fold. Since the beam patterns are asymmetric, the
results at 45° and −45° differ. At 45° the gain is lower than at −45°.
At such alignments, avoiding the WiHD interference becomes more
challenging than for others.
6.2.3 Probing Time
Next, we investigate the impact of the number of probes M. If M is
Our approach
required fewer probes
than a regular sweep.
small, our protocol only probes a few sectors each time the stability
degrades. As a result, it requires more time to select a stable pattern.
Beyond a certain threshold of M, the probability of probing a suitable
sector increases significantly, and our beam switching quickly con-
verges. Figure 6.7 depicts this effect for a challenging scenario, where
the interfering node is located close to the AP. In this case, the station
should set M ⩾ 5 to achieve a short stabilization time. However, if
the value of M is too large, the performance in terms of throughput
drops since beam sweeps become inefficient. From our experiments,
we observe that M = 6 is typically a good trade-off. In comparison to
the default operation of the router, this means that the beam sweep
duration decreases by 82.4%. Moreover, our approach requires fewer
beam sweeps due to its high stability. Thus, the time spent on beam
training is much shorter.
6.2.4 Protocol Operation
Our last experiment evaluates the protocol operation when reacting
Interference from
multiple directions is
challenging.
to interference. We consider intermittent interference from two WiHD
transmitters located at different angles on the semicircle. When one of
the interfering nodes starts transmitting, the SNR drops at the station.
As a result, the default mechanisms in IEEE 802.11ad trigger a sector
level sweep to find a better receive beam. However, this new receive
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Figure 6.7: Stabilization time of our adaptive beam switching mechanism.
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beam is unlikely to also minimize the interference from the second
WiHD node or a mobile interferer. It causes IEEE 802.11ad to perform
sweeps continuously and jumps back and forth between different
beam patterns. Such frequent channel probing strongly degrades
the performance. In contrast, the system stability s in our protocol
prevents such fluctuations. To validate this, we emulate its behavior
and that of IEEE 802.11ad on real-world traces collected from our
practical testbed.
Figure 6.8 depicts two examples of the above scenario. In example
Our mechanism
quickly adapts to
changing conditions.
(a), the interfering nodes are placed at a reasonable angular distance
from the AP. As expected, IEEE 802.11ad continuously triggers beam
sweeps and switches among two different patterns. In contrast, our
adaptive approach quickly finds a suitable sector and stabilizes within
less than a millisecond. Figure 6.8 only shows the selected beam
patterns during the first 16 milliseconds of the experiment for clarity.
However, the fluctuations of IEEE 802.11ad continue until the end
of the experiment. The SNR graph of example (a) shows that our
protocol achieves a stable value whereas IEEE 802.11ad experiences
frequent SNR drops. As a result, the throughput improves by 72%.
In example (b), the interfering nodes are closer to the AP. This is
a particularly challenging scenario since the phased antenna array
of the routers is not capable of producing beam patterns which are
narrow enough to filter the interference spatially. Figure 6.8 shows
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that this increases the stabilization time to about six milliseconds.
As shown by the SNR graph, our mechanism chooses a trade-off
beam pattern that balances the impact of both interfering nodes. In Higher layer
protocols benefit
from high stability.
contrast, IEEE 802.11ad achieves a higher SNR at the expense of costly
beam sweeps and high instability. Although there is no throughput
gain, we achieve a very high connection stability, which is crucial for
upper-layer protocols such as TCP.
6.3 discussion and summary
Our adaptive beam switching mechanism mitigates lateral interference
Adaptive beam
switching reduces
the interference
among concurrent
transmissions.
in mm-wave wireless networks. It significantly reduces the beam
steering overhead in case of intermittent interference from neighboring
links. Such interference is critical in practical deployments due to the
strong side lobes of phased antenna arrays in consumer-grade mm-
wave devices. Whenever interference occurs, our mechanism switches
to an alternative beam at the receiver. Thus, the interference falls
into a minimum of the beam pattern. The key difference to existing
approaches is that ours does not need to probe all possible beam
patterns. Only the ones which are most likely to perform better
than the current one are needed. We evaluate the performance of our
protocol in practical experiments with off-the-shelf devices and achieve
average throughput gains of 60%. In contrast to conventional beam
sweeping as in IEEE 802.11ad, the training time reduces by 82.4%.

7
A D A P T I V E B E A M O P T I M I Z AT I O N
Designing wireless communication systems that operate at very high
State-of-the-art beam
training uses generic
beam patterns.
frequencies, manufacturers often resort to sub-optimal yet straight-
forward solutions. This case also applies for beamforming in current
off-the-shelf devices. The IEEE 802.11ad standard is limited to perform
the sector level sweep with a codebook of generic beam patterns. Such
patterns are envisioned to have a uniform narrow shape and cover the
entire space around the device. Instead of beamforming towards a spe-
cific direction, devices choose the beam pattern out of their codebook
which provides the highest gain in that direction. Unfortunately, a
large codebook of precise beams causes a significant overhead since all
beams are probed sequentially. As a trade-off, practical codebooks typ-
ically contain beams that cover a broader area or multiple directions
with reduced directionality.
We design a mechanism that adaptively optimizes the beam for
We adapt beam
patterns to the
current channel
conditions.
the current channel conditions. Using only non-coherent SNR mea-
surements, we enable full Channel State Information (CSI) extraction
on consumer-grade off-the-shelf devices. Our adaptive beam opti-
mization mechanism allows to fully exploit the capabilities of phased
antenna arrays in such devices. It probes the channel using carefully
engineered beam patterns that allow devices to extract both amplitude
and phase information from simple SNR readings. Since SNR measure-
ments are supported on all IEEE 802.11ad devices, our mechanism is
widely applicable.
By measuring the relative phase among all the elements in the
Relative phase
measurements reveal
the complex channel
state information.
antenna array, we obtain the CSI. Explicitly, we define one antenna
element as a reference and measure the relative phase to another
element. Both measured elements are switched on while all others
are turned off. Then, we transmit a probing frame for different phase
values at the antenna, thus cause phase-shifted signals at the receiver.
Figure 7.1 illustrates this approach with two-bit phase shifters. In
the received signal constellations, the complex gains of the reference
(blue) and of the other element (red) sum up. The sums (black)
for each of the four probes are affected by slight gain and phase
variations. Unfortunately, common off-the-shelf receivers only observe
the resulting amplitude regarding the received signal strength; they
typically do not expose the complex gains. Since the four probes cover
a 2π phase range, their powers must lie on a sinusoidal curve. Our
key insight is that the initial phase of that curve is directly related to
the relative phase among both antenna elements. By exploiting this
property using Fourier analysis to reconstruct the sinusoidal curve,
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Figure 7.1: Illustration of CSI extraction with phase-shifted SNR measure-
ments. The upper part shows the signal constellations with four
different phase shifts, whereas the lower part illustrates how we
derive the relative phase using a sinusoidal curve.
we compute the phase shift δ for the received signal. Figure 7.1 shows
an example for δ = π/4. Repeating the process for each element of
the antenna array, we obtain the full CSI and use it to derive beam
patterns that maximize the SNR and automatically exploit reflections
in the environment.
In the following, we state our protocol design to obtain full CSI
using only SNR measurements in Section 7.1. A practical evaluation in
an office environment as well as in an anechoic chamber is provided
in Section 7.2. Finally, at the end of this chapter, we discuss and
summarize our findings in Section 7.3.
7.1 protocol design
Our adaptive beam optimization approach operates between an AP
Our protocol
comprises the
channel estimation
and beam
optimization.
and a station, whereby both benefit from optimized beams. The
design of our protocol involves multiple aspects. In the following,
we provide on overview on the protocol operations, state our system
model, describe the estimation of complex channel gains, and, delve
into the generation of optimized beams that fully adapt to the channel.
7.1.1 Protocol Operation
Our protocol operation consists of two phases, 1) initialization and 2)
continuous adaptation as illustrated in Figure 7.2. In the initialization
phase, devices establish a connection using the default IEEE 802.11ad
procedure based on generic beam patterns. After that, we exhaustively
probe all of the antenna elements of the array. This one-time overhead
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Figure 7.2: Adaptive beam optimization with processing (gears symbol) and
communication (antenna symbol) steps.
allows us to obtain the full CSI and to determine which of the elements
contribute most to it. Based on this information, we restrict the Exhaustive antenna
probing causes a
one-time overhead.
following channel measurement to those elements. This significant
reduction of the probing overhead allows focusing on the subspace
of the channel which is relevant for the physical environment. The
number of used antenna elements N is determined by
N = arg maxn
(
∑n
k=1 ak)
2
n
, (7.1)
where ak is the amplitude of antenna k, and antenna elements are or-
dered by strength. To complete the initialization phase, we obtain the
beam pattern that maximizes the SNR within the computed subspace
and uses it for regular communication. After that, the continuous
adaptation phase allows us to re-adjust the beam pattern when the CSI
and the environment change during on-going communication. Simi-
larly to IEEE 802.11ad, our mechanisms probes the channel periodically
but limits the channel measurement to the strongest antenna elements
and thus to the current subspace. However, the subset of relevant an- Not all antennas
require probing
during the
continuous
adaptation.
tenna elements may change if the environment, for example, changes
due to user mobility. To adapt to such changes, we divide the periodic
channel probing sweep into a measurement part and an exploration
part. The channel measurement is performed over the subspace of
strongest antennas, whereas the exploration part probes a subset of
randomly chosen antenna elements. In doing so, the latter identifies
potential changes in the relevant channel subspace. As shown in
Figure 7.2, we choose the overall duration of the sweep such that it is
equivalent to that of a regular IEEE 802.11ad sector level sweep. Still, if
full CSI is desired, our protocol can easily be reconfigured to probe
all antenna elements at the expense of higher overhead. After each
periodic sweep, we recompute the beam pattern that maximizes the
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SNR. The complexity of the processing steps shown in Figure 7.2 isOur training
duration is equal to
that of the default
operation.
negligible due to the very high computational efficiency of our method.
It enables our protocol to operate both on powerful APs as well as
resource-constrained stations.
7.1.2 System Model
In our system model, we assume that both transceivers utilize a
Off-the-shelf devices
use analog
beamforming with a
single RF-chain.
phased antenna array that is capable of analog beamforming with an
arbitrary number of antenna elements. All these antenna elements
are connected to a single RF-chain and controllable via a weighting
network of amplifiers and phase shifters. This architecture is common
for off-the-shelf devices. More advanced beamforming techniques
such as digital or hybrid beamforming are expensive and not yet
available in consumer-grade devices.
When a transmitter sends a signal x towards a receiver, the sig-
nal gets distorted during the transmission. The received signal y is
expressed as
y = c ′Hpx+ c ′N, (7.2)
where c and p indicate the complex antenna gains at the receiver
and transmitter, respectively. H denotes the propagation effects of
the channel and N is uncorrelated additive white Gaussian noise.
The channel H represents geometrical propagation effects such as
reflections and blockage but also fading and free-space attenuation.
By this definition, the received signal power is computed as |c ′Hp|2.
For simplicity reasons, we ignore the noise power. Taking into account
that most off-the-shelf devices only expose the SNR or RSSI in dB-scale,
we obtain the received signal power by |c ′Hp|2 = 10
SNR
10 using the
well-known formula of the SNR in logarithmic units.
7.1.3 Complex Gain Estimation
The core contribution of our mechanism is to obtain the complex
We obtain the
complex channel
gains from simple
SNR measurements.
gain for each antenna element using simple strength readings. To
achieve this, we transmit multiple probing signals with different phase
shifts and use the received signal strengths to reconstruct the complex
gains. In particular, we obtain the relative phase shift of individual
antenna elements concerning a reference. Regarding this reference,
we distinguish between two different estimation variants for high and
low SNR scenarios. The former is the intuitive approach in which we
use a single antenna element as the reference and directly measure the
relative phase shift of other antenna elements. Unfortunately, the beam
patterns of single antenna elements expose a quasi-omnidirectional
shape with low gain. It allows channel estimation in all directions
when the link quality is sufficient, and devices are close to each other.
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However, when devices are far away, or only a non-line-of-sight link is
available, the gain of a single antenna element is insufficient to reach
the receiver. As a result, the reference cannot be received which makes
the channel estimation impossible. For these low SNR scenarios, we
propose the second variant that estimates the complex gains by using
a directional beam pattern with multiple active antenna elements as
the reference instead of the beam of a single antenna. It provides a
much stronger reference beam, but only allows the estimation of the
complex gains in the specific directions of that particular beam. In case
of sudden movement, when the receiver moves out of the reference
beam, the channel estimation is likely to fail. Thus, we have a trade-off
between both variants that address different application scenarios.
strong link estimation. In our first variant, we retrieve the
Strong link
estimation uses the
best antenna
elements as the
reference.
complex gains by enabling a single antenna element as a reference.
Given a phased antenna array with multiple elements, where each is
identified using an index k, the reference element is denoted with k¯.
All these elements expose a complex gain pk on the transmitted signal,
such that the overall gain of the array p is composed of pk∀k. In static
environments, the channel H and the complex receiving gain c are
assumed to be constant. Thus, p can be measured from the received
signal strength.
Measuring the amplitude of all antenna elements is straightforward.
For each antenna element, we generate a beam pattern by switching
on a single element at a time. Such a probing pattern for each antenna
element k is defined by:
pk ′ =
{
0 k ′ ̸= k
1 k ′ = k
, p =
p ′
∥p ′∥ , (7.3)
where p ′ refers to the non-normalized version of the gain. Using
this approach that requires n probes to measure the amplitude of
n antenna elements, we select the element that provides the highest
received signal strength as reference k¯.
For the phase shift measurements, we need to probe each antenna
Each antenna is
probed multiple
times with different
phase shifts.
element, except the reference, multiple times with different phase
shifted gains. For the reference element, zero relative phase shift is
assumed per definition. Being particularly interested in the relative
phase shift, we need to enable both antenna elements k and k¯ in a
probing pattern. For the element k, we probe four different phase
values p ′k ∈ {1, i,−1,−i}, while p ′¯k = 1 and all other elements are
set to zero. That is, each probing beam contains the sum of two
signals—the signal transmitted by the measured antenna element k
with one out of four different phase shifts and the reference signal from
element k¯. Using a wave decomposition expression and a fast Fourier
transform, we then extract the relative phase among the phase shifted
measurements as illustrated in Figure 7.1. The detailed formulation
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id psh (element phase) etype (element amplitude)
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ts 0 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
1 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
2 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
...
...
...
29 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0
30 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0
31 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4
re
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ti
ve
ph
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ts
32 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 4, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
33 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 4, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
34 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 4, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
35 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 4, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
36 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
37 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 4, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
...
...
...
150 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0
151 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, 0 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0
152 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4
153 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4
154 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4
155 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, · · · 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4
Table 7.1: Sample channel estimation codebook for complex gain retrieval in
strong links. The upper part shows 32 sectors for the amplitude
measurements, while the lower part 124 sectors for relative phase
measurements with the eights element as reference.
for this mathematical problem is stated in [Pal+18a]. The total numberProbing beams
contain the sum of
two signals.
of probes that are required directly relates to the number of elements
in the array. For the reference element, a single probe is sufficient to
obtain the amplitude; it has a relative phase shift of zero. For all other
elements, we need one probe to obtain the amplitude and four probes
to estimate the phase shift relative to k¯. Thus, for a total number of
n antenna elements, our approach requires n+ 4 (n− 1) probes to
retrieve the complex gain of the antenna array.
Many of current off-the-shelf devices, such as the Talon AD7200
Probing all 32
antenna elements
requires 156 beams.
(Chapter 4) use a phased antenna array with 32 elements. Using the
2-bit phase shifters and 3-bit amplifiers, we set-up a probing codebook
as stated in Table 7.1. For the phase shifters, we iterate through the
values 0 to 3 and set the amplitude to 4. In preliminary experiments,
this amplitude setting provided the best estimation accuracy. In
total, this channel estimation results in a codebook with 156 different
probing beams. As the devices only support to configure up to 64
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different beams at a time, we split the full estimation process into
three consecutive sweeps or reduce the number of interested antenna
elements. Using a full codebook, we could at least estimate 13 elements
simultaneously in a single sweep.
weak link estimation. As the channel estimation is only feasi-
Weak link estimation
uses a directional
beam as the
reference.
ble with a strong reference signal and the previous variant becomes
inaccurate with a low gain of k¯, we propose a second channel estima-
tion variant that operates with weak links. Instead of using a single
antenna element as a reference, it selects a directional beam with
multiple active antenna elements as the reference. The directionality
results in a higher received signal strength of the reference beam thus
increase the channel estimation accuracy. One of the generic beam
patterns that are configured by default on the devices can be chosen as
reference. Due to many active antenna elements, these beams provide
a strong gain even when single antenna elements are inactive. They
enable the estimation of complex gains on weak links. This becomes
useful when the link is blocked or devices communicate over long
distances. For this variant, we assume that the phase of the reference
beam is zero and determine the relative phase of all other antenna
elements.
To estimate the channel on weak links, we need to distinguish
We differentiate
between active and
inactive antenna
elements in the
reference beam.
between two cases when a) the measured antenna element is active in
the reference beam and whether it is not. For antenna elements that are
inactive in the reference beam, four different phase shifts need probing.
In addition to the active elements in the reference beam, the measured
element is activated with phase shifts {1, i,−1,−i}. This allows us to
estimate the relative phase as in the strong link estimation variant. To
assess the amplitude, we also compute the difference with respect to
the reference beam. For antenna elements that are already active in
the reference beam, the phase difference cannot be simply extracted.
The reference is already affected by this particular element. In this
case, only three other phase shifts must be probed and compared to
the existing one. It requires a more protracted analytical analysis,
but effectively reduces the number of required probes. A detailed
explanation of the mathematical model behind his computation is
provided in [Pal+18a; Pal+18b].
The channel estimation on weak links requires to generate of prob-
Channel estimation
on weak links
requires a dynamic
probing codebook.
ing codebook for a specific reference beam dynamically. Thus, defining
fixed codebook with static probing sectors as for the strong link esti-
mation in Table 7.1 is impossible in this scenario. The probing beams
highly vary with the antenna elements that are active in the reference
beam. Active antenna elements need to measured by the reference
beam itself and three additional probes with different phases. For inac-
tive antenna elements, we require four probes to estimate the complex
gain. In total, we need 1+ 3k+ 4 (n− k) probes for an antenna array
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with n elements of which k are active in the reference beam. Using
the default beam patterns of the Talon AD7200 with 8 active elements
on average, we need 121 probes to estimate all complex gains of the
antenna array.
7.1.4 Optimized Beam Patterns
Using the previously described channel estimation, we become able to
Optimized beam
patterns are
generated by
maximizing the
expected signal
strength.
compute beams that directly adapt to the current channel conditions
and maximize the SNR at the receiver. As discussed above, the received
signal strength is |c ′Hp|2. We derive a beam pattern p that maximizes
this equation by aligning the phases of all the antenna elements such
that their signals do not cancel each other and constructively interfere.
As the phase shifters in the array operate in a discrete space, we round
the phases to match the hardware’s resolution (2-bit for the Talon
AD7200). The computational complexity for this beam generation is
minimal, as the process requires simple matrix operations only. Thus,
we can compute the optimal beam pattern given specific channel
conditions highly efficient.
7.2 practical evaluation
For performance evaluation in two experiments, we implement our
We implement full
CSI extraction on
commodity hardware.
adaptive beam optimization mechanism on commodity off-the-shelf
hardware. In particular, we use the Talon AD7200 devices of our
testbed experimentation platform from Chapter 4. Setting specific
beams requires full access to the beamforming control and the un-
derstanding of the antenna layout. To include custom beam patterns
for the channel probing and communication, we modify the sector
sweep behavior. Our performance measurements are conducted in an
open-plan office environment as well as an anechoic chamber. By em-
bedding our implementation in the regular operation on the devices,
our results are obtained from actual data transmissions in the testbed
and not generated in post-processing. This approach enables us to
quantify the performance concerning the SNR, data rate, and through-
put using the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). In the following,
we first state our testbed setup. Then, we evaluate the signal strength,
throughput, as well as the data rate, and finally investigate the pattern
shapes of optimized beams.
7.2.1 Testbed Setup
Our prototype implementation consists of an IEEE 802.11ad AP that
serves one or multiple stations. We use the Talon AD7200 devices to
realize both, the AP and the stations. For ease of experimentation,
we control all devices from a laptop using our testbed automation
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Figure 7.3: Experiment setup in an indoor open-plan office environment.
system over a common 2.4GHz Wi-Fi network. Using this control and The evaluation
scenario contains one
AP and multiple
stations.
management network, we instruct the individual stations to connect
to the AP, generate traffic in the IEEE 802.11ad network, and collect
statistics. For simplicity, we run specific components of our algorithm
on the laptop, such as the reconfiguration of the codebooks. However,
these portions of the code could also run directly on the devices since
our approach has very low computational requirements.
The operation of our prototype is as follows. First, all devices,
We select different
codebooks and
measure the signal
strength and
throughput.
the AP and the stations, load their default codebook with generic
beam patterns. Then, the stations establish a connection to the AP
using the regular IEEE 802.11ad procedure. After that, we load an
initial measurement codebook on the devices and collect the resulting
SNR readings to compute a particular transmit beam pattern that
maximizes the signal quality for each link. We do this for the AP and
the stations to analyze both the up- and downlink. To specifically
optimize the beam patterns under low SNR conditions, we employ
the weak link estimation scheme described in Section 7.1.3. Finally,
all devices are re-configured with the optimized beam patterns and
generate traffic in the network. In particular, we use iperf3 [iPerf] to
sequentially generate uplink and downlink traffic for ten seconds on
each link. In each experiment, we repeat this measurement twenty
times while collecting statistics such as throughput, data rate, and
signal quality.
We evaluate our approach with performance measurements in an
Measurements are
taken at 24
distributed stations
in an office
environment.
open-plan office environment as shown in Figure 7.3. Additionally, we
characterize the generated beam patterns by radiation measurements
within an anechoic chamber. The open-plan office area has a size of
20m× 7.5m and is surrounded by twelve individual offices. The AP
is deployed below the ceiling next to the desks. Further, we place the
stations at 24 different positions within the room. Twelve of these
positions correspond to typical workspaces at the desks. The stations
are oriented such that they mimic the usual placement of a laptop.
Next, six positions are in an area without desks but still in line-of-
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sight of the AP. Finally, six additional positions are chosen behind
an isolated wall that separates the entry area from the open-plan
office space. These positions are not in line-of-sight, which means that
reflections are required to reach the AP.
7.2.2 Signal Gain Maximization
As described in Section 7.1.4, we design our mechanism to maximize
Optimized beams
increase the received
signal strength.
the signal strength at receivers. In the first part of our evaluation, we
conduct experiments to measure the SNR gains that are achievable with
our approach in comparison to the default IEEE 802.11ad operation
with generic beam patterns. For both we measure the SNR at all
positions of our office testbed on the up- and downlink. As shown
in our results in Figure 7.4, the generic beams patterns achieve an
average SNR of 6.46 dB for the uplink and 5.98 dB for the downlink.
Our optimized beams that adapt to the current channel conditions
increase the SNR up to 10.81 dB and 10.38 dB for the up- and downlink,
respectively. The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) reveals that
90% of the measurements with generic beam pattern expose an SNR
lower than 12.55 dB. In contrast, the optimized beams achieve an SNR
higher than this in about 45% of our measurements.
Table 7.2 lists the SNR gains achieved at individual measurement po-
Up- and downlink
results are
uncorrelated and
location dependent.
sitions in our testbed environment. We find that the distance between
AP and stations cause only a minor effect. However, the variance
among different positions is high. In some spots, only marginal gains
are observable while in others they are up to 8.00 dB. Some positions
can be easily reached via reflectors while others cannot. At location
20, for instance, the station could not establish a link at all. Moreover,
the gains on the up- and downlink are uncorrelated and may exploit
different reflection paths. In general, we observe an average increase
of the SNR by 4.35 dB on the uplink and by 4.40 dB on the downlink
when using our optimized beams instead of the generic ones.
To validate the high SNR gains, we additionally analyze the signal
Constellations of
optimized beams are
less noisy.
constellations at the physical layer. As the off-the-shelf devices do not
allow to access the raw signal samples, we utilize a platform similar
to our channel sounding platform as described in Section 3.1. In
particular, we place a Sivers IMA FC2221V/01 V-band down-converter
with a horn antenna at the location of the receiver and capture the
raw samples using a Keysight DSOS254A oscilloscope. The band-
width of the oscilloscope is sufficient to capture and decode the full
IEEE 802.11ad signal. Doing so, we obtain the In-phase and Quadrature
(IQ) constellations of data frames transmitted with both the generic
and optimized beam patterns and different Modulation and Coding
Schemes (MCSs). Figure 7.5 shows an example for frames with MCS 8,
which use a π/2-QPSK modulation. Our optimized beam patterns
show a visible accuracy improvement and lead to constellations that
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Figure 7.4: Average SNR and CDF of generic and optimized beam pattern for
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Figure 7.5: Constellation diagrams of MCS 8 encoded frames transmitted with
generic (left) and optimized beam patterns (right).
loc . uplink downlink
1 3.46 dB 2.08 dB
2 −0.26 dB 2.42 dB
3 2.27 dB 1.47 dB
4 6.76 dB 6.99 dB
5 6.47 dB 1.75 dB
6 5.11 dB 6.12 dB
7 5.45 dB 6.43 dB
8 1.40 dB 1.92 dB
9 6.80 dB 5.42 dB
10 7.39 dB 5.13 dB
11 3.93 dB 8.00 dB
12 5.66 dB 6.67 dB
loc . uplink downlink
13 5.37 dB 6.01 dB
14 2.00 dB 2.18 dB
15 6.89 dB 5.16 dB
16 4.28 dB 3.33 dB
17 2.08 dB 3.43 dB
18 3.71 dB 3.94 dB
19 4.45 dB 5.46 dB
20 n/a n/a
21 4.97 dB 4.68 dB
22 2.85 dB 1.45 dB
23 4.18 dB 4.20 dB
24 4.81 dB 7.02 dB
Table 7.2: SNR of our optimized beams relative to the generic ones. Each row
corresponds to a specific station location in our evaluation. The
station at location 20 could not connect.
96 adaptive beam optimization
are significantly less noisy than those of the generic beam patterns.
They effectively reduce the number of symbol errors, which in turn
improves the stability of the communication link.
7.2.3 Pattern Shapes
To characterize the optimized beam patterns that are computed with
Optimized beams
exhibit a higher
directionality.
our CSI estimation, we perform additional antenna radiation measure-
ments in an anechoic chamber. In particular, we mount an AP in the
center of the chamber on a pan-tilt unit to orient it in different azimuth
and elevation directions. A second device is configured as station and
placed few meters away with a fixed orientation to measure the CSI
as described above. First, the AP is oriented to different directions in
the azimuth plane with zero elevation. In all these orientations, we
compute the optimized beam patterns according to the strong link
estimation approach. Second, these beams are configured in a code-
book and configured on the devices. While the AP iterates through all
possible orientations, both devices record the received signal strengths
for each of the configured beams. Doing so, we obtain their radiation
patterns without any environmental reflections. Figure 7.6 illustrates
some of these beam patterns shapes for azimuth orientations of −30°,
−10°, 10° and 30° and zero elevation. Besides the optimized beam
patterns, the figure also depicts the generic beam patterns that the
device would choose according to the default IEEE 802.11ad operation.
These results show that our approach increases the achievable SNR
by about 5.17 dB and visibly lead to much more narrow beam lobes.
Thus, adaptive beam optimization provides a higher directionality.
While rotating the transmitter, we continuously measure the cover-
A uniform coverage
enables more flexible
device deployments.
age of the optimized and generic beam patterns. In each orientation,
the AP measures the CSI and computes an optimized beam. The sta-
tion measures the signal strength of the best generic beam as well as
of the beam that is optimized for that particular orientation. Thereby,
we assess the coverage of the default IEEE 802.11ad operation and our
adaptive beam optimization approach as shown in Figure 7.7. With the
generic beam patterns, we find a strong gain towards the front of the
device while the coverage in the back is significantly lower. During the
default operation, devices should face each other to achieve the best
link quality. Our approach provides uniform coverage in all directions.
It facilitates a more flexible device deployment and allows APs to be
mounted in locations where they do not necessarily face the stations.
Chapter 10 provides additional measurements of our optimized
beam patterns in three-dimensional environments and details the
complex gains of individual elements in the antenna array.
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Figure 7.6: Radiation patterns of optimized and generic beams in comparison.
Dashed lines show the maximum achievable gain.
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Figure 7.7: Measured coverage of generic and optimized beam patterns.
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Figure 7.8: Line-of-sight throughput CDF and MCS histogram. Dashed lines
indicate the downlink, whereas solid lines the uplink.
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Figure 7.9: Non-line-of-sight throughput CDF and MCS histogram. Dashed
lines indicate the downlink, whereas solid lines the uplink.
7.2.4 Throughput Improvement
The vast SNR improvement in Section 7.2.2 enables our devices to
Optimized beams
allow devices to
select higher MCS
switch to a higher MCS at most locations. As a result, we obtain
significant throughput gains when generating TCP traffic with iperf3
in the network. Figure 7.8 exemplary depicts the CDF of the achieved
TCP throughput at a location in line-of-sight of the AP in our testbed
environment. We achieve gains of 58% for the uplink and 102% for
the downlink, respectively; that is, the downlink throughput effec-
tively doubles. Moreover, the right graph in Figure 7.8 depicts the
distribution of the used MCS in all transmitted up- and downlink
frames for that location. As expected by the higher SNR the devices
tend to switch to higher MCS by using the optimized beams instead of
the generic ones. For instance, with our optimized beams, the devices
select MCS 8 for more than 70% of the transmitted frames. The default
operation sticks to a lower MCS for about 70%.
In Figure 7.9, we provide a similar analysis for a blocked location
without any line-of-sight link to the AP (see Figure 7.3). Due to the
blockage, the AP and the station must communicate via reflections.
Our results indicate that the generic beamforming mechanism in
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Figure 7.10: Throughput saturation at high MCS. MCS 5 and MCS 9 are not
implemented.
IEEE 802.11ad performs poorly in such a scenario. It only achieves an
average throughput of 42.7Mbps on the uplink and 314.54Mbps on We enable efficient
communication over
reflected signal
paths.
the downlink while mostly operating with MCS 1 to MCS 3. Despite
missing a strong link, our optimized beams inherently align towards
the reflection path and thereby increase the signal quality such that
transmissions with modulation higher than MCS 3 become feasible.
On both, the up- and downlink, we achieve a throughput of about
855Mbps, which is a remarkable gain. The generic beam patterns
are inappropriate for complex deployments with a high amount of
blockage. Our approach, in contrast, achieves order-of-magnitude
gains and facilitates a considerable throughput.
7.2.5 Expected Data Rate
Despite high SNR improvements and clear gains in the pattern shapes,
Devices are already
saturated with an
MCS below
maximum.
the throughput improvements at certain locations are marginal. To
explain this behavior, we delve into the internal operations of the
device. In many situations, it does not switch to higher modulations
even though the signal strength would be sufficient and increases
by factor 3 or more. In particular, the rate adaptation often does
not exceed MCS 8 even though the router implements up to MCS 12.
Figure 7.10 shows that in a typical scenario the throughput saturates
with MCS 8 at about 1.5Gbps. We observe this effect on many locations
of the testbed independent of the length of the link and other aspects
that impair the signal quality. Only situations in which the link
is not already saturated lead to high-performance gains. The rate
adaptation disfavors MCS configurations beyond MCS 8 that all base
on a Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) with 16 constellation
points (16-QAM). We assume that this is an intentional design decision
of the hardware manufacturer that tolerates certain limitations to
lower the production costs. The typical traffic on the router is limited
by the Gigabit Ethernet interface anyway such that IEEE 802.11ad is
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not the bottleneck and already saturates the system with an MCS
below maximum. In this regard, a conservative rate adaption that
does not switch to the maximum is sufficient and more robust against
decoding errors. As a result of these limitations, the benefits of our
beam optimization only become visible when a link using the generic
beam patterns of IEEE 802.11ad operates below MCS8. Otherwise, the
SNR improvement does not translate into an effective throughput gain.
Next generation devices that implement the IEEE 802.11ay standard
Next generation
systems supporting
higher data rates are
likely to benefit from
our optimization.
are expected to provide better support for data rates beyond 1Gbps.
Those could highly benefit from optimized beams for throughput
enhancements. To illustrate the benefits that would be achieved on
hardware that can process higher data rates, we compute the data rate
according to the expected MCS for a given SNR. To this end, we build
on the signal quality thresholds recommended in the IEEE 802.11ad
standard [IEE14] as listed in Table 2.1. Transforming the measured
SNRs to sensitivity thresholds, we look up the recommended MCS and
obtain the expected data rates. The values are then cross-validated
with our measurements.
Table 7.3 lists the expected data rate for the generic and our opti-
Expected data rates
increase by up to a
factor of 2.49.
mized beams as well as the achieved gains averaged over the up- and
downlink. In average, we increase the data rate by 60% and reach
3.20Gbps while the default operation with generic beam patterns only
facilitates 2.13Gbps. Strong gains are achieved across most locations
of the testbed. At specific stations, the gains reach up to a factor of
2.49. In a few cases, the achieved data rate is still limited. This effect
occurs in particularly challenging locations, such as the desks which
are very close to the AP. Since the AP hangs from the ceiling, the
vertical angle of the link towards the station located at the desks is
very steep. Due to the layout of the antenna array (see Section 4.3.2),
the vertical steering capability of the devices is limited. While those
links are inherently weak, our approach still provides a substantial
improvement even in such challenging scenarios. It enables the system
to reach a higher MCS in most cases.
7.3 discussion and summary
Our adaptive beam optimization requires additional SNR feedback.
The training
overhead is
adjustable.
Instead of feeding back only the ID of the best antenna beam pattern
as with conventional beam training, the SNRs of all the beam patterns
that were probed are required. Furthermore, the overhead to acquire
full channel state information would be higher than that of the con-
ventional IEEE 802.11ad training. However, measuring the full CSI for
all antenna elements is usually not necessary. Our mechanism can
flexibly adjust the number of active antennas based on how rapidly
the sub-channel changes, thus, allowing us to reduce the overhead and
achieve a desired accuracy. Probing a single sector in the sector level
7.3 discussion and summary 101
location generic optimized gain
1 0.79Gbps 1.48Gbps 1.86
2 0.77Gbps 0.95Gbps 1.23
3 0.77Gbps 1.09Gbps 1.42
4 2.50Gbps 4.56Gbps 1.82
5 3.98Gbps 4.62Gbps 1.16
6 2.70Gbps 4.09Gbps 1.52
7 2.52Gbps 4.58Gbps 1.82
8 4.62Gbps 4.62Gbps 1.00
9 2.29Gbps 4.01Gbps 1.75
10 2.03Gbps 3.62Gbps 1.78
11 2.68Gbps 4.51Gbps 1.69
12 1.93Gbps 2.81Gbps 1.46
13 2.66Gbps 4.57Gbps 1.72
14 4.24Gbps 4.62Gbps 1.09
15 2.50Gbps 4.18Gbps 1.67
16 2.20Gbps 2.70Gbps 1.23
17 2.41Gbps 2.81Gbps 1.17
18 1.12Gbps 2.26Gbps 2.03
19 1.30Gbps 2.44Gbps 1.87
20
21 2.09Gbps 3.47Gbps 1.66
22 0.77Gbps 1.17Gbps 1.53
23 0.77Gbps 1.92Gbps 2.49
24 1.34Gbps 2.48Gbps 1.86
Table 7.3: Expected data rate with generic and our optimized beams for each
specific station location in our testbed.
sweep takes about 2.8µs (see Chapter 5). Hence, probing all N = 32
antenna elements would need N+ 4 (N− 1) = 156 probes, which re-
sults in a total training time of about 2.8ms. With 13 active antenna
elements, we perform the beam training as fast as the IEEE 802.11ad
sector level sweep with 64 sectors in about 1.2ms. As not all antenna
elements contribute to good beam patterns, learning a sub-space of
the channel with less active antenna elements is usually sufficient and
provides a good trade-off between overhead and performance.
This flexible overhead also allows our approach to adapt to mobil-
The estimation
should adapt to the
channel dynamics.
ity which requires to train the beams continuously. By adapting the
number of active antennas in the array, we can select a training over-
head that matches the dynamics of the devices and the environment.
Specifically, we only need to probe a small sub-space of the channel in
case the movement is small.
102 adaptive beam optimization
Throughout our evaluation, our CSI estimation mechanism probes
The overhead does
not increase with the
hardware precision.
each possible value of the phase-shifters. The resulting overhead is
limited for two-bit phase shifters that are prevalent in off-the-shelf de-
vices but would increase significantly for higher-resolution hardware.
However, four samples are sufficient to reconstruct the sinusoidal
curve. More probes only compensate for inaccuracies in the SNR
readings. To keep the overhead low, we propose to probe four phase
shift values even if more combinations are possible.
In summary, obtaining full CSI on mm-wave devices enables beam-
Our approach
enables CSI
extraction from
non-coherent signal
strength
measurements.
forming to achieve higher directionality. It allows for more accurate
beam steering and exploits multi-path effects caused by reflectors and
obstacles in the environment. Unfortunately, this requires complex
channel measurements which are not provided by commercial off-the-
shelf devices. We propose an adaptive beam optimization scheme that
extracts full CSI on such devices from non-coherent signal strength
measurements. In particular, we engineer beam patterns with con-
stant phase shifts that allow extracting CSI regarding the phase and
magnitude from simple SNR readings. As such readings are available
on most devices, our approach is easily portable to any hardware.
Moreover, we use the obtained CSI to compute beam patterns that
Optimized beams
fully adapt to the
environments.
adapt to the environment and maximize the signal strength at receivers.
In this way, we avoid destructive interference and inherently choose
the best available path between transmitter and receiver. Using our
testbed experimentation framework, we implement our scheme on
IEEE 802.11ad tri-band routers by accessing the beamforming control of
the integrated 32-element phased antenna array. Measurements of the
optimized beam-pattern reveal that our scheme significantly increases
the directionality. Evaluations in a real-world office environment show
that our optimized beams increase the signal strength by 4.38 dB and
achieve a 60% higher data rate.
Part IV
S E C U R I T Y
This part of the thesis addresses security aspects of mm-
wave communication systems. We investigate the feasi-
bility of eavesdropping on reflections with environmental
objects in Chapter 8. Followed by Chapter 9, in which we
analyze attacks on the beam training in IEEE 802.11ad and
tamper with the beam steering.

8
E AV E S D R O P P I N G O N R E F L E C T I O N S
The high carrier frequency of mm-wave communications induces
Directionality
impedes
eavesdropping and
other network
attacks.
very specific signal propagation effects. Since path loss increases
quadratically with the frequency, high antenna directionalities are
required to realize links at Wi-Fi scale distances. Indeed, IEEE 802.11ad
specifies beamwidths as small as 3 degrees [Nit+14] to compensate
the attenuation. Because of the narrow beamwidth, it is often asserted
that mm-wave networks are inherently resilient to eavesdropping.
Many publications [Fre13; Yan+15] assume that eavesdropping is
infeasible if the eavesdropper is forced to locate itself several degrees
off the path between the transmitter and the receiver. However, at the
mm-wave frequencies, even small-scale objects can cause significant
reflections. In this chapter, we practically investigate the vast impacts
of inconspicuous objects on mm-wave security. We assess the feasibility
of eavesdropping on directional mm-wave links in Section 8.1, perform
experimental measurements in Section 8.2, and discuss and summarize
our findings in Section 8.3.
8.1 attack method
Eavesdropping is a prevalent attack in wireless communications and
Mm-wave signals
reflect on many
environmental
objects.
easy to mount with off-the-shelf equipment. Attacks typically exploit
the omnidirectional propagation characteristics to overhear the com-
munication at remote locations. Due to the high directionality, this is
challenging in mm-wave communications. Mm-wave signals are easy
to reflect on a variety of plain surfaces, walls, and buildings [Rap+14].
Exploiting these reflections may compensate the challenge of direction-
ality from a security perspective and facilitate eavesdropping outside
of the intended signal beam’s coverage.
Transmitter
Signal beam
Environmental object
Reﬂections
Receiver
Figure 8.1: Small-scale object exploited by an eavesdropper to create a virtual
periscope and reflect the signal out of the intended signal beam.
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Eavesdroppers may intercept highly directional transmissions by
Reflections may
facilitate
eavesdropping on
directional links.
creating a virtual periscope using a small-scale object as a reflector.
In contrast to large-scale reflections that make eavesdropping evident
to the receiver, we consider inconspicuous environmental objects are
sufficiently small not to impede the intended communication. These
objects are placed to redirect only parts of the transmitted signal out-
side of the designated signal beam as illustrated in Figure 8.1. Varying
the geometry and material properties of potential reflectors facilitates
an eavesdropper to decode the reflected signal and simultaneously
impede the attack from being detected. In particular, we consider
three classes of attackers:
• Object manipulator. This attacker tampers with the environment,
by placing or moving small-scale physical objects. It carefully
manipulates objects in proximity of the signal beam. Thus,
these objects cause reflections that are directed towards the
eavesdropping antenna.We consider different
attacker classes: the
object manipulator,
the nomadic attacker,
as well as the
opportunistic
stationary attacker.
• Nomadic attacker. This attacker is mobile, but cannot manipulate
physical objects. Nomadic attackers do not place any additional
objects but instead, find a favorable location to exploit existing
reflections from the environment.
• Opportunistic stationary attacker. This attacker neither moves it-
self nor any environmental object. It avoids any suspicion and
possibly leaves only an eavesdropping ‘bug’ in the environment.
Consequently, this attacker must solely rely on reflections to-
wards its specific location, which are caused by environmental
objects within the narrow beam of the intended communication.
In the following, we state our system model, detail the attacker
classes, describe the topology and environment, and indicate our
performance metrics.
8.1.1 System Model
Our system model consists of three communication parties (1) a trans-
Our system model
comprises Alice, Bob,
and Eve.
mitter Alice, (2) a receiver Bob, and (3) an eavesdropper Eve. Alice
transmits a signal towards Bob that she wants to keep secret from Eve
by using a narrow beamwidth. We assume that both antennas of Alice
and Bob are perfectly aligned and transmit in the optimal direction.
Eve aims at revealing the information that Alice sends to Bob without
obstructing it. She tries to receive reflections from objects in the signal
beam. For convenience, Eve is assumed to use the same hardware as
Alice and Bob, acts passively, and is only listening for signals from
Alice.
To set up a link budget, we use the Free-Space Path Loss (FSPL)
model. It is a good approximation for the propagation loss experienced
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at a certain distance from the transmitter in free space without any
environmental obstacles. According to [Whi05], the FSPL is defined as We set up a link
budget model to
assess the received
signal strength in
free space.
FSPL =
(4πdf
c
)2
, (8.1)
where f is the carrier frequency of the signal, d the distance to the
transmitter, and c the speed of light. We express reflections and
blockage of objects inside the signal beam by additional gains and
blockage. In particular, the received signal strength with reflections in
dB-scale is determined by
Pr[dB] = Ptx +Gtx − FSPLd +Gr +Grx, (8.2)
where Ptx is the transmitted power, Gtx and Grx are the antenna gains
at the transmitter and receiver, FSPLd denotes the FSPL at a distance d,
and Gr is the reflection gain. In terms of blockage, the received signal
strength is expressed by
Pb[dB] = Ptx +Gtx − FSPLd − Lb +Grx, (8.3)
where Lb denotes the blockage loss.
Assuming that all devices have identical hardware components
We make the same
assumptions for all
devices.
and operate at the same beamwidth, we set Gtx equal to Grx and
consider Ptx to be constant. Thus, the received signal strength only
depends on the reflectivity, blockage, and distance between the devices.
This assumption implies that variations in distance compensate bad
reflectivity or blockage and vice versa. Practical antennas for mm-
waves achieve directivity gains above 20 dB. Objects of different size,
shape, and orientation may feature different characteristics. Although
this model does not incorporate any misalignment of the antennas and
reflectors, it provides a basic understanding of the scenarios covered
in this work and guides us in specifying the attacker models in the
following.
8.1.2 Attacker Classes
Throughout this work, we distinguish three attacker classes, (1) the
object manipulator that moves and places objects to cause reflections,
(2) the nomadic attacker that moves itself and exploits reflections of
existing objects, and (3) the opportunistic stationary attacker that can
neither move nor manipulate the environment. In detail, the attackers
are specified as follows.
the object manipulator . The object manipulator considers Eve
The object
manipulator tampers
with objects in the
environment.
to be located at a fixed location outside of the coverage of the intended
signal beam. From this location, it is impossible to receive the signal
directly. However, Eve tampers with the environment and places
arbitrary objects to cause reflections towards her direction. She is able
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Figure 8.2: System model showing the setup of Alice, Bob, and Eve with
reflections of the signal.
to steer her antenna towards this object to optimally receive reflections
of the transmitted signal. By doing so, she aims at obtaining a signal
quality sufficient for information decoding. At the same time, Eve
tries to remain invisible to Alice and Bob by causing only marginal
blockage of the direct signal transmission.
the nomadic attacker . In contrast to the previous class, the
The nomadic attacker
is mobile a seeks for
good eavesdropping
locations.
nomadic attacker does not assume Eve to change the environment but
tries to exploit existing environmental reflections. Eve freely chooses
a location outside the beam coverage and steers her antenna towards
any reflector in the environment. Unable to affect the blockage at all,
she only aims at maximizing her received signal quality by seeking
for the optimal eavesdropping location and orientation. Relying on
existing reflections is more challenging than manipulating the ob-
jects. However, detecting the nomadic attack is more difficult because
nothing in the environment changes from the normal operation.
the opportunistic stationary attacker . In the opportunis-
The opportunistic
stationary attacker
acts completely
passive.
tic stationary attacker model, Eve can neither manipulate the environ-
ment nor move herself to an optimal position. This implies that she
must entirely rely on environmental objects in the hope that a signal
may eventually reflect towards her location. Similar as in the nomadic
attacker model, Eve does not cause any blockage. Her only option is
to steer her antenna from a fixed location. This class constitutes the
weakest attacker in our consideration but makes Eve nearly impossi-
ble to detect. Neither the environment nor Eve’s location causes any
suspicious change.
8.1.3 Topology and Environment
In our testbed environment, reflecting objects are located on the center
line of the narrow beam between Alice and Bob. This is the optimal
case that causes the highest reflection and blockage. As illustrated in
Figure 8.2, Bob is located in the shadow region behind the blocking and
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Figure 8.3: Variation of the system model with different surface shapes of
the reflecting object.
reflecting object. Eve resides outside the direct coverage of the signal
beam and only receives the reflections that bounce off the object. We Objects may have
convex or concave
surfaces.
consider reflecting objects with different characteristics of reflectivity
and blockage. Both of these characteristics vary with the material and
size, as well as with the structure and shape of the object. With planar
reflector surfaces the transmitted and reflected beams expose the same
beamwidth. Convex surfaces, in contrast, disperse the reflections in
different directions as illustrated in Figure 8.3a. On the contrary, with
concave reflector surfaces, the signal focuses towards a certain focal
point, as shown Figure 8.3b. At this point the signal bundles its power
and can be received with high strength. Throughout our investigation,
we only consider first-order reflections and omit additional reflectors.
8.1.4 Performance Metrics
To evaluate the performance of eavesdropping, we measure the signal
We measure the
signal strength and
bit errors.
strength and Bit Error Rate (BER) during data transmission. The
signal strength at Bob and Eve reveal the effective reflectivity r and
blockage b of an object as
r = max (sEve) / max
(
sopt
)
(8.4)
b = 1−
(
max (sBob) / max
(
sopt
))
. (8.5)
In this equation sBob and sEve are the received signal strengths at Bob
and Eve in linear scale. The optimal received signal strength from a
direct transmission without reflectors is denoted by sopt. Further, the
secrecy capacity [BR06] expresses the performance of eavesdropping
as
cs = log10 (1+ sBob) − log10 (1+ sEve) . (8.6)
The normalized secrecy capacity represents the advantage in signal
quality of Bob over Eve by residing in the beam. Its maximum value The secrecy capacity
describes the
eavesdropping
resistance.
of 1 implies that Eve is unable to decode anything from the signal. In
contrast, the lowest value of 0 indicates that the signal strength at Eve
is at least as high as at Bob which facilitates perfect eavesdropping.
Additionally, the effective blockage represents the attenuation of the
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signal by placing the reflector in the beam. The reflectivity is the
relative reflected signal strength compared to the signal strength atWe determine the
effective blockage and
relative reflectivity.
Bob in unblocked transmission. Blockage and reflectivity are both
considered in the secrecy capacity. Eavesdropping achieves the best
performance by lowering the secrecy capacity. Within our attacker
model, we aim at low secrecy capacities while simultaneously reducing
the effective blockage to remain undetected.
8.2 practical investigation
To develop an understanding of the aforementioned attacker classes,
Experiments are
performed with our
channel sounding
platform.
we evaluate the eavesdropping performance using our channel sound-
ing platform from Section 3.1 in practical experiments. Using the
Software-Defined Radio (SDR) based setup, we transmit custom sig-
nals and evaluate the received and decoded data. Our evaluation
scenario comprises a transmitter and a receiver with directional an-
tennas as well a variety of small-scale objects between them. For each
object, we measure the reflections towards an eavesdropper and the
blockage of the targeted transmission. We vary the shape, size, and
material of the object to represent a wide variety of ordinary small-
scale objects spanning from coffee cups to cell phones. Such objects
could be placed in a particular location by the object manipulator or
represent those that are common in the environment without object
manipulation. The eavesdropper is placed in an exhaustive set of
locations in order to represent the nomadic attacker and also to evaluate
the spatial footprint of an opportunistic stationary attacker. In particular,
we conduct five different testbed experiments that show:
(1) the feasibility of eavesdropping on reflections,
(2) reflector location optimization,
(3) freedom-of-space from scattering,
(4) focused reflections for improved signal strength, and
(5) reflections on common communication devices.
In all these experiments, the transmitter is mounted on a rotation
The transmitter is
optimally steered
towards the receiver.
head to steer the signal in different directions. This ensures that the
signal beam is in at least one orientation optimally aligned to the
receiver. The receiving antenna is placed at various locations as seen
in Figure 8.4. Depending on the experiment, we evaluate different
distances of Bob in direct line of the transmission and change the offset
angles of Eve with a constant distance to the reflector. Eve’s initial
orientation is perpendicular to the transmission direction. In every
experiment, we conduct 100 iterations and state the 95% confidence
intervals for measurements of the BER and signal strength. The signal
strength is expressed in dB and normalized to the noise floor.
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Figure 8.4: Experimental setup showing the communication parties and loca-
tion variations analyzed throughout our evaluation.
8.2.1 Baseline and Setup
Before starting the individual experiments, we analyze the baseline
Measurements
without any reflector
are used as a
baseline.
and measure the performance of Bob and Eve without any objects
in the beam. These measurements produce sopt, which is needed for
the effective reflectivity and blockage calculations via Equation 8.4
and Equation 8.5 in the subsequent experiments. The antennas for
Alice and Bob are distributed at a fixed distance of 2m away from
each other. Eve resides 1m away from the direct link and is oriented
perpendicular to the transmission direction. In optimal transmission
without any objects in the beam, Bob’s signal strength peaks at perfect
alignment of 0° with 23.9 dB. Since we are using an antenna with a
beamwidth of 7°, the signal strength drops by about 3 dB at an offset
angle of 3.5°. Due to the narrow beamwidth, no signal is measured at
Eve which is unsurprising as she resides outside the beam.
8.2.2 Feasibility of Eavesdropping
In our first experiment, we evaluate the impact of an object manipula-
We analyze the
blockage and
reflectivity of various
objects of different
sizes.
tor by placing arbitrary objects in the signal beam to cause reflections
towards Eve’s antenna. Although it is well-known that mm-waves
reflect off metallic reflectors and many other materials, we investigate
the critical point between reflector size and material and the effective
blockage and reflectivity. An optimal reflector maximizes reflectivity
for eavesdropping but simultaneously minimizes blockage to avoid
being detected. In particular, we use a metal block and small metal
sheets of different sizes. Besides, reflections of a block of wood and
acrylic glass are evaluated as well. Given the narrow beamwidth,
all objects (except the acrylic glass) are significantly smaller than the
beam, which has a width of 12 cm at 1m distance.
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Figure 8.5: Reflectivity and blockage of different objects in the beam.
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Figure 8.6: Achievable secrecy capacity with different objects in the beam.
The larger metal sheet and the wood block cause high attenuation,
Most objects with
high reflectivity
block the intended
signal.
while all other objects only marginally block the signal. Apparently,
metal causes strong reflections, but their strength highly depends on
the reflector’s size. Only the smallest 10× 10mm2 metal sheet results
in a low received signal strength at Eve. Even the wood block and
acrylic glass, both with plain surfaces, cause considerable reflections.
The effective reflectivity r (see Equation 8.4) and blockage b (see
Equation 8.5) of each object is shown in Figure 8.5. With an effective
reflectivity of 96%, as for the metal block, the signal quality at Eve is
nearly as good as at Bob. Unfortunately, this high reflectivity comes
with high blockage of 63% and might be easily detectable. While the
smaller metal sheets block less than 1% of the signal, they still provide
a notable effective reflectivity of up to 16%. With a reflectivity of 47%
and a blockage of 10%, the acrylic glass is a good trade-off between
both characteristics.
All analyzed objects in our experiment lower the secrecy capacity
All reflecting objects
decrease the secrecy
rate.
as shown in Figure 8.6. Featuring a small size, the 25× 25mm2 metal
sheet decreases the secrecy capacity by 32%. The metal block of size
70× 70mm2 diminishes the secrecy capacity to 1%, which means that
Eve’s reception becomes nearly as good as Bob’s.
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Figure 8.7: Effective reflectivity, blockage, and secrecy capacity for Alice
and Eve at fixed positions and Bob with varying distance. An
increasing distance of Bob leads to higher reflectivity and lower
blockage and secrecy capacity.
8.2.3 Reflector Location Optimization
While the previous section reveals the feasibility of eavesdropping
By moving the
receiver, we vary the
relative
eavesdropping
distance.
on reflections, the question on where to place the reflector is still
unanswered. In our second experiment, we aim to determine the opti-
mal reflecting location that diminishes the secrecy capacity of Alice’s
transmission. The object manipulator optimizes its performance by
varying the relative object location within the beam. To cause the
reflections, we use a medium size metal sheet of size 70× 70mm2.
While the reflector and the eavesdropper are located at fixed locations
separated by 1m, the receiving antenna for Bob is placed at distances
of 1m, 2m, and 3m away from the reflecting object. This setup results
in a communication distance of 2m, 3m, and 4m between Alice and
Bob, respectively. As in the previous experiment, the eavesdropping
distance is kept constant at 2m. By varying only the distance of Bob
and not that of Eve, we ensure to maintain the same reflections in all
evaluation steps. However, varying this distance affects the optimal
received signal strength sopt at Bob in direct transmission without
blockage. For larger distances between Alice and Bob, the relative
eavesdropping distance decreases and perform differently.
Only considering shadowing effects, we would expect Bob’s signal
Small objects are
affected by
diffraction.
strength sBob to decrease similar to sopt and the effective blockage
to be constant. In the line-of-sight setting, Bob always resides in the
shadow region. However, as seen in Figure 8.7, the blockage decreases
with Bob’s distance. This effect must be caused by diffraction, which
still occurs in mm-waves around small obstacles [Jac+12; Kle+12].
Diffraction, by implication, assists the eavesdropper in remaining
invisible by lowering the effective blockage. Furthermore, the effective
reflectivity increases with Bob’s distance. The reflected signal does
not change, but, since sopt decreases, the relation between Eve’s and
Bob’s signal strength becomes greater.
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Figure 8.8: Effective reflectivity for different eavesdropper locations.
Since the effective reflectivity increases more than the blockage
Reflectors are ideally
placed close to Alice.
decreases, the secrecy capacity decreases with Bob’s distance. In this
particular experiment, we observe the secrecy capacity to decrease by
81% when moving Bob’s antenna from 1m to 3m away. The optimal
position for placing the reflecting object is, apparently, close to Alice.
By placing an object there, Eve not only increases the reflected signal
strength but also can be less afraid of blocking too much of the beam.
8.2.4 Freedom-of-Space from Scattering
Finding the optimal reflector orientation is a challenging task. Small
Scattering
compensates small
misalignments of
reflectors.
misalignments can have significant impacts on the signal quality at
Eve. This experiment analyzes the freedom-of-space that a nomadic
attacker has in choosing its location for a fixed reflector. In addition
to that, we investigate whether scattering helps the opportunistic sta-
tionary attacker. The more locations from which Eve can successfully
eavesdrop, the more likely an opportunistic stationary attacker can be
successful despite not moving itself nor altering the environment. We
set up this experiment as the first one (Section 8.2.2), but instead of
placing Eve only perpendicular to the beam directions, we move her
on a circle around the reflecting object. Figure 8.8 shows the reflected
signal strength with different reflectors over varying eavesdropping
angles. With the metal block of 70× 70mm2 placed as the reflector,
the signal strength strongly decreases when moving away from the
optimal position of 90°. At an offset of 7°, the signal strength already
drops by around 10 dB. Round objects like a porcelain cup and a
metal shielded cup reflect much weaker than the planar metal sheet.
However, they feature a nearly constant signal strength over a wide
range of eavesdropping positions; they scatter the signal to multiple
directions.
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Figure 8.9: Secrecy capacity in dependency of the eavesdropper’s location.
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Figure 8.10: Signal strength of the eavesdropped signal with bent reflectors.
The secrecy capacities shown in Figure 8.9 support our finding
Attackers may
benefit from
scattering on round
objects.
that attackers residing not in the optimal reflection direction might
improve their performance with round reflectors. In this particular
scenario, we observe that the round metal reflector provides better
reflections than the planar one at an offset angle of approximately 10°.
When only the coarse beam direction is known, an attacker benefits
from these scattering effects. They become particularly important for
the opportunistic stationary attacker that is limited in mobility.
8.2.5 Reflection Focusing
To analyze if reflectors can focus the signal towards the attacker, we
use a planar, concave, and convex metal sheet of size 100× 200mm2 as
reflecting object. In contrast to the previous experiments, the reflectors
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Figure 8.11: Blockage and reflectivity of objects with different bendings.
are larger, because they are easier to bend to the correct curvature.
Figure 8.10 shows the signal strength at Eve with these objects overConcave surfaces
focus the reflections. the transmitter’s azimuth angle. With the insights from the previous
experiment, it is obvious that the convex reflector provides a low signal
strength. However, slight deformations of only a few millimeters are
sufficient to optimally focus the beam for our evaluation setup where
Alice and Eve are both 1m away from the reflector. Compared to the
planar reflector, we achieve an increase in the signal strength of 1.5 dB.
Since the size of the object does not vary, the blockage remains constant.
Still, the effective reflectivity varies as depicted in Figure 8.11. Concave
reflectors bundle the reflected signal towards a focal point at which
very high signal strengths are achievable. Object manipulators, as wellFinding the focal
point is challenging. as nomadic attackers, can exploit this to obtain better eavesdropping
performance. However, they only benefit from focusing the signal
beam when residing precisely at the focal point. For that reason, this
approach is unfavorable for the opportunistic stationary attacker. Even
small misalignments in position and orientation may lead to massive
losses in the signal strength.
8.2.6 Reflections on Commodity Devices
Regular communication devices—which will be equipped with mm-
Commodity devices
cause reflections on
their surfaces.
wave hardware soon—cause reflections towards potential eavesdrop-
pers. These devices are typically made of materials with high reflec-
tivity. Both nomadic attackers and opportunistic stationary attackers
can take advantage of such reflections despite not being able to place
their own reflectors. To analyze how strong these reflections are in
practice, we place several communication devices in our evaluation
setup. In particular, we use an iPhone 6, a laptop, and a Mac mini in
different orientations. Similar to the previous experiments, they are
deployed at a distance of 1m away from the transmitter and receive
the reflected signal at 1m distance perpendicular to the transmission
direction. As shown in Figure 8.12, the signal that is reflected at a
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Figure 8.12: Reflected signal strength with common communication devices.
laptop display achieves the highest strength of 24 dB. This is as high
as we observed in direct transmission without reflectors. The side of
the laptop, the iPhone display, and the Mac Mini also achieve reflected
signal strengths between 14 and 19 dB. Only the side of an iPhone
is too small and curved to cause significant reflections towards the
eavesdropping antenna; the signal strength remains below 4 dB. These
results imply that reflections can be caused not only by specifically
placed reflectors but also by inconspicuous consumer devices. In a typ-
ical communication scenario, the signals may reflect on the surface of
the receiver and enable a nomadic attacker as well as an opportunistic
stationary attacker to eavesdrop without changing the environment.
Our practical evaluation with testbed experiments shows that eaves-
Eavesdropping on
environmental
reflections is feasible.
dropping on reflected mm-wave transmissions is possible and enables
attackers to reside outside the designated signal beam. Further, it
shows that varying the reflector position affects the eavesdropping
performance and that small-scale diffraction helps to be undetectable.
By bending objects, we reveal that concave surfaces scatter the signal
and increase the freedom-of-space at the cost of signal strength. In con-
trast, convex surfaces focus the beam and increase the signal strength
at certain positions. Finally, we demonstrate that not only additional
reflectors but also the intended recipient’s devices can cause signif-
icant reflections of mm-waves. A summary of all evaluated objects
along with their measurement results is provided in Table 8.1.
8.3 discussion and summary
Although mm-wave communication systems are often addressed as
intrinsically secure against eavesdropping from afar, our practical
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work demonstrates that this is not the case. We introduce three
distinct attacker models and evaluate their performance in practical
experiments. Our findings prove that highly directional mm-wave
transmissions are not intrinsically secure against attackers outside the
beam. Despite evaluating only low distances in our laboratory setup,
we show that environmental objects cause strong reflections outside
of the expected coverage.
Attackers of the object manipulator class can tamper with the en-
Manipulating objects
in the environment
can direct reflections
towards an attacker.
vironment by placing objects in the signal beam to cause reflections
towards a fixed eavesdropping antenna. Using this method, they can
achieve good reflections with low blockage. Our experiments show
that it is possible to place objects in such a way that reflections fa-
cilitate eavesdropping: objects as small as 25× 25mm2 decrease the
secrecy capacity by 32% without any effective blockage. For a fixed
object size, the blockage remains nearly independent from the object’s
shape and orientation, but the effective reflectivity towards a certain
eavesdropping position varies. Sophisticated object structures with
concave surfaces can focus the signal beam towards a certain eaves-
dropper. For example, bending a metal reflector leads to a received
signal strength at the eavesdropper as high as that at the intended
receiver. An attacker with physical access to the environment can
achieve good eavesdropping performance.
Nomadic attackers fall into a significantly weaker attacker class
Nomadic attackers
exploit existing
reflections in the
environment.
and cannot actively manipulate the environment. Yet, they can also
achieve a good eavesdropping performance by exploiting reflections
that occur in the environment and at the surface of the communication
devices itself. The nomadic eavesdropper seeks to find a location at
which strong reflections are receivable with a minimal position change
to avoid detection. We demonstrate that device-incident reflections
of common communication devices, such as a laptop or a mobile
phone, are sufficient to enable eavesdropping: essentially the recipient
becomes the traitor to itself. In such a scenario, the attacker only has
to find a good location, point its antenna toward the receiver, and then
eavesdrops on the reflected signals that bounce off of the device.
The opportunistic stationary attacker is less powerful; it must eaves-
Completely passive
attackers need to
compensate poor
signals.
drop from a given location without being able to manipulate objects
in the environment. Our results show that round objects disperse the
signal into multiple directions, thus facilitating attacks from oppor-
tunistic attackers. In most cases, however, we found the signal to be
too weak for effective eavesdropping. If the attacker is off by only a
few degrees from the optimal angle of reflection, the signal strength
strongly impairs. Consequently, this attack likely needs to compensate
for poor signal quality. Besides using expensive antenna apertures,
this attack might be launched by multiple cooperative eavesdroppers
in a distributed attack with several eavesdropping elements planted
throughout the environment.

9
B E A M S T E A L I N G
Compensating for high attenuation, mm-wave communications ap-
Beam stealing
tampers with the
beam selection.
ply beam steering. This provides strong directionality and allows to
transmit signals only in a particularly preferred direction. As revealed
experimentally in the last chapter, this directionality leaves a false
sense of security in case of environmental reflections. However, also
the underlying training protocols such as the sector level sweep in
IEEE 802.11ad [Nit+14; IEE14] are unprotected against malicious be-
havior. Finding the optimal antenna steering typically takes place
before any secure channel is established. The sector level sweep sends
probing frames over all available beams. Receivers report the one
that is received with the highest signal strength such that its beam
can be selected for further transmissions. Since this process is neither
authenticated nor encrypted, devices cannot distinguish whether the
feedback comes from the expected peer or an attacker. An Attacker
might tamper with the beam training process for his benefit. He could
inject forged feedback from distant locations to steer the beam towards
his direction as illustrated in Figure 9.1. While this slightly impairs the
signal quality at the legitimate devices, it boosts that at the attacker.
Thus, the attacker increases his chances for eavesdropping and may
act as a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) to relay and intercept packets
between the legitimate devices. Launching such an attack could have
a severe impact, as it cannot be prevented with conventional security
mechanisms that operate on higher layers.
In this chapter, we practically demonstrate the feasibility and impact
of an mm-wave beam stealing attack and propose an authentication
scheme to defend against this threat. Section 9.1 specifies an at-
victim
victim
legitimate beams
forged beams
attacker
Figure 9.1: Injecting forged feedback into the sector sweep operation turns
devices to select sectors that better serve the attacker.
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tacker model that targets the sector level sweep of IEEE 802.11ad and
feedbacks forged sector information on behalf of other devices. In
Section 9.2, we implement a proof-of-concept of such an attack on
off-the-shelf devices and experimentally evaluate our findings. Ad-
ditionally, we propose an authentication scheme, to protect against
forged sector sweep feedback in Section 9.3. Finally, Section 9.4 dis-
cusses and summarizes our findings.
9.1 attack method
The sector level sweep in IEEE 802.11ad networks is prone to attacks
that inject forged feedback to tamper with the sector selection on
remote devices. The following describes the vulnerabilities in the
sector level sweep, the attack method and possible scenarios such as
active eavesdropping and the MITM.
9.1.1 Vulnerabilities in the Sector Level Sweep
Beam training mechanisms, such as the sector level sweep algorithm
Forged feedback
selects arbitrary
sectors.
in IEEE 802.11ad, probe all sectors in a predefined codebook. In do-
ing so, they find the sector that provides the highest signal strength
at a receiver. This protocol is performed mutually between two de-
vices and works as described in Section 2.2.3. The initiating device
transmits sector sweep frames sequentially on all available sectors
with an identifier encoded in the payload. During the transmission,
the second device selects a quasi-omnidirectional sector for receiv-
ing and determines the received signal strength for all the frames it
overhears. It then chooses the sector for which it receives the highest
signal strength and reports back the respective identifier. Finally, the
initiating device selects this sector for further transmissions. To cope
with changing channel conditions, all devices periodically repeat the
sector sweep. Since the transmitted frames are unprotected IEEE 802.11
control frames, attackers can inject forged payload and report arbitrary
sector to be selected by other devices.
9.1.2 Forged Sector Sweep Feedback
Victims of a beam stealing attack are two legitimate devices, an Access
Attackers redirect the
beams in arbitrary
directions.
Point (AP) and a station, that are communicating via IEEE 802.11ad
and perform the sector level sweep to determine aligned transmit
sectors. The attacker’s goal is to change the sectors both devices select
and force them to redirect their beams. Steering the victims’ beams
towards his location, allows him to receive frames that otherwise could
not be decoded. He can freely take any position in the surrounding
but is unlikely to reside directly between the devices on the line-
of-sight. Throughout our investigation, we focus on typical indoor
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Figure 9.2: Sequential overview of the sector level sweep with forged feed-
back.
environments. As mm-waves do not penetrate walls or obstacles, the
attacker stays in distances of a few meters. Besides, we assume that he
has full control over the capabilities of its IEEE 802.11ad interface, can
listen to all frames received at its antenna, and inject custom ones. He
has neither access to the legitimate device’s hardware nor the software
and does not cooperate with others.
To tamper with the sector selection, the attacker forges the feedback
Forged sector sweep
feedback turns the
beams into arbitrary
directions.
of the sector level sweep. After an initiator sends out sector sweep
frames in all sectors, it typically awaits the feedback from the respon-
der. The attacker listens to the sector sweep frames itself, makes an
own selection and sends back his feedback to the initiator on behalf
of the legitimate responder as shown in Figure 9.2. The attacker just
needs to ensure that his forged feedback gets accepted, for example
by achieving a faster reply time or jamming the legitimate frames.
Whenever the initiating device completes the sweep, it chooses those
sectors the attacker has forged. This allows an attacker to perform
active eavesdropping or launch a MITM as described in the following.
9.1.3 Active Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping on wireless communication networks is typically con-
Directional
transmissions make
eavesdropping more
challenging.
sidered to be a passive attack in which an attacker captures and
processes all the frames it could receive. While this might have a
high success rate in conventional wireless systems with omnidirec-
tional radiation characteristics, it becomes challenging and location
dependent in mm-wave networks. Whether an eavesdropper could
receive frames depends not only on its distance to the transmitter
but also on the direction, and side lobe gains of the selected transmit
beam. For good eavesdropping results, an attacker should ideally be
1) located on the line-of-sight between the communicating devices,
2) in directions with significant side lobes gains, or 3) redirect the
signal by exploiting environmental reflections (Chapter 8). However,
achieving this is seldom possible. To relax the location requirements
and facilitate eavesdropping from any location, we forge the sector
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Figure 9.3: Man-in-the-Middle attack scenario in which the attacker imper-
sonates the station and launches a rogue AP.
sweep feedback. As this approach requires injecting custom frames,
we refer to it as active eavesdropping.
Eavesdropping on sector sweep frames is rather simple as they are
Forged sector sweep
feedback facilitates
eavesdropping with
distant locations.
transmitted sequentially in all sectors and modulated with low Modu-
lation and Coding Schemes (MCSs). At least those that are transmitted
in the direction of the attacker should be receivable. Data frames are
more challenging to decode. They are modulated with higher MCS
and transmitted only in the chosen sector, which is unlikely to provide
sufficient gain towards a distant eavesdropper. To listen on mutual
communication, an active eavesdropper forges the sector sweep feed-
back of legitimate devices. He does this such that he can decode the
transmitted frames but still allows for a high data-rate between the
legitimate devices.
9.1.4 Man-in-the-Middle
To launch a MITM attack on directional mm-wave networks and relay
A MITM relays
packets between two
devices.
packets between legitimate devices, an attacker needs to impersonate
the station and connect to the AP. The station must be persuaded to
connect to the attacker instead of legitimate AP. A typical setup of
such a scenario is illustrated in Figure 9.3. The attacker impersonates
the station and establishes a connection to the AP. Hence, the AP
believes to be connected to the station, when in fact it is connected
to the attacker. Spoofing the station’s MAC and IP address and using
a higher signal power allows the attacker to trick the AP. Forging
its beam selections provides the required signal power towards his
location. While the legitimate link gets degraded, a reliable connection
to the attacker becomes possible. The rogue AP pretends to be the
legitimate one. This scenario, in which the attacker aims at catching
the connection from the legitimate station, is also known as ’evil twin’
attack. Both APs compete for the station’s connection. In contrast to
station impersonation, the rogue AP cannot initiate the association
itself. It periodically announces its presence in beacon frames and
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waits for the stations to connect. A MITM attack combines the station
impersonation and rogue AP, thus receives frames from the legitimate It impersonates the
station and launches
a rogue AP.
station and forwards them towards the AP and vice versa. Simultane-
ously, traversing packets can be forged, dropped, and analyzed. Since
both victims believe in communicating with their counterparts, the
MITM is transparent and hard to detect. Next, we provide details on
our proof-of-concept implementation on off-the-shelf devices.
9.2 practical investigation
This section provides the results of launching the beam stealing at-
We investigate the
impact on
off-the-shelf devices.
tack in practical IEEE 802.11ad networks. We provide our proof-of-
concept implementation with off-the-shelf devices and experimentally
evaluate our the performance of forging the sector sweep feedback.
After describing our setup, we investigate attack scenarios of active
eavesdropping, station impersonation, and rogue access points. The
combination of them constitutes a MITM attack that relays all traffic
between legitimate devices through a malicious link. Additionally, we
discuss possible countermeasures and examine detection schemes.
9.2.1 Experiment Setup
Our proof-of-concept implementation of the MITM attack on direc-
Using our testbed
platform, we select
arbitrary sectors.
tional mm-wave networks is built on off-the-shelf IEEE 802.11ad devices.
Talon AD7200 routers from our testbed experimentation platform (see
Chapter 4) constitute the attacker as well as the legitimate devices.
The OpenWrt operating system with the wil6210 driver running on
the devices allows us setting up the connection between the devices.
Unfortunately, the closed-source firmware for the mm-wave module
does not allow to inject arbitrary frames without being connected to
an AP. To overcome this limitation, we indirectly inject our forged
sector sweep feedback via the legitimate devices. With our binary
firmware patches, which allow integrating custom beam training pro-
tocols, devices report custom sectors in the sector sweep feedback.
This forces the beam of the transmitter to steer towards an arbitrary
direction on behalf of the attacker.
Sending custom association and disassociation requests helps the
Re-associations help
the attacker to
capture the
connection.
attacker to capture the connection between the legitimate devices.
This is achieved by sending custom management frames with the
debug feature of the wil6210 driver. As the format of IEEE 802.11
association and disassociation frames is well documented, we captured
default parameters from the legitimate operation and adjust the source,
destination, and Service Set Identification (SSID) fields, respectively.
Doing so allows disassociating the station and associating the attacker.
For the evaluation of the feasibility of our attack, we set up two
Talon AD7200 devices for the legitimate station and AP and up to
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Figure 9.4: Evaluation scenario for active and passive eavesdropping with an
attacker placed at six different locations.
two additional devices for the attacker. They are interconnected via
a 2.4GHz Wi-Fi network for management and control. The two legit-We set up all devices
in a single room. imate devices communicate via the 60GHz link, while the attacker
aims to intercept that connection. All respective network interfaces are
configured with static addresses. To control the attack and automate
our experiments, we further utilize our testbed automation system.
Custom scripts start a rogue AP and fetch the properties from legiti-
mate devices for impersonation. We use sockets to generate custom
traffic using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and analyze the frames
traversing the attacker in relaying or eavesdropping with the Python
packet manipulation tool scapy1. Throughout our experiments, we
consider a typical indoor scenario. As walls and obstacles absorb
mm-wave signals, we assume the attacker to be located in the same
room and only a few meters away from the legitimate devices. The
attacker’s performance is evaluated in four steps. First, we experimen-
tally study the outcome of injecting forged sector sweep feedback in
an eavesdropping scenario. Second, we investigate the feasibility of
station impersonation by setting up a fake station. Third, we analyze
the success of deploying a rogue AP. Finally, we combine the previ-
ous scenarios in a MITM attack and evaluate how well the attacker
can reroute data packets. Our results are described in the following
sections.
9.2.2 Active Eavesdropping
In our first experiment, we distribute the AP and the station at a
The eavesdropper
takes six different
locations.
distance of 3m, which is a typical use-case in IEEE 802.11ad net-
works [Mal+10a]. To assess the active and passive eavesdropping
performance, we place a third device as eavesdropper at six differ-
ent positions parallel to the communication direction as illustrated
in Figure 9.4. Given the irregularity of the beam-pattern, exploring
all possible locations and directions do not provide meaningful re-
sults. Thus, we focus on this simple proof-of-concept scenario with
an eavesdropper at different angles and distances to the transmitting
1 http://secdev.org/projects/scapy/
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Figure 9.5: Capture rates of active and passive eavesdropping at six different
locations.
devices. We configure the eavesdropper in monitor mode and transmit
50 UDP packets with a length of 8192Byte from the station to the AP.
The AP responds to each incoming packet with the same payload.
Overhearing the same packets, the eavesdropper records and validates
received requests and responses for active and passive operation. In
passive eavesdropping, the sectors are selected using the default oper-
ation. For the active eavesdropper, we forge the sector selection such
that the beam directs towards the eavesdropper’s location. All of our
experiments are repeated five times.
Our results reveal that the passive eavesdropping success is location
The active
eavesdropper is less
location dependent.
dependent and varies enormously. As shown in Figure 9.5, we observe
good capture rates at certain positions where the attacker decodes
most frames correctly. The eavesdropping location might already fall
into one of the sidelobes of the transmitting antenna beam. In other
locations, the packet rate goes below 20%, which can be explained
with the irregular antenna pattern shapes. With active eavesdropping,
by steering the signal directly towards the attacker, we compensate
these gaps and become less dependent on the eavesdropper’s location.
In all evaluated locations, we increase the capture rate of requests
and responses. The achievable capture rates vary with the asymmet-
ric beam-patterns deployed on those devices. Active eavesdropping
increases the packet rate by 38% on average.
Steering the beam away from the intended direction impairs the link
Redirecting the beam
slightly decreases the
throughput.
quality between the devices. To address this impact, we measure the
achievable throughput on this link under passive and active eavesdrop-
ping as well. Our results in Figure 9.6 exhibit a constant throughput
with the default beam alignment in passive eavesdropping. The active
attack that forged the sector selection lowers the signal strength at the
intended receiver, thus impairs the performance. Depending on the
eavesdropper’s location the impact varies. While active eavesdropping
decreases the average performance between the legitimate devices by
15%, it still achieves a remarkable throughput of about 1.4Gbps.
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Figure 9.6: Achievable throughput with active and passive eavesdropping at
six different locations.
9.2.3 Station Impersonation
For the impersonation attack, a fake station imitates the configuration
A fake station
impersonates the
legitimate ones.
of the legitimate one. To achieve this, it duplicates the MAC and
IP address. In the following experiment, we consider two different
scenarios, one with a higher distance and one with a lower distance
of the fake station to the AP. All three devices, the attacker, the
station, and the AP, are placed on a line, whereas the AP is located
in the middle. This setup constitutes the most challenging case, as
the attacker needs to force the AP to steer its signal in the complete
opposite direction and cannot reuse the existing beam. First, we
deploy the station at a distance of 1m and the attacker 3m away from
the AP. In the second scenario, we swap the distances and set up
the station at 3m while moving the attacker closer. By swapping the
distances, we enforce that either the station or the attacker becomes
favored and receives signals with higher strength than that of the other
one. Our setup for both scenarios is depicted in Figure 9.7. During
the experiment that is repeated 20 times, the station pings the AP.
After starting the attack, we observe the connection for 10 seconds.
Throughout this interval, the AP logs the received signal strength and
the chosen sector. The stations continuously check the connectivity
and records all control frames to reveal which one is associated.
From the frames that we recorded throughout the experiment, we
determine the sectors that the AP choose in the sector level sweep
and whether they serve the station or attacker. For all observed sectorWe record the chosen
sectors during
transmissions.
sweeps, we count how often the sector towards the fake station is
chosen and express this as success-rate of the sector sweep competition.
A sector level sweep is triggered after each association and repeated
continuously throughout the communication. It can be initiated by all
devices and is performed mutually over multiple rounds. However,
for less stable connections the sweeps are performed more often. By
manually sending association requests, we also trigger a new sweep,
which offers another chance for the fake station to set its forged
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Figure 9.7: Placement of devices for the station impersonation attack. We
evaluate two scenarios with the attacker in higher and lower
distance to the AP than the legitimate station.
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Figure 9.8: Success in sector selection and network connectivity rate of
the fake station for the default behavior and by forcing re-
associations.
sector. If a station invokes this process, its outcome depends on the
last round of the sector sweep which is initiated by the AP. While
both stations compete to respond, only one gets accepted. In most
cases both stations start the association process simultaneously, the
AP coordinates the channel access such that their sweeps are executed
alternately. The station which initiates the last sweep is accepted and
used until the next sweep starts. Hence, the signal strength has only
minor influence, but sending association attempts, whenever indicated,
increases the chances of setting the own sector. The success rate
without re-associations, as shown in Figure 9.8a, achieves 56.3% for
the higher and 64.7% for the lower distance. Forcing re-associations
from the fake station increases the success rate on average by about
18.0% to 81.3% and 82.4%, respectively.
The performance of station impersonation depends on the success of
The attacker must
acquire a connection
to the AP.
the fake station to acquire an association with the AP. Once the attacker
attempts to associate, the AP reacts with a disassociation as it believes
to be already associated. Then, both stations, the legitimate and the
fake station, compete with each other to associate again. Whether the
attack succeeds depends on the relative signal strength between both
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stations. With the fake station at the higher distance, we observe an
average Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) at the fake station
that is 12.1 dB lower than that at the legitimate station. When the
fake station is closer to the AP, its RSSI increases by 13.4 dB while that
at the legitimate station decreases by 12.5 dB. We assume a stable
connection if devices receive at least ten ping replies continuously.
Our first scenario, where the signal strength of the fake station is
low, we accomplish a successful connection in only 18.8% of our
experiments without invoking re-associations. In the second scenario,
we observe that higher signal strengths are prioritized, such that
the success rises to 52.9%, as shown in Figure 9.8b. For winning
the association competition, the attacker manually injects association
frames whenever necessary. Forcing the devices to run another round
of the association process increases the chances to obtain a stable
connection. We achieve a connectivity of 68.8% at the higher distance
and 88.2% at the lower distance. This results in an average gain of
42%. Hence, an attacker must ensure a continuous association and a
high signal strength simultaneously to impersonate a station.
9.2.4 Rogue Access Points
The rogue AP cannot invoke the association itself but relies on the
The rogue AP
announces its
presence and waits
for stations to
connect.
station to initiate the connection. Therefore, the duration of the Beacon
Interval (BI) at which it advertises its presence by sending beacons
takes a crucial role. The attacker sends out beacons alternately to the
legitimate AP. Stations in range associate with the AP from which
they received the last beacon. When they are already associated,
they disassociate first and initiate a new association. This allows the
rogue AP to respond and capture the connection. Unfortunately, the
alternating beacons lead to many re-associations. Our experiments
consider this in relation to the BI in three different scenarios. First,
we keep the BI of the legitimate and rogue AP constant at the default
setting of 100ms. Second, we investigate a higher BI for the rogue AP
of 200ms. Last, the rogue AP sends beacons more frequent than the
legitimate AP by keeping its BI at 100ms, whereas that of the legitimate
AP increases to 200ms. As expected, we observe many re-associations
in the former two scenarios. Taking a closer look at the packet dumps
reveals that the station sends out many disassociation frames. This is
an indicator that it gets confused by too many association attempts. If
we set different BIs for both APs, the number of disassociation frames
decreases. It seems that whenever a beacon is received before it is
expected, the station re-initiates the association. Hence, both APs
compete, and the one that lastly transmitted a beacon obtains a change
to catch the connection until the next BI. In the third scenario, the
attackers BI is lower than that of the legitimate AP. Thus, intervals
exist that are not interrupted by new beacons from the legitimate AP.
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Figure 9.9: Placement of devices for the rogue AP attack. We evaluate two
scenarios with the attacker in higher and lower distance to the
station than the legitimate AP.
Only in this scenario, we achieve a stable connection for a complete
interval. Hence, to successfully launch a rogue AP, the attacker should
ensure a BI lower than that of the legitimate AP.
To evaluate the success of the rogue AP, we use the decreased BI
We decrease the BI to
achieve a higher
connectivity.
and set up the experiments similar to the station impersonation ones.
We distribute the rogue AP and the legitimate devices as shown in
Figure 9.9 on a straight line with the station in the center. First, we
keep the rogue AP at a higher distance and place it 3m away from
the legitimate station while the legitimate AP has a distant of 1m.
Second, we switch the distances and move the rogue AP closer to a
distance of 1m and move the legitimate AP to 3m distance. These
two setups allow us to investigate the feasibility of launching a rogue
AP with different relative signal strengths between the attacker and
the legitimate devices.
During our experiments, both APs continuously ping the station.
We collect all frames
to determine the
attack performance.
Once the rogue AP is associated, all devices continuously record the
network state and the selected transmit sectors. Due to association
issues, the network connection might fail even though the sectors
are selected properly. To address this, we consider both properties
individually. While the rogue AP pings the legitimate station, they
capture frames on all interfaces. Similar to the station impersonation
experiments, we assume a stable network connectivity, if the station
receives ten ping replies successively. Moreover, we check the captured
frames to reveal the sector that are chosen by the station and which AP
it favors. All measurements are repeated 20 times. Our results for the
network connectivity and sector success rate are shown in Figure 9.10.
With higher distance, the rogue AP achieves a network connectivity
of 44% and a sector success rate of 56%, meaning that in 44% of
probes, we successfully ping the station for at least 10 seconds. During
that time, we choose the optimal sector for the attacker in 56% of the
time. The results for the network connectivity in the lower distance
are significantly higher and rise by 24% up to 68%. The sector success
rate is rarely affected and achieves 60%. Hence, the rogue AP depends
less on high signal strengths than the station impersonation.
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Figure 9.10: Network connectivity and success rate in selecting the sector of
the rogue AP for the attacker at s higher and lower distance than
the legitimate AP (observed over all experiments).
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Figure 9.11: Experiment setup for the MITM attack with legitimate devices,
the fake station, and the rogue AP. The attacker aims at inter-
cepting the connection between the user and the server.
9.2.5 Man-in-the-Middle
Based on the previous results, we evaluate a combined MITM attack.
The MITM combines
all previous attacks.
For this, we tamper with the transmit sectors at legitimate devices
and apply the station impersonation, as well as the rogue AP attack
simultaneously. In the experiment, our devices are placed as shown
in Figure 9.11. We set up a legitimate station and an AP at a distance
of 3m. Both establish a wireless link and, in addition to it, connect
a user to a remote server. The MITM consists of a fake station and a
rogue AP. The former is located at a closer distance to the legitimate
AP, namely 0.5m, while the latter is 0.5m further from the legitimate
station. Both are interconnected via Ethernet to relay packets. As in
the rogue AP experiment, the attacker uses the decreased BI. The fake
station makes use of re-associations to capture the connection from
the legitimate one. For both malicious links, between the attacker’s
and legitimate devices, we forge the sector sweep feedback such that
the selected beams favor the attacker. To prevent the fake station from
connecting to the rogue AP, we locate them back-to-back and block
the space between them. We evaluate the MITM attack by sending
UDP packets and intercepting an HTTP connection.
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Figure 9.12: Packet error rates on the malicious link in the MITM evaluation
scenario with the default behavior and by forging the sector.
In the first part of our experiment, we send 100 UDP packets in
We transmit packets
and determine the
path they take.
50ms intervals from the user towards the server. Ordinarily, these
packets would traverse the legitimate station and AP only. By starting
the rogue AP and fake station, we aim at rerouting those packets
through the man-in-the-middle such that the attacker obtains access.
We choose the payload of the transmitted packets to carry a unique
sequential number for identification. The server is configured to reply
to all received packets and acknowledge the reception by sending
back the same payload. This allows us to identify the packets that
are traversing the rogue AP and the fake station. Throughout this
experiment, we evaluate the packet loss and duplicate rates with and
without forging the sector sweep feedback. We first launch the rogue
AP and station impersonation as mentioned in the previous evaluation
steps. Second, we additionally force the legitimate devices to select a
sector with high gain into the direction of the rogue AP or fake station,
respectively. By doing so, we investigate the impact of forged sector
feedback on the performance of the MITM attack.
Our evaluation results show that forging the sector sweep feedback
Forged feedback
reduces the packet
errors.
decreases the packet error rates as shown in Figure 9.12. With the
default sector selection, as reported from all devices, we observe a
median of the packet loss rate of 0.13 and a duplicate rate of 0.01. This
means that many packets still take the legitimate link from the station
to the AP without traversing the attacker. These results agree with our
findings in the rogue AP and station impersonation: the legitimate
devices alternately use the malicious and legitimate link. However,
we can minimize these effects by forging the feedback and steer the
legitimate devices towards the attacker. This decreases the median
of the packet loss rate by 92% to only 0.01. In most of the time, we
do not observe any packet duplicate at all. Additionally, we calculate
the rate of valid replies received by the legitimate station. As shown
in Figure 9.13, the performance improves with forged sector sweep
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Figure 9.13: Rate of valid replies received at the legitimate station in the
default behavior and by forging the sector.
feedback. The rate of correctly received reply packets increases from
87% to 99%.
To demonstrate the practical impact of such a MITM attack, we
Our attack facilitates
an HTTP
interception.
utilize an HTTP interception example. We set up an HTTP proxy in
transparent mode at the attacker to replace all image contents in a
traversing HTML file. The required tools are provided by Mitmproxy2
that easily enables to intercept, modify, and relay HTTP traffic flows.
The result is obvious. While browsing the Internet, we see replaced
images all over the websites. Hence, we successfully demonstrate
that a MITM attack can be practically launched against a directional
IEEE 802.11ad network.
9.2.6 Detection Schemes
Detection is the first step to protect against attacks such as the MITM
We investigate four
detection metrics.
presented above. In this section, we discuss four possible detection
metrics to indicate whether an attack is happening or not. In particular,
we consider the 1) the switching between sectors, 2) changes in the
received signal strength, 3) beacon interval length, and 4) beacon
counters as potential attack indicators.
Since active eavesdroppers and the MITM attacker send additional
IEEE 802.11ad frames, they are visible to the legitimate devices and
detectable. Unfortunately, detecting if additional frames are receivedSelected sectors and
signal strength
variations indicate
an attack.
from an unintended transmitter is challenging. The best metrics that
are available on off-the-shelf devices are to monitor the selected sectors
and the resulting signal strength. If the attacker launches an attack,
victims are forced to select another transmit sector instead of the
legitimate one. Occasionally, feedback might be received from the
legitimate device and the attacker, such that the sector selections start
to fluctuate. Frequent switches between sectors with different patterns,
might indicate an attack that injects forged feedback information. This
also affects the signal strength, as choosing a sector that serves the
eavesdropper most likely decreases the signal strength at the legitimate
device. A simple detection scheme might trigger an alarm whenever
2 https://mitmproxy.org
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Figure 9.14: Error rates of four detection metrics.
the difference between consecutive signal strength measurements is
higher than a specific threshold. However, natural effects such as
blockage and mobility also cause switching beam patterns and high
variations of the signal strength over time. For evaluation of these
aspects, we record samples of the signal strength and the selected
transmit sector during a mobile and attacking scenario. Recorded
traces with 100 frames in 5 repetitions indicate that an attack can be
differentiated from mobility. Monitoring the sector switches with a
detection window of 20 sweeps, we obtain no false positives and a
false negative error rate of 14%, as shown in Figure 9.14. Analyzing
the signal strength provides similar results: the detection achieves a
false positive and false negative error rate 14% and 7%, respectively.
It appears that observing the sector switches is slightly more accurate
than considering the signal strength, which incorporates naturally
high noise. Nevertheless, both detection schemes based on switching
sectors and the signal strength exhibit high error rates.
Detecting the rogue AP, in particular, we analyze the time difference
The rogue AP sends
additional beacons.
of beacon intervals, compare it with the announced values, and count if
more beacons are received than expected. Additional beacons from an
attacker shorten the measured interval as new beacons appear earlier
than expected. If we detect beacons, which deviate the schedule of the
previous beacons, it is quite obvious that a rogue AP exists. Further,
the IEEE 802.11ad beacon frame format contains an A-BFT field that
counts the number of beacons that have been already transmitted.
Considering this value reveals if too many beacon phases by different
devices take place. For evaluation of these two detection metrics,
the beacon interval and the A-BFT count, we record 20 samples in
a regular and in an attack scenario with the rogue AP. We repeat
our measurements 5 times. The detection of beacon irregularities is
processed in monitor mode by capturing all control frames. In our
implementation, we exemplary use a threshold for the time difference
of 2.5% and trigger an alarm whenever it is exceeded. For the A-BFT
count, we compare the values of two consecutive beacon intervals
and classify an attack when the current value is not higher than the
previous one. The results of these two detection schemes are also
shown in Figure 9.14. Their performances are better than those of
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Figure 9.15: Schematic illustration of authenticated sectors that protect
against forged feedback in beam stealing attacks.
observing the transmit sector and signal strength. Taking the beacon
interval into account reveals no false positives and a false error rate of
5%. Analyzing the A-BFT reveals a false positive and negative error
rate of 5%, each.
All described schemes only detect the forged sector sweep feed-
Detection requires
that at least some
frame are received
from the legitimate
device.
back if at least a few frames or beacons from the legitimate devices
are processed. A highly sophisticated attacker might jam all these
frames such that the victims get completely isolated. By distorting
the legitimate frames, jamming attackers may also reduce the number
of re-associations that we observed in our experiments. In such a
situation, when a victim only receives frames from the attacker, the
proposed detection schemes are likely to fail. The upcoming sec-
tion presents an authentication scheme as a possible countermeasure
against beam stealing attacks.
9.3 authentication scheme
Due to the lack of any authentication mechanism in the sector sweep,
Our authentication
scheme prevents
beam stealing.
IEEE 802.11ad devices are vulnerable to low-layer attacks such as beam
stealing or denial-of-service. We propose a sweep authentication
scheme, which ensures that devices only accept valid feedback from
intended devices, as illustrated in Figure 9.15. It extends the existing
sector sweep with a mutual feedback authentication by amending the
frame format. The following first describes our scheme in detail and
then provides results from our evaluation.
9.3.1 Authenticated Sector Sweep
The operation of our sweep authentication is split into a session
Devices authenticate
the sector sweep
feedback.
establishment phase and an authenticated sweep phase. Devices
have an asymmetric pair of keys, of which the public key is assumed
to be verifiable by others. In the session establishment phase, two
devices exchange their public keys. Both then agree on a session secret
9.3 authentication scheme 137
CDOWN
(9 bit)
Direction
(1 bit)
Sector ID
(6 bit)
Antenna ID
(2 bit)
RXSS Length
(6 bit)
Ant. Select
(9 bit)
Sector Select
(1 bit)
SNR Report
(6 bit)
Poll Required
(2 bit)
Reserved
(6 bit)
Auth.
(variable)
Nonce
(variable)
Sector Sweep Frame Format:
Sector Sweep Feedback Frame Format:
Original Field Amended Field
Figure 9.16: Amended sector sweep frame format.
that is derived from their keys. As secret keys are kept private, this
session secret is unique for every link. During the authenticated sweep
phase, devices perform the usual sector level sweep with specific
additions. They generate a random cryptographic nonce for each
sweep and append it to the sweep frames. Receivers select the best
sector and determine an authenticator for the selected sector based on
the received nonce as well as the session secret. This authenticator is
appended to the sector sweep feedback. Devices then take the reported
sector from the feedback and verify its authenticity using the respective
nonce and session secret. The nonces ensure that selecting sectors
is only possible for correctly received sweeps and protect against
replaying. Due to the session secret, only responses from legitimate
peers are accepted. Since attackers cannot forge the authenticator they
are unable to alter the sweep feedback.
Running our protocol, we assume that the attacker can listen to all
IEEE 802.11ad traffic and generate and inject arbitrary frames but does
not interrupt the initial association. He can transmit more powerfully
than any other device, but neither jam nor remove frames from the
air. Devices are assumed, to be honest with each other and verify
their identities. Common cryptographic protocols such as SHA-256
are assumed secure and cannot be broken in feasible time.
9.3.2 Extended Frame Format
To authenticate the sector sweep feedback, we extend the structure
We extend the frame
structure.
of sector sweep frames. Such frames are regular IEEE 802.11 control
frames and contain a sector sweep, or a sector sweep feedback field,
as shown in Figure 9.16. The sector sweep field specifies the direction
of the sweep, a countdown of remaining sectors in the sweep, the
sector and antenna ID, and the length of an optional receive sweep.
The sector sweep feedback field contains the ID of the selected sector
and antenna, the measured SNR for this sector and a poll request
indicator. As common mm-wave devices use a single antenna and
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perform a transmit sector sweep only, we omit the antenna selection
and receiver sector sweep for simplicity in our design. However, this
could be easily integrated in future work. In our sweep authentication,
we extend the sector sweep field by an additional nonce and add an
authenticator to the sector sweep feedback field. Both values have
variable length, such that our design remains flexible and support
extensible security and performance requirements. In the following,
we provide details on our authentication scheme and describe how
the nonce and authenticator fields are used.
9.3.3 Protocol Design
The authentication procedure of the sector sweep feedback is illus-
Our protocol is
performed during a
sector level sweep.
trated in Figure 9.17 and operates as follows. Given are an Initiator I
and a Responder R that both perform our authentication protocol. Both
devices have a key pair {pkI, skI}, and {pkR, skR} respectively with
which they can verify their identity. In the session establishment phase,
they broadcast their public keys pkI and pkR as well as a random seed
ϵI and ϵR. Using common cryptographic key exchange mechanisms
(such as Diffie-Hellman), both determine a session secret s using their
secret keys and the exchanged public keys. To this end, they apply
a function dh (pk, sk) that provides s = dh (pkI, skR) = dh (pkR, skI).
Moreover, s is randomized using the seeds ϵI and ϵR. Due to the
cryptographic properties of asymmetric key exchange, only I and R
can determine the session secret s and can use it for mutual authentica-
tion. During the initiator sweep with M sectors, I generates a unique
cryptographic nonce νI. R receives at least some of the sweep frames,
determines the best sector mˆ, and computes an authenticator αR of
length lα as
αR = authlα (mˆ,νI, s) = trunc (h (mˆ,νI, s) , lα) , (9.1)
where authl (m,ν, s) computes an authenticator of size l as a trun-
cated hash function of the concatenation of m, ν, and s. With
trunc (x, l) we denote a function that truncates an arbitrary input
x to a length of l bit. According to the NIST guidelines [Dan12], the
output of a hash function can be truncated by extracting the leftmost
bits. In the responder sweep with N sectors, R generates a nonce νR. I
computes its authenticator as αI = authlα (nˆ,νR, s) for the selected
sector nˆ. After both devices complete their sweeps, I sends nˆ and αI
in a feedback frame and R acknowledges with mˆ and αR. Finally, both
devices verify the received authenticators. I verifies αR with mˆ and s
by computing the truncated hash authlα (mˆ,νI, s) itself. Similarly, R
verifies αI with nˆ and s. If both verifications succeed, the devices set
their sectors accordingly and continue the communication.
As the space for nonces is limited, and they might repeat, we renew
the session secret to protect against replaying outdated authenticators.
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select mˆ
select nˆ
Auth. Feedback: [nˆ,↵I ]
Auth. Ack: [mˆ,↵R]
verify (↵I , nˆ, s)
verify (↵R, mˆ, s)
…
…
Initiator Sweep 1: [⌫I ]
Initiator Sweep 2: [⌫I ]
Initiator Sweep M: [⌫I ]
Responder Sweep 1: [⌫R]
Responder Sweep 2: [⌫R]
Responder Sweep N: [⌫R]
↵I = auth(nˆ, ⌫R, s)
↵R = auth(mˆ, ⌫I , s)
s = dh (pkI , skR)
s = dh (pkR, skI)
pkI , ✏I
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Figure 9.17: Simplified sequential operation of the sector sweep with authen-
tication.
To achieve this, we periodically start over with the session establish- Session secrets are
renewed to prevent
repeating nonces.
ment to generate new session secrets. Devices should implement a
countdown that decreases with every sweep, such that it can trigger
the renewing process before the limited space of nonces expires.
Sweep authentication only extends the operation of the sector level
Sweep authentication
is independent of
specific protocols.
sweep without changing any internal operation. Therefore, our design
is globally applicable and independent of specific cryptographic algo-
rithms. Particular algorithms, as well as the length of keys, nonces,
and authenticators, can be chosen on demand. In the following section,
we present an evaluation of our proof-of-concept implementation.
9.3.4 Performance Overhead
We evaluate the performance overhead of our sweep authentication in
a combination of simulations and practical measurements. This section
first describes our evaluation setup and then presents the results of
our simulations and measurements. Finally, we end this section with
a summary of our findings.
evaluation setup. To assess the performance of transmitting
sweep authentication frames, we provide a proof-of-concept imple-
mentation of our amended sector sweep frame format in the Network
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Simulator 3 (ns-3) [NS3]. In particular, we use the IEEE 802.11ad im-We combine
simulations with
practical
measurements.
plementation from Assasa and Widmer [AW16] and integrate our
extended frame format. The existing implementation already provides
the essential components of the IEEE 802.11ad protocol, such as the
sector sweep and the respective MAC layer frame formats. For our
evaluation, we reserve additional space at the end of the sector sweep
and sector sweep feedback frames to incorporate the nonces and au-
thenticators. Our simulation environment determines the required
transmission time of our authentication scheme and the regular sec-
tor level sweep. Unfortunately, the ns-3 simulator does not allow to
consider the packet processing delay that is caused by cryptographic
operations. To compensate for this drawback, we additionally evaluate
the cryptographic computation overhead on commodity mm-wave
devices. In particular, we use Talon AD7200 routers (see Chapter 4) and
implement common cryptographic algorithms from the OpenSSL [SSL]
library. Benchmarking the performance of these algorithms on the
resource-constrained router hardware, allows us to estimate the av-
erage processing delay. Combining simulation results and practical
measurements, we determine the effective performance overhead of
sweep authentication in comparison to the original sweep. Our results
are described in the following.
simulation results . We first evaluate the impact of different
The size of nonces
has a high impact on
the performance.
nonce sizes in our authentication. To this end, we run simulations of
the sector sweep in ns-3 with 60 sectors at both devices. In the con-
figuration, we set the space that is reserved for the authenticators to
8Byte and use the SHA-256 algorithm to compute the cryptographic
hashes. Our results for nonces with up to 5Byte are shown on the left
in Figure 9.18. The time overhead that is caused by our sweep authen-
tication increases linearly with the size of the transmitted nonces. As
nonces are transmitted for every sector in the sweep, they have a high
impact on the total completion time and cause the most significant
overhead. Nonces of 1Byte causes a time overhead of about 2%. With
a size of 5Byte, the overhead increases to about 9%. To achieve a
feasible trade-off between provided protection and time overhead, we
continue evaluating the authenticator size with nonces of 4Byte.
In contrast to the size of nonces, the size of authenticators in the
Authenticators are
only transmitted
once per device.
sector sweep feedback has only a minor impact on the overall perfor-
mance. For our second set of simulations, we configure 60 sectors,
use the SHA-256 algorithm, and evaluate authenticator sizes of up
to 8Byte with 4Byte nonces. Our results are shown on the right in
Figure 9.18. Increasing the authenticator size from 1Byte to 8Byte
only causes a difference of about 0.1%. Independent of the number
the sweeps, the authenticator is only transmitted twice (once by each
device) in the sector sweep feedback or the acknowledgment. Thus,
one can be less strict with the size of the authenticators. In summary,
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Figure 9.18: Transmission time overhead with different nonce (left) and au-
thenticator (right) sizes compared to the original sector sweep.
we achieve a performance overhead of 7.31% with 4Byte nonces and
8Byte authenticators.
In our third simulation, we investigate the impact of the number of
The number of active
sectors has no impact
on the relative
performance
overhead.
used sectors on the performance overhead. The more sectors being
used, the more sweep frames need to be transmitted. Despite adding
nonces to each of these frames, the overhead is following a linear
trend. The number of transmitted authenticators is independent of
the number of sectors. As a result, the relative transmission overhead
remains constant and the number of sectors itself does not affect the
relative performance of our sweep authentication.
practical measurements . In practical measurements on off-
We benchmark
different hash
algorithms.
the-shelf devices, we investigate the performance of different crypto-
graphic hash implementations. In particular, we consider the most
commonly used algorithms SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, as well as
HMAC(MD5) with block sizes of 64Byte. On the router, we measure
the time that is needed to complete the required cryptographic op-
erations and integrate the measurements as additional delay in the
simulation. We hash random values over an interval of 3 seconds and
determine their average duration. Our measurements are shown in
Figure 9.19. The computation of an SHA-512 hash takes about 2.52µs
on average. Processing with SHA-256 is about 0.99µs faster and takes
only 1.53µs. As in the previous simulations, we consider the perfor-
mance overhead in a sweep with 60 sectors in which we set the sizes
of nonces to 4Byte and add 8Byte authenticators. Despite variations
in the processing time, the impact of different hash algorithms on the
overhead is only about 0.1%.
Computing a session secret causes additional time overhead. Investi-
The generation of the
session secret cause a
one-time overhead.
gating this, we measure the average processing time for performing an
Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange. In experiments,
the devices generate a 160 bit and 192 bit session secret in about 1.3ms
and 1.8ms, respectively. Since shared secrets are only generated to
start a session, the overhead of a few milliseconds is sustainable.
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Figure 9.19: Processing time and overhead with different hash algorithms
compared to the original sector sweep.
As the available space to generate random nonces is limited, the
devices periodically renew the session secret to mitigate collisions.
As described by Zenner in [Zen09], the relation of maximum colli-
sion probability pmax, bitlength l, and the number of nonces θ canThe session secret is
renewed every few
minutes.
be expressed by θ
2−θ
2∗2l ⩽ pmax. With nonces of 4Byte (l = 32) and
assuming a maximum collision probability of pmax = 2−9, we can use
212 = 4096 collision-free nonces. Following the maximum link main-
tenance time of 128 ms from the IEEE 802.11ad specification [IEE14],
the devices should renew the secret every 212× 128ms = 8.7min.
Hence, the generation session secrets cause additional overhead only
one every few minutes.
results . Our evaluation shows that adding authenticators and
Sweep authentication
protects against
beam stealing with
feasible overhead.
nonces to the sector level sweep causes an additional time overhead
due to the transmission of larger frames. With SHA-256 and embed-
ding 4Byte nonces and 8Byte authenticators, the overhead compared
to the original sweep is only 7.31%. In the simulation, we find that the
most significant performance impact is caused by nonces that must be
transmitted for every sector. In contrast, the authenticators are only
transmitted once by every device. We measured the processing time
that is required to compute the cryptographic operations on the Talon
AD7200 tri-band routers. Common algorithms affect the performance
overhead by only 0.1% on average. In conclusion, our sweep authenti-
cation achieves a feasible overhead protecting the feedback in sector
level sweeps.
9.4 discussion and summary
The IEEE 802.11ad standard adopts directional communication to over-
Lower layer
amendments increase
the attack surface.
come the challenge of the increased signal attenuation in the mm-wave
frequency band. In this regard, several new features on the lower lay-
ers are introduced such as predefined antenna sectors with directional
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transmission features and the sector level sweep protocol for beam
training. In this chapter, we identify these extensions as a new at-
tack vector that threatens wireless networks. A distant attacker can
manipulate the beam training and force victims to steer their anten-
nas to arbitrary directions. Forging the sweep feedback increases
the chances of eavesdropping or launching a MITM attack. This is
particularly harmful if no higher layer encryption and authentication
mechanisms are applied. But also if higher protocol layers are properly
secured beam stealing constitutes a threat. An attacker that gathers
encrypted data frames has still access to unprotected signaling and
channel control. It might steer the beams to off-site directions and
effectively cause a denial-of-service. In contrast to classical jamming,
this becomes particular energy efficient as only a few frames have to
be transmitted. Individual devices could be effectively isolated from
the network. Forcing multiple devices to steer their signals towards
one specific location may result in distributed jamming. Furthermore,
selfish devices may exploit the beam training of others to minimize
interference and maximize their signal quality. The more applications
make use of directional mm-wave communications; the more attack
scenarios are likely to appear.
We demonstrate the feasibility of a beam stealing attack for active
Beam stealing
enables active
eavesdropping and a
MITM attack.
eavesdropping and for acting as MITM with off-the-shelf IEEE 802.11ad
devices. Our results from practical experiments highlight the signif-
icance of such an attack. Beam stealing increases the performance
of eavesdropping by 38% while still achieving a notable throughput
of 1.4Gbps. A MITM attack successfully tampers with an HTTP con-
nection and achieves a median packet error rate of only 1%. Current
devices typically perform transmit-side beamforming only and de-
ploy a fixed quasi-omnidirectional sector for receiving. Tampering
the receiving beams could further increase the attacker’s possibilities.
Devices could not only be prevented from transmitting in particu-
lar directions but also from receiving. Steering receive beams in the
direction of an attacker could turn jamming highly efficient. Such
weaknesses cannot be mitigated in particular implementations as
the standard lacks arrangements for protection. With the upcoming
IEEE 802.11ay standard [Gha+17], new beam training protocols will be
introduced. These protocols induce higher complexity to make beam
training more efficient. We believe that they are likely to increase the
attack surface as well.
Although our experimental analyses only cover line-of-sight scenar-
ios with short distances, the described beam stealing attack is likely
to be successful in non-line-of-sight scenarios with larger distances as
well. The impaired signal quality of the attacker that resides further
away may be compensated with higher transmission power. Reflec-
tions and additional attenuations make injecting forged feedback more
challenging but not impossible. Our authentication scheme is inde-
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pendent of the attacker’s link quality, thus mitigates attacks in both
scenarios.
Current detection and protection schemes are insufficient to address
New protection
schemes are required
to handle attacks on
directional networks.
attacks on mm-wave beam training. In contrast to data frames, the
standard provides no authentication mechanisms to protect sector
sweep frames against misuse. The sector level sweep is performed
before any link is established, thus before the communication channel
could be secured. This makes forging the feedback particular hard to
defend. New low-layer protocols that rely on such feedback to control
the beam alignment must be secured from bottom-up. For example,
authenticating the sector sweep frames could prevent attackers from
injecting arbitrary feedback.
We propose a sweep authentication that protects against beam
Our sweep
authentication
protects against
beam stealing with
feasible overhead.
stealing attacks. Performing a key exchange and authenticating the
sector sweep feedback, it ensures that responses to the sweep are only
accepted from legitimate devices. In a combination of simulations
and measurements, we demonstrate the feasibility of our approach
and find that the incurred time overhead is only about 7.3% higher
than that of the original sweep. The protocol behind our approach is
flexible and allows to configure a trade-off between protection and
performance, thus, adapts to various applications and requirements.
Lightweight authentication schemes with pure symmetric cryptogra-
phy are likely to cause less overhead. In this work, we focus on the
transmission overhead that is caused by embedding additional authen-
tication fields in the frame format and assess the general feasibility of
authentication in the sector level sweep. A thorough security analysis
might be required to address different attack scenarios and mitigate
physical layer attacks such as jamming. Distance bounding along with
secure device localization based on mm-wave signal characteristics
appear promising to also detect and defend against beam stealing.
We strongly suggest to come up with proper solutions to address
the efficiency and security issues that currently impede directional
mm-wave communications.
Part V
M E A S U R E M E N T S
In this part, we provide complementary measurements
with our testbed experimentation platform. We obtain the
radiation patterns of the default sectors, individual antenna
elements, and custom directional beams in Chapter 10.
In Chapter 11, we measure the performance of different
beams in a practical large-scale deployment and outline
the advantages of directionality.

10
A N T E N N A R A D I AT I O N PAT T E R N S
Knowing the beam patterns of the sectors that are used in mm-wave
Measurements of
beam patterns allow
to asses their
performance in
different directions.
devices is crucial to get an in-depth understanding of propagation
effects and systems performance. Their shape highly depends on the
antenna’s geometries and the placement inside the device. Due to
the complex layout of conventional antenna arrays with dozens of
elements in off-the-shelf devices, their radiation patterns are hard to
predict by calculations. For example, the antenna array in the Talon
AD7200 exposes 12 patch antennas on the front surface, 6 on the back,
and 14 additional dipole antennas on the side. Uniform rectangular
arrays as often used in theory are not the norm. Precise measurements
in all spherical directions are required to assess the performance of
particular beam patterns. Using our practical testbed experimentation
platform, we precisely measure different radiation patterns of the
antenna array in the Talon AD7200.
Section 10.1 describes our setup that is used to measure the default
beam patterns in Section 10.2. In Section 10.3, we reveal the patterns
of individual elements in the antenna array, which lead to array factor
in Section 10.4. Section 10.5 provides measurements of custom beams
with different characteristics such as strong directionality and multiple
lobes. Finally, Section 10.6 summarizes our findings.
10.1 measurement setup
Our measurement setup, with which we measure the radiation pat-
We perform
measurements in an
anechoic chamber
and precisely steer
one device mounted
on a pan-tilt unit.
terns, consists of two Talon AD7200 devices in an anechoic chamber.
As shown in Figure 10.1, we mount one device on a pan-tilt unit that
uses two precise step-motors to orient it in different directions. In
particular, we use a FLIR PTU-E46-70 that achieves an accuracy of up
to 0.003°. The Talon AD7200 is mounted with a custom adapter plate
directly above the center of the rotation axis. The second device is
placed three meters away on a tripod facing the first one. The walls,
floor, and ceiling of the room are covered with radio-wave absorbing
foam to omit disturbing reflections and multi-path effects. For each
measurement, we establish a connection between both devices and
perform frequent sector level sweeps. During this, both devices record
the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) for received frames in all sectors. The
codebook with the sector definitions varies among our measurements.
We start with the predefined codebook that comes with the firmware
to obtain the default beam patterns. In the subsequent measurements
with custom beams, we adjust the codebook accordingly. Specifi-
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Figure 10.1: Measurement setup with two Talon AD7200 devices in an ane-
choic chamber. The device on the left is mounted on a pan-tilt
unit that steers it to different spherical directions.
cally, we use the features of our testbed experimentation platform
described in Chapter 4. Our automation system remotely triggers the
measurements on the devices over a 2.4GHz management network.
The pan-tilt unit, remotely controllable via Ethernet, is handled by our
automation as well.
10.2 default beam patterns
Access Points (APs) periodically announce their existence by succes-
Devices use transmit
sectors that are
defined in a codebook.
sively transmitting beacon frames in different sectors. Stations that
overhear at least one of these beacons initiate the sector level sweep to
find the optimal transmit beam. While the sectors used for beaconing
and the sector level sweep can differ, they are all configured in a single
codebook. The recent firmware for the mm-wave module in the Talon
AD7200 supports up to 64 different transmit sectors of which 36 are
defined by default (see Chapter 4). Beam training is only applied
for transmit sectors; the devices use a single quasi-omnidirectional
sector for reception. APs trigger the beaconing every 102.4ms [IEE14].
When devices communicate, sector level sweeps are initiated at least
once per second or whenever necessary. As experimentally revealed,
performing a mutual beam training with the default sectors takes
on average 1.27ms. Probing a single sector needs 18.0µs; additional
49.1µs are required for hand-shakes and feedback. In the following,
we measure the SNR of the predefined sectors used in the sector level
sweep in two- and three-dimensional setups.
2d pattern measurements . In our first experiment, we mea-
sure the predefined transmit sectors of the Talon AD7200. The pan-tilt
unit steers the device in steps of 0.75° from −159° to 159° in pan-
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Figure 10.2: Measured beam patterns for the default sectors 0 - 17.
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Figure 10.3: Measured beam patterns for the default sectors 18 - 63.
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Figure 10.4: Measured three-dimensional beam patterns for the default sec-
tors 0 - 8.
direction, while keeping a constant tilt of 0°. In each step, the second
device records the SNR while the first one sends sector sweep frames.
Averaging over at least 20 measurements, we obtain the radiation We first measure the
antenna radiation
patterns in the
planar space.
patterns. Figure 10.2 and Figure 10.3 illustrate our results for all 36
default sectors. Shadows in the plots represent the 95% confidence
intervals. The measured beam patterns show different characteristics.
We find that some transmit beam patterns, such as those of sectors 7,
8, 14, 15, 21, 27, 61, and 63, expose a clear main-lobe. They provide
a strong gain in one particular direction. Other beams, such as those
of sectors 1, 4, 16, 19, 23, and 30, come with multiple, equal powered
lobes. Sectors 9 and 59 cover a wider range. Due to these strong
variations and the irregular beam shapes, we do not provide specific
beamwidths or steering angles. Towards the back of the antenna—for
angles higher than 120° or lower than −120°—most beam patterns get
distorted. This is not surprising since the antenna array is partially
shielded in this direction. Few beam patterns, such as those of sectors
3, 5, 25, 26, 28, 29, 60, and 62, exhibit low gains in all directions. It Most beam patterns
expose irregular
shapes.
is likely that they have their maximum outside the evaluated hori-
zontal plane. To account for these directions as well, we extend our
measurements to the third dimension with different tilts of the device.
3d pattern measurements . To map the antenna radiation pat-
We extend our
measurements to the
spherical space.
terns in spherical space, we repeat our measurements and additionally
tilt the rotation head from −30° to 30°. We use the same setup as
before, take measurements at different pan angles from −159° to 159°,
but decrease the accuracy to 2.25°. Still, this results in more than 3800
iterations. Figure 10.4 and Figure 10.5 illustrate the measured beam
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Figure 10.5: Measured three-dimensional beam patterns for the default sec-
tors 9 - 63.
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Figure 10.6: Radiation pattern of the default receive sector.
patterns projected to a spherical surface. The x- and y-axes represent
different pan and tilt angles, respectively. Our results indicate that
most beam patterns vary at different elevations. For example, sector
24 shows a decent lobe to the front in high elevation which turns into a
gap at tilt angles below zero. Comparing the spherical beam patterns
to those of the planar measurements in Figure 10.2 and Figure 10.3,
we find that some sectors increase their gain when tilted. Especially
for sectors 5, 12, 13, 18, 24, 28, 29, and 62 the highest signal strength
increases by about 3 dB to 6 dB. Sectors 6, 25, and 26 still not expose a
clear main-lobe within the measured space. Nevertheless, we obtained
sufficient information to assess the default transmit beam pattern
performance in the most relevant communication directions.
receive beam pattern. The single receive sector is intended to
The receive sector
provides a quasi-
omnidirectional
coverage with small
gaps.
provide a quasi-omnidirectional coverage. To obtain its beam pattern,
we switch the roles of the two devices in our measurements. While
the fixed device continuously transmits sector sweep frames, the one
on the pan-tilt unit evaluates the SNR. Minimizing the noise-floor in
our results, we only consider transmit sector 63, which provides the
highest gain. Since the transmit power and direction remains constant,
the measured SNR corresponds to the receive gain of the antenna.
Figure 10.6 shows the beam pattern in two- and three-dimensional
measurements. In contrast to all transmit beam patterns, it has fewer
variations and features a constant gain in most directions. However,
at specific angles, it clearly exposes lower gains which might impede
the signal reception. These irregularities can be particularly harmful
as the default operation cannot switch to different sectors.
10.3 individual antenna elements
Radiation patterns are a combination of the signals from multiple
Patch antennas
provide a strong gain
to either the front or
the back.
antenna elements in the array. To analyze their individual beam
patterns, we repeat the previous measurement with a custom codebook
of sectors that have only a single antenna element active. The gains
of all other elements and all phase values are set to zero. As before,
we pan the device from −159° to 159° and tilt it from −30° to 30°. The
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accuracy is kept at 0.75° and 2.25°, respectively. Figure 10.7a shows
the beam patterns for three exemplary elements on the front surface
of the array. They all expose a strong gain between ±45°. Depending
on the location of the element in the array, one side might be slightly
favored. For example, the pattern of antenna element 10 exposes a
lower gain for orientations above 10°. Elements on the back surface
clearly show a lobe in the opposite direction, shown in Figure 10.7b.
On this side, the Radio Frequency Integrated Circuit (RFIC) partiallyThe RFIC partially
blocks the signals. blocks the radiation. The four antenna elements, 4, 19, 20, and 21, on
the left side of the RFIC, expose strong gains at about −160°. For the
two antenna elements, 11 and 13, on the other side, the beam patterns
orient towards 160°, respectively. The dipole antennas on the sides
of the array expose different characteristics, as shown in Figure 10.7c.
Elements 2 and 26 are located on one side while elements 9 and 17 are
on the other. All the remaining radiation patterns show a diffuse shape.
These antennas are likely to be used to fine-tune the beams in various
directions. In the upcoming section, we extend the measurements
of all these elements and additionally take into account the relative
phase among them.
10.4 antenna array factor
The antenna array factor is a characteristic that describes the complex
The antenna array
factor describes the
complex gains of all
individual elements.
gain of an array in different directions. It allows to compute the
radiation pattern for a specific antenna configuration and also enables
to derive particular steering characteristics. This possibility facilitates
to generate beams with high directionality or multiple lobes.
To obtain the array factor, we measure the Channel State Infor-
mation (CSI) as described Chapter 7 for each of the different device
orientations in our setup. Since the devices are rather close to each
other, the strong link estimation (see Section 7.1.3) is sufficient. In
contrast to the previous measurements of individual antennas, we
also record the relative phase between the elements and estimate their
complex gains. Since any multi-path propagation effects do not distort
our measurements, these gains correspond to the antennas’ physical
radiation characteristics. Combining them, we construct the array
factor. For an orientation defined by the azimuth and elevation angles
(ϕ, θ), we define the array factor AF(ϕ,θ) as a vector of the elements’
complex gains. In particular, we derive
AF(ϕ,θ) = [c0 (ϕ, θ) , c1 (ϕ, θ) , . . . , c31 (ϕ, θ)]
T , (10.1)
where ci (ϕ, θ) represents the complex gain at the i’s antenna element
in measured in (ϕ, θ) direction. These values are recorded for azimuth
angles ranging from −159° to 159° and elevation angles from −30° to
30°. Thus, our measurements obtain the physical antenna radiation
characteristics in the most relevant directions.
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Figure 10.7: Excerpt of the measured beam patterns of individual antenna
elements.
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In the knowledge of the array factor, we estimate the beam pattern
The array factor
allows estimating the
radiation of
particular beam
configurations.
shapes given particular antenna configurations. Radiation patterns
are a superposition of the complex gains of individual elements with
specific weights applied. The antenna array factor and the weights
from the configuration allow estimating the radiation pattern without
explicitly measuring it. Given the weights for all antennas elements
in W = [w0,w1, . . . ,w31], we compute the radiation pattern from the
scalar product with the array factor AF(ϕ,θ) as p (ϕ, θ) =
⏐⏐W ·AF(ϕ,θ)⏐⏐.
This computation reveals the relative strength a beam in arbitrary
directions.
Moreover, the array factor enables to derive beams with specific
Beam patterns with
specific geometrical
characteristics can be
derived from the
array factor.
geometrical characteristics. For example, knowing the AF(ϕ0,θ0) for
a direction (ϕ0, θ0) allows to obtain the weights W0 that optimize
the beam in this particular direction as W0 = conj
(
AF(ϕ,θ)
)
(see
Chapter 7). Multi-lobe beam patterns can be generated by either
averaging over multiple of such beams or solving a matrix equation
as
Wml =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
c0 (ϕ0, θ0) c1 (ϕ0, θ0) · · · c31 (ϕ0, θ0)
c0 (ϕ1, θ1) c1 (ϕ1, θ1) . . . c31 (ϕ1, θ1)
...
...
. . .
...
c0 (ϕn, θn) c1 (ϕn, θn) . . . c31 (ϕn, θn)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
P
· [1, 1, . . . , 1] ,
(10.2)
where MP is the pseudo-inverse of a matrix M. Similar to this ap-
proach, we design beam patterns that minimize the radiation in spe-
cific directions. With this tool at hand, beamforming on devices
becomes more accurate and set up a beam that exactly steers towards
the intended receivers.
Exemplary beam patterns with normalized power levels are shown
We compute
directional,
multi-lobe, and side
lobe suppression
beam patterns.
in Figure 10.8. Figure 10.8a illustrates directional beam patterns that
point into one specific direction. They are ideal for high throughput
transmissions but still expose few side lobes. Figure 10.8b shows
multi-lobe beams with two and three steering directions. Keeping
the steering directions close, as shown in the pattern on the right, we
obtain a wide lobe. Moreover, isolating specific directions reduces
side lobes. Figure 10.8c shows beam patterns with the same steering
directions than in Figure 10.8a but additional isolation directions
in the side lobe directions. The isolations effectively suppress the
side lobes while only slightly decreasing the gain in the steering
direction. Depending on the application scenario, different beam
steering possibilities exist. Within this work, we only provide an
excerpt of possible beam patterns that could be derived from the array
factor. In the following, we detail the characteristics of directional
beam patterns.
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(a) Directional beam patterns
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(b) Multi-lobe beam patterns
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(c) Side-lobe suppression beam patterns
Figure 10.8: Estimated shape of custom directional, multi-lobe and side lobe
suppression patterns. All patterns are generated with the array
factor and use 16 active antenna elements.
10.5 custom directional beams
This final measurement reveals the beam patterns of custom directional
We measure custom
directional beam
patterns.
sectors. Following our adaptive beam optimization approach from
Chapter 7, we first steer the device to nine different directions of
−60°, −30°, −20°, −10°, 0°, 10°, 20°, 30° and 60° and estimate the
CSI. Based on this, we compute an optimal beam pattern for each
direction that maximizes the signal strength. Since our environment
does not expose any reflectors, the resulting beams are likely to expose
a strong main-lobe in the specified direction. Setting these beams in a
codebook and repeating our measurements, we obtain the two- and
three-dimensional radiation patterns shown in Figure 10.9. Indeed,
our measurements expose a strong directionality. In contrast to the
predefined beam patterns, they exhibit a stronger main-lobe and lower
158 antenna radiation patterns
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 1
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 2
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 3
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 4
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 5
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 6
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 7
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 8
0°
45°135°
180°
-135° -45°
45 40
35
Directional Sector 9
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
-135° -90° -45° 0° 45° 90° 135°
pan-30°
-15°
0°
15°
30°
ti
lt
25 dB 30 dB 35 dB 40 dB 45 dB
Figure 10.9: Custom directional antenna patterns.
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side lobes. Specifically, the gain is about 5.17 dB higher than in the
default beams. Under different tilting, the beams show a smooth Our beams steer
precisely towards the
receiver.
gradient with low variations. These results confirm that the hardware
components in the phased antenna array are capable of generating
more precise beam patterns than those defined by the default sectors.
10.6 discussion and summary
Our measurements, as presented above, capture the radiation charac-
We provide precise
radiation patterns of
default and
customized beams.
teristics of the Talon AD7200 with different beams. The default beam
patterns feature an irregular shape and expose strong side lobes. Iden-
tifying a clear main-lobe is hardly possible. With our control over the
antenna weighting network, we isolate individual antenna elements
and measure their radiation characteristics as well. Patch antenna
elements on the surface of chip expose typical radiation to the front or
back. Dipole antennas have lower gains and can be used to fine-tune
the beam pattern. Obtaining the array factor with complex antenna
gains, we derive custom beam patterns with strong gains in one or
multiple directions. Additional measurements approve that our beam
patterns provide much higher directionality than the default ones.
Despite using an antenna array that is used in many devices, our
Other devices may
expose different
characteristics.
results are very specific for Talon AD7200. Other devices may mount
the antenna at different positions in the device, thus causing different
radiation effects. The Netgear Nighthawk R9000, for example, mounts
the antenna directly in front of the mainboard and blocks signals to-
wards to back. In such a scenario our measurements are not applicable
and likely deviate from the physical characteristics. Nevertheless, we
derived our beam patterns from measurements with multiple pairs
of devices. Thereby, we confirm that all Talon AD7200 expose similar
characteristics. Our beam patterns have general applicability and can
be reused for other setups with Talon AD7200 devices.
The array factor measurements are highly valuable and enable to
Custom beam
patterns can be
adjusted to the
environment.
fully exploit the beamforming on the Talon AD7200. They provide the
foundation to generate codebooks of beam patterns with specific geo-
metric features. For example, the default beam patterns are unlikely to
perform well when the device is mounted under the ceiling or in any
corner of a room. Beams that are oriented towards the blocking walls
cause an unnecessary training overhead. Custom beams derived from
the array factor can steer the signal directly to different positions in the
room. As a result, the coverage maps to the environment and the beam
resolution increases. We highly encourage users to consider custom
codebooks when deploying devices in productive environments.
The measurements in this chapter partially support our contribu-
tions in Chapter 5 and 7. Additionally, we believe that future projects
could make use of the generated data as well. To support the commu-
160 antenna radiation patterns
nity and allow others to benefit from our work, we release the relevant
data on our public project page1 (see Section A.6).
1 The measured antenna radiation patterns are available at: https://github.com/
seemoo-lab/talon-sector-patterns
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P R A C T I C A L D E P L O Y M E N T
The measurements in the previous chapter demonstrate the perfor-
Practical
deployments expose
sub-optimal
characteristics.
mance of our directional beams under ideal conditions. To obtain the
radiation patterns, transmitter and receiver were close to each other,
and no multi-path effects distort the observations. Practical deploy-
ments, in contrast, have different characteristics; signals are seldom
received in high accuracy from only a single direction. Deployed
devices are mostly not oriented face-to-face and stay further away
from each other. Additionally, multiple communications may occur
at the same time, thus causing interference. In order to evaluate such
practical performance aspects of directional beams, we take extensive
measurements with different beam configurations in a large-scale
deployment with multiple devices.
Section 11.1 describes our large-scale measurement setup. In Sec-
tion 11.2, we investigate the performance gain of directional beams
over the default configuration. Section 11.3 reveals the spatial isola-
tion that is achieved between concurrent transmissions. Section 11.3
details the interference among these transmissions with directional
and side lobe suppression beams. Multi-lobe beam patterns that reach
multiple devices are evaluated in Section 11.5. Finally, we discuss and
summarize our findings in Section 11.6.
11.1 measurement setup
The atrium of our University and State Library (ULB) on campus
Our measurement
setup consists of 28
devices deployed
among three floors.
features an open-space among multiple floors. This environment is
ideal to evaluate parallel mm-wave communication links over longer
distances. On each floor, a balustrade separates a corridor with
workspaces and book-shelves from the open atrium. It provides an ex-
cellent position to deploy our devices since people in the environment
can not block signals from there. For our measurements, we occupy
the upper three floors and set up 28 Talon AD7200 devices from our
testbed experimentation platform as shown in Figure 11.1. While 12
devices are placed in each of the upper two floors, four are located on
the lower one. Since our measurements are performed during regular
opening hours of the library, we mark all devices with an information
sheet and avoid unnecessary disturbances of other visitors as much
as possible. To remotely control all devices and measurements, we
configure an additional management network in the 2.4GHz band.
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Figure 11.1: Large-scale experiment setup with multiple Talon AD7200 de-
vices in an atrium.
Running experiments with 28 individual devices means that 756
We limit the
measurements to
specific scenarios.
possible links exist. Each device can pair with 27 others. Measuring
all possible combinations with multiple links active at a time would
turn out to be very time-consuming. To keep the complexity of our
measurements low and finish within a day, we had to limit our scenario
to specific scenarios of link combinations. They are split into three
groups. First, we consider a group of scenarios with up to four active
links on the same floor. In the second, the set of scenarios expands
to links spanning two floors. Finally, our third group considers up to
8 active links on all three floors. In the latter two, devices can also
establish links on different floors. Our scenarios comprise parallel
links and also those that cross each other. In total, they cover different
characteristics. Figure 11.2 gives an impression on the placement of
devices and the links between them.
Our measurements for each scenario are performed in multiple
After obtaining the
CSI, we measure the
performance with
different beams.
steps. First, we estimate the CSI as described in Chapter 7 between
all devices on the up- and downlink. This CSI allows devices to
compute optimized directional, multi-lobe, and side lobe suppression
beam patterns. They derive an optimized directional beam pattern
that maximizes the signal strength at their link partners. The multi-
lobe beam pattern exposes lobes to all the other devices and the side
lobe suppression pattern aims at minimizing the interference at other
receiver but the intended one. For each of those beams, the intended
receiver and all other devices in the scenario record the SNR. While
having all links in the scenario we measure the achievable throughput
with default and directional beams.
For all links in these scenarios, we obtain the CSI and SNR of particu-
lar beam patterns and also invest the effects of these patterns on other
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2nd ﬂoor
3rd ﬂoor
4th ﬂoor
Figure 11.2: Deployment of 28 devices spanning three floors in an atrium for
practical measurements. Connections represent an exemplary
scenario with eight concurrent links.
devices in the same scenarios. Moreover, we measure the throughput
with directional beams as well as with the default ones. All through-
put measurements are performed with iperf3 [iPerf] and repeated
three times to achieve sufficient confidence. In total, we obtained the
characteristics of 402 links in 61 different scenarios. The following
example scenario illustrates the measurements we perform.
example scenario. A scenario with three active links may consist
An example
describes our
measurements with
three active links.
of the combinations A->B, C->D, and E->F among the six devices A
to F. First, to be able to generate custom beam patterns, we estimate
the CSI between all devices. Then, these devices compute a directional
beam that follows the link directions. A selects a beam that maximizes
the signal strength at B. Similarly, C and E optimize the beam pattern
regarding D and F, respectively. To derive a multi-lobe beam, all
transmitters A, C, and E, aim to steer the signal towards the receivers
B, D, and E simultaneously. They create a beam with a lobe in each
transmission direction employing their CSI. For spatial isolation of
the links, all transmitters suppress the side lobes towards all but the
intended receiver. C creates a beam pattern that maximizes the signal
strength at D and simultaneously suppresses the reception at B and F.
A and E perform similarly and create a beam towards B and F with low
interference on the other links, respectively. Configuring these beams
on the transmitters, we record the SNR at each receiver. Additionally,
we measure the throughput with traffic on all links simultaneous.
Scenarios with more or less active links are evaluated correspondingly.
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Figure 11.4: Total throughput with up to four parallel transmissions.
11.2 directional gains
The first part of our practical experiment considers the directional
Devices select an
optimized directional
beam pattern.
beam patterns. Similar to our measurements in the anechoic chamber
(see Chapter 10), we compare the achievable signal strength with
directional beams to those of the default beam patterns. Figure 11.3
illustrates the results averaged over our groups of link scenarios. When
considering only links on a single floor, our directional beams provide
an SNR of 27.1 dB at the receiver. With links spanning over two or three
floors, the average SNRs with 27.6 dB and 27.4 dB does not indicate
any significant difference. In contrast to the default beam patterns
that achieve an SNR of 20.6 dB, 20.3 dB, and 20.3 dB respectively, the
average performance with directional beams is about 6.94 dB higher.
This difference is even slightly higher than the results in our previous
measurements and indicates the strong practical application.
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11.3 spatial isolation
Spatial-reuse is one of the most considerable advantages of directional
Spatial-reuse
requires highly
directional beams
without interference.
mm-wave communication. When links become very narrow and ob-
tain wire-like characteristics, they do not distort each other and enable
simultaneous interference-free transmissions. How close our direc-
tional beams are to this theoretical consideration, we evaluate with
parallel throughput measurements on multiple active links. Iterating
through the scenarios of different link combinations, our measure-
ments with generic and directional beams reveal the accumulated
throughputs shown in Figure 11.4. In scenarios covering a single floor
with two active links, the total throughput by using the generic beams
is about 1512.3Mbps. With two and four active links, the throughput
does not significantly differ and reaches values of 1370.2Mbps and
1488.6Mbps, respectively. Directional beams slightly increase these
values by about 12.5% and achieve a total accumulated throughput
on the active links of 1722.9Mbps, 1640.8Mbps, and 1547.0Mbps
respectively. Using directional beams not only on the transmitter but
also on the receiver, we increase the throughput by about 307.0Mbps.
Similar results are observable with links covering two or three floors,
as shown for the former in the graph on the right in Figure 11.4. In all
scenarios, directional beams provide a constant performance gain.
Surprisingly, the measurements do not indicate any spatial-reuse.
Our optimized beam
cause interference.
With perfect link isolation, the accumulated throughput would scale
linearly with the number of active links. Instead, the evaluated links
share the available resources as they would do in omnidirectional
communication systems. The spatial separation between those links is
likely too low to operate entirely independent. Before transmitting a
frame, the devices sense the channel and only start the transmission
when they do not detect any other transmission. While this reduces
the collisions of transmitted frames, it leads to unnecessary high
congestion back-offs in directional networks. Unfortunately, we could
not adjust the sensitivity of the carrier sensing on the Talon AD7200
devices. The only option we have is to decrease the interference on
other links using side lobe suppression in transmission beams.
11.4 interference mitigation
Interference among parallel communication in spatial proximity has
Side-lobe suppression
reduces the
interference.
vast impacts on the performance of each link. When two devices
that are close to each other start transmitting at the same time, they
halve their performances. Transmitted frames are time-multiplexed
and transmitted on after the other. Each device only obtains access
to the channel for half of the time. While this is a common issue in
lower frequency bands with omnidirectional communications, direc-
tional communications should overcome this limitation when links
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Figure 11.5: Interference and signal gain with directional and side lobe sup-
pression beams relative to the default beam patterns.
are unaffected from each other. Unfortunately, our directional beams
not only increase the gain into the intended directions but also in-
troduce additional interference to other receivers. Despite enhancing
the performance on individual links, our directional beams limit the
overall network performance. Using side lobe suppression in our
beam patterns, we decrease the signal strength in the directions of
the other devices, thus limit the interference. Figure 11.5 shows the
interference of directional and side lobe suppression beams relative to
the generic ones for links on a single floor. Directional beams increase
the interference of about 1.58 dB, 2.82 dB, and 3.41 dB for 2, 3 and 4
active links, respectively. Thus, it is unsurprising that links distort
each other. The side lobe suppression reduce the interference. With
two active links, the interference is 1.46 dB lower than with the default
beams. Similar differences occur for two and three active links with
−1.58 dB and −1.76 dB, respectively.
Another issue of side lobe suppression is the lower SNR the resulting
Spatial isolation in
dense deployments is
challenging.
beam provides in the intended direction. While this difference was
small under ideal circumstances in the anechoic chamber, the differ-
ences between side lobe suppression and direction beam patterns can
take multiple dB. As shown in Figure 11.5 (right), our directional
beams perform about 6.55 dB better than the generic beams. With
sidelobe-suppression, the gain with two active links is only 2.53 dB
and further reduces to 0.92 dB and 0.27 dB for three and four active
links. Hence, interference mitigation with side lobe suppressions in
such a dense scenario is insufficient to achieve spatial isolation.
11.5 multi-lobe beam patterns
Multi-lobe patterns serve multiple devices at the same time and enable
multicast transmissions. In our experiments, we obtain the SNR that
is achievable with such multicast beams. The lowest SNR of each
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Figure 11.6: Effective multicast signal strength of beam patterns with multi-
ple lobes.
receiver described the performance of the beam as it effectively limits
the modulation and data-rate that can be used to reach all receivers.
We derive this multicast signal strength for all scenarios within our Multi-lobe beam
patterns enable
efficient
multicasting.
experiment as shown in Figure 11.6. Generic beam patterns already
achieve satisfying results. Most of them expose a broad coverage
with good chances to reach multiple receivers. Still with an increas-
ing number of receivers, the provided signal-strength decreases. It
reaches about 20.55 dB when serving a single receiver that decreases
to 18.74 dB, 18.10 dB, and 16.72 dB for two, three and four receivers.
Our optimized multi-lobes beam patterns specifically point into the
direction and thus achieve higher precision. The lowest signal strength
at all receivers stays higher as with the default beam patterns. Serving
one receiver only, the multi-lobe patterns expose a single lobe and
correspond to the directional beam patterns. They provide an SNR
of 27.12 dB. Beams featuring two lobes obtain an SNR of 22.07 dB,
thus performs 3.33 dB better than the generic beam. With three and
four lobes the differences are smaller but still increase the signal
gains by 1.24 dB and 0.93 dB respectively. Generating beams with few
lobes, our mechanism achieves better multi-cast performances than the
generic coverage. These results implicate that directional multicasting
is possible with specific aligned multi-lobe beam patterns.
11.6 discussion and summary
Measurements in a practical deployment demonstrate the advantages
Beam patterns
should adapt to the
environmental
context.
of beamforming in mm-wave communication networks. Generic beam
patterns predefined on the devices provide decent coverage and facili-
tate different application scenarios. Still, they leave a high potential
for improvements. Our directional beams achieve SNRs that are about
6.94 dB higher. Serving multiple receivers, specific multi-lobe patterns
increase the effective SNR for multicasting to two users simultaneously
by 3.33 dB. When multiple links are active, our side lobe suppres-
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sion beams decrease the interference by 1.46 dB, thus enhancing the
spatial separation among concurrent transmissions. Applying direc-
tional beams on the transmitter side, we increase the throughput by
12.5%. Directional beams on both transmitter and receivers antennas
exceed the throughput of generic beams by 307.0Mbps. Despite these
remarkable advantages, we do not achieve any spatial-reuse. TheCustom beam
patterns perform
better than generic
ones.
deployment of devices is too dense for links to become independent.
These results indicate the high importance of cross-layer considera-
tions. Beamforming alone achieves remarkable performance gains. For
optimal network operations, it should jointly cooperate with schedul-
ing and carrier sensing algorithms to increase the total performance
of practical wireless mm-wave networks.
The measurements in this chapter partially support our contribu-
tion in Chapter 7. Additionally, we believe that future projects could
make use of the generated data as well. To support the community
and allow others to benefit from our work, we release the relevant data
on our public project page1 (see Section A.7). The available data-set
contains the SNR, CSI, and throughput measurements at the links
covered in our scenarios.
1 The measured link statistics are available at: https://github.com/seemoo-lab/
talon-library-measurements
Part VI
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
In this part, we discuss our findings, possible applications,
and future work in Chapter 12. Afterwards, Chapter 13
concludes this thesis.
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D I S C U S S I O N A N D O U T L O O K
Having great ideas in mind, we started our research on performance
We faced the issue of
lacking evaluation
platforms.
and security aspects in mm-wave communication systems. Unfortu-
nately, our work soon faced the limitations of mm-wave prototyping
platforms. Existing solutions, by then, did not provide the desired
capabilities. Due to the lack of alternatives, we delved ourselves
into operating off-the-shelf devices. In contrast to early prototyping
systems, they already provide decent Gigabit-links with integrated
antenna arrays. As soon as the first IEEE 802.11ad compatible router,
the Talon AD7200, became available on the market, we vowed to get
the maximum benefits out of it. This intention resulted in our testbed
experimentation platform, which significantly amplified our research.
Our platform is flexible and still standard compliant. Obtaining access
to the beam training parameters on the devices enables our perfor-
mance improvements presented in Chapter 5, Chapter 7, and Chapter 6
as well as the security considerations in Chapter 9. Complementing
this, our setup for signal propagation analysis additionally allows
for investigating reflection and environmental aspects in Chapter 8.
Combined, both platforms provide an unprecedented framework that
simplifies practical mm-wave research. In the following, we state
application scenarios for our framework and outline future work that
is worth to address in follow-up research projects.
12.1 applications
Our testbed experimentation framework provides access to the beam
Our practical testbed
framework has many
applications.
training operation and the capability to implement custom beam pat-
tern shapes. Thereby, it allows implementing even more advanced
beam training techniques. For example, compressive sector selection
and adaptive beam optimization might be combined to reduce the
training overhead further while increasing the beam accuracy. Joint
training of both, transmit and receive sectors could additionally am-
plify the directional gain. Carefully selecting the active antennas in the
array might decrease the power consumption of transmissions. With
the Channel State Information (CSI), a high amount of environment
information could be collected. In combination with precise direc-
tional probing beams, sensing applications such as gesture recognition
and in-band radar technologies are conceivable. Practical measure-
ments in large-scale environments with numerous obstacles should
be performed to identify optimal Access Point (AP) and base station
deployments. Managed mm-wave Wi-Fi networks tend to use ultra-
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dense topologies to serve stations with high data rates. Due to the risk
of blockage, planning and maintaining such networks is challenging;
they may expose dead spots without coverage. At these locations,
a seamless handover to other communication technologies that are
less affected by sudden impairments should be considered. Dealing
with substantial channel variations also raises the question of optimal
adaptation. In contrast to omnidirectional systems, which typically
adjust the coding rate and transmission power only, antenna steering
and connection handover increase the degree-of-freedom in adaptation
algorithms. Devices should not only rely on the signal strength when
selecting an AP and communication technology.
With their directional propagation characteristics, mm-wave trans-
missions are suitable to achieve a high localization precision. Leverag-
ing the angles-of-arrival of links, we exemplary describe two different
localization systems that use a single or multiple APs in the follow-
ing. Following this, we discuss the challenges and opportunities of
practical mm-wave applications.
pseudo-lateration. User localization in indoor environments
Reflection paths can
be used to localize
devices.
with a single AP is still an unsolved challenge. Most existing schemes
require multiple infrastructure nodes or prior knowledge of the en-
vironment. We propose a pseudo-lateration scheme that exploits
environmental reflectors as pseudo anchors to derive a user’s location.
By combining these directions of reflected signal paths with time-
of-flight measurements, we obtain a typical triangulation problem.
Our protocol operates in three steps. First, the AP performs a sector
level sweep with narrow beams. For each beam, the stations report
the received signal strength. Second, they refine their receive beams
for the identified signal paths and determine their angular offsets.
Processing these measurements, the AP determines the angular direc-
tions of the line-of-sight and all reflected signal paths. Finally, both
nodes cooperatively measure the time-of-flight to compute the paths’
distances. Combining the distance and the angular direction, a user
localization becomes possible. We implement the angular estimation
of this localization scheme on our channel sounding platform (see Sec-
tion 3.1). Traces from an indoor environment are further processed in
simulations. Our publication [Che+17] provides extended results and
a detailed description of our protocol. In summary, pseudo-lateration,
with narrow beams and users in proximity, achieves a centimeter scale
accuracy.
localization with multiple aps . The localization scheme in
The default beam
patterns allow device
triangulation.
the previous section comes with certain requirements that are chal-
lenging for deployments with commodity devices. Time-of-flight
measurements are either imprecise or unavailable at all. As seen in
Chapter 10, typical beam patterns are highly affected by irregulari-
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ties and lack a narrow shape. Taking such technical limitations into
account, we propose a second indoor localization scheme that oper-
ates with off-the-shelf devices. In particular, we consider a typical
IEEE 802.11ad network with multiple APs. Each AP periodically per-
forms the sector level sweep and collects the measured Signal-to-Noise
Ratios (SNRs) from all stations in range. Due to a low SNR accuracy,
transmission angles cannot be directly obtained. Instead, our localiza-
tion scheme employs particle filters along with linear programming
and uses a Fourier analysis to derive a station’s location from measure-
ments of multiple APs. Using our testbed experimentation platform,
we implement and evaluate our algorithm in practical office scenarios.
Our publication [Bie+18] provides detailed protocol descriptions and
extended results. In summary, our system operates in real-time and
achieves a sub-meter accuracy in 70% of the cases. Given the limited
hardware capabilities, this constitutes a remarkable result.
challenges and opportunities . Emerging mm-wave appli-
Directional beams
facilitate localization
system.
cation scenarios often provide location-based services that require to
precisely localize a device. Despite mm-wave communication systems
with narrow beams address these demands, practical results are not as
accurate as theory expects. Overcoming these limitations, we demon-
strate that device localization is feasible. While the first approach is
impractical with off-the-shelf devices, it achieves high accuracy gains
due to receive beamforming. The second approach only exploits the
generic beam patterns that are predefined on the devices. They use
a fixed receive beam pattern that provides a quasi-omnidirectional
coverage. Extending this localization scheme with custom directional
beam patterns and receive beamforming is likely to increase the ac-
curacy. In other words, practical device localization leaves space for
various improvements.
With our open research platform, we provide an ecosystem for
Our framework is
easily extensible and
not limited to the
presented
application.
firmware modifications on off-the-shelf mm-wave devices that is not
limited to the applications above. Besides using our tools in our re-
search projects described in this work, they already lead to various
findings from other researchers. For example, Zhang, Garude, and
Pathak [ZGP18] use our environment simulation to evaluate their
proactive blockage mitigation technique that uses joint transmissions
from multiple APs. Loch et al. [Loc+17] use specific multi-lobe beam
patterns to track the movement and rotation of mobile devices with
zero overhead. By integrating our simulation environment, they vali-
date their approach in a wide range of scenarios. Using our testbed
platform, Assasa et al. [Ass+18] investigate medium access and trans-
port protocol aspects in dense mm-wave networks. In doing so, they
reveal practical issues caused by channel contention and frame ag-
gregation on higher layer network performance. A measurement
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campaign by Saha et al. [Sah+18] investigates the beam training and
rate control characteristics of various off-the-shelf devices. They use
our platform to adjust lower layer parameters. While these examples
demonstrate a few possibilities of our framework, we expect numerous
extensions in future work.
12.2 future work
Our research has not yet fully exploited the capabilities of our frame-
We give ideas for
further feature
extensions.
work. Especially the features of our testbed experimentation platform
could be further extended. With extensive analyses of the firmware
running in the IEEE 802.11ad chip, we aim to access the Automatic
Gain Control (AGC) and carrier sensing settings. Controlling these
two parameters in a realistic setup provides more accurate insights
on directional propagation effects and further allows to investigate
the limitations of spatial reuse. By enabling frame injection and raw
In-phase and Quadrature (IQ) sample processing, off-the-shelf devices
could be turned into powerful Software-Defined Radios (SDRs). Facil-
itating a peer-to-peer mode and simultaneous AP and station mode
operations could enable directional device-to-device communications.
Analyzing and understanding the proprietary one-wire protocol be-
tween the baseband and antenna module of the IEEE 802.11ad Wi-Fi
chip could enable to interchange the antennas with other evaluation
systems. In particular, this could allow using a cheap off-the-shelf
antenna in SDR based prototyping systems.
On the long-term, academic researchers and engineers from in-
Academic researcher
and engineers from
industry should join
their forces to shape
the future of
mm-wave
communications.
dustry should work hand-in-hand. Unfortunately, in the domain
of mm-wave communications, both areas have drifted apart. The
research directions above only address problems that industry has
already solved. While industry came up with market ready con-
sumer products—which is a great effort and highly honorable—many
research groups still stick to their ancient prototyping systems. Al-
though our contribution narrows the gap between these parties, it is
far from being a solution to the stated problem. Every time manufac-
tures release a new product the process of analysis and integration of
our tools starts over again. Literary spoken, we fix the symptoms and
provide a short-term solution. Industry and academia must combine
their forces to succeed in the long-term. Academia comes with great
ideas but struggles with practical implementations. Industry solution
mostly focuses on standardized specifications. However, what remains
left when standardization lacks new ideas? We believe that innovation
is an interdisciplinary process that cannot be driven by either party.
Manufacturers should find a way to open their products for research
without losing their intellectual property. Evaluation platforms should
be publicly available and not restricted to those with non-disclosure
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agreements. Researchers, in contrast, should focus on the practicality
and applicability of their proposed solutions. In the end, this way is
beneficial for all and lead to novel mm-wave applications.

13
C O N C L U S I O N S
In this work, we propose performance and security enhancements
State-of-the-art beam
training is imperfect.
It causes a high
overhead, uses
generic beams, and is
vulnerable to forged
feedback.
for practical mm-wave communication systems. Current mm-wave
systems operating in the unlicensed 60GHz band underutilize the
advantages of directional communication. Despite the substantial
available spectrum, IEEE 802.11ad does not achieve throughput gains
that are significantly higher than those in the latest sub-6GHz stan-
dards. Off-the-shelf devices with integrated phased arrays of dozens
of antenna elements exhibit irregular beam pattern with sub-optimal
directionality. Due to several strong side lobes, they make spatial-
reuse almost impossible. Additionally, state-of-the-art beam training,
such as the sector level sweep in IEEE 802.11ad, is imperfect for three
reasons. First, all available sectors are frequently probed even though
some are unlikely to perform well. Second, the utilized fixed codebook
with generic beam patterns does not adapt to the environment. Third,
the protocol does not provide any protection against forged feedback.
Unfortunately, due to the lack of proper mm-wave evaluation systems,
addressing these issues in practical scenarios becomes a challenge.
Instead of relying on existing prototyping systems with limited fea-
Our framework
enables practical
experimentation
with off-the-shelf
devices.
tures, our practical studies base on off-the-shelf hardware with custom
software modifications. We propose a holistic evaluation framework
that consists of two components. First, our channel sounding platform
and ray-tracing based simulations allow analyzing the signal propaga-
tion in various environments with arbitrary reflectors and blockage.
Second, our testbed experimentation platform facilitates evaluations
and measurements in practical deployments. Using commodity tri-
band wireless routers allows an IEEE 802.11ad compliant operation. We
open these devices for research experiments by revealing access to the
internal operations of the proprietary Wi-Fi firmware. With modified
software components, our platform provides full access to the operat-
ing system, device driver, and network interface. Integrating binary
patches in the firmware, we uncover specific beam training parameters.
Such modifications allow implementing custom beam training proto- Firmware
modifications allow
for beam training
customizations.
cols with full control over all elements in the phased antenna array.
This platform taps the full potential of the resource-restricted hard-
ware components and provides a cost-efficient and scalable evaluation
framework for practical standard-compliant experiments.
Using the testbed experimentation platform above, we implement
and validate performance improvements for the beam training in
IEEE 802.11ad devices. Our compressive sector selection integrates
existing path tracking approaches into the sector level sweep. By
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only probing a random subset of available sectors, it speeds up the
training by a factor of 2.3. Still, it finds the best sector from a givenWe increase the
directionality of
beams, lower the
training overhead,
and avoid
interference.
codebook with predefined beam patterns. Since antenna side lobes
may cause distortions to other devices, we propose to steer the re-
ceiving beam away from any interference direction. Our adaptive
beam switching mechanism continuously tracks the interference and
signal strength in all the main and side lobes. It identifies a trade-off
that maximizes the Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) and
switches the beam whenever necessary. This approach facilitates the
parallel operation of incompatible protocols in the same frequency
range. By this means, we increase the throughput by about 60% in
practical testbed experiments. Dynamically adapting the beam pat-
terns to the wireless channel conditions maximizes the signal strength
at receivers. Our beam optimization derives beams that have a much
higher directionality than the default ones. With specific probing
beams including constant phase shifts, we obtain the full Channel
State Information (CSI). The protocol behind our approach uses this
CSI and automatically exploits reflections and destructive interference
in the environment. Practical evaluations in different environments
show that this approach increases the signal strength by 5 dB on aver-
age. In summary, our contributions reduce the training overhead and
distortion caused by interference while enhancing the directionality.
Directional beams have minimal coverage that is limited by any
Attackers can
eavesdrop on
reflections and
remotely tamper
with the beam
training.
blockage in the environment. Thus, intercepting an mm-wave link
is typically assumed to be more challenging than in omnidirectional
communications. Our experimental studies show that, despite a strong
directionality, attack vectors exist. In practical experiments, we reveal
that environmental objects in the beam may reflect the signal towards
the outside of the designed coverage area and facilitate eavesdropping
from remote locations. Inconspicuous small-scale objects are sufficient
to cause significant reflections. Consumer devices with metal bodies
are perfect reflectors and enable an eavesdropper to obtain a signal
strength in order of that of the intended receiver. Even the beam train-
ing itself can become an attack vector. Attackers can forge the feedback
in the sector level sweep and report arbitrary sectors to choose. This
beam stealing attack forces victims to steer their beams to random
directions. As a result, Denial-of-Service (DoS) and Man-in-the-Middle
(MITM) attacks become possible as practically demonstrated in our
testbed. To protect against this threat, we discuss countermeasures
and propose a simple authentication scheme. With about 7.3% over-We outline current
threats in mm-wave
communication and
discuss possible
countermeasures.
head, our authenticated sector level sweep enforces that responses are
accepted from legitimate devices only. These contributions empha-
size the threats and security challenges that still exist in directional
communication networks. Proper solutions should be considered to
enhance the security in future standards.
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Emerging application scenarios, such as information shower and
Emerging mm-wave
applications
scenarios benefit
from our
contributions.
cable replacements, heavily rely on the mm-wave specific propagation
effects with high directionality. Unfortunately, current systems and
devices do not yet turn these advantages into practice. We believe
that our contribution narrows this gap between theory and practice.
Both, our adaptive beam optimization and switching mechanisms, en-
hance the directionality and minimize the interference among multiple
devices. They increase the spatial isolation and provide a significant en-
hancement over the standard operation. Compressive sector selection
integrates the imperfections of low-cost hardware components into
an effective and efficient beam training with reduced probing overhead.
Protecting the sector level sweep with a simple yet effective authenti-
cation scheme, we increase the attack resistance of devices concerning
beam stealing. Our framework for testbed experimentation and simu-
lation facilitates extensive practical evaluations. It allows investigating
various aspects of mm-wave communications from a practical per-
spective. Publicly releasing our framework and measurements to the
Our tools and
measurements allow
others to build on
our findings.
community, we ease the reproducibility of our results. The provided
artifacts enable others to adapt our tools to their purposes and to build
on our findings. We strongly believe that our testbed platform is a
great contribution to the community, simplifies practical mm-wave
research experiments, and leads to novel experimental-driven results.

Part VII
A P P E N D I X

A
S O F T WA R E A N D D ATA R E L E A S E S
During our research, we engineered various tools that enabled us to
implement our systems. To allow others to build on our achievements
we release selected software components and measurements. This
simplifies reproducing our results and develop custom extensions. In
the following, we describe our software and data releases.
a.1 talon tools
The Talon Tools project consolidates a set of software tools for prac-
tical research with commodity IEEE 802.11ad devices. It bases on
TP-Link’s Talon AD7200, which is the first wireless router that sup-
ports the IEEE 802.11ad standard and was released in 2016. Using
this platform allows investigating various aspects of 60GHz mm-wave
communications in realistic on-site experiments. With our framework,
we support various kinds of measurements and evaluations performed
with multiple routers in arbitrary environments.
The Talon Tools repository consolidates multiple contributions that
are required to start testbed experimentation with the Talon AD7200
devices. It links to other of our repositories and integrates:
• our OpenWrt system image,
• the Nexmon firmware patching framework for ARC,
• the TPy testbed experiment automation tool, and
• measured antenna radiation patterns.
The Talon Tools project page is available at:
https://www.seemoo.de/talon-tools/
a.2 openwrt system image
The released OpenWrt variant contains the source code to compile a
Linux Embedded Development Environment (LEDE) system image
for the TP-Link Talon AD7200. With the wil6210 driver and firmware
already integrated, it supports to configure the 60GHz interface in
Access Point (AP), managed, and monitor mode. Therewith it allows
to easily establish mm-wave links between multiple devices. Through
the Linux based operating system, this allows to use the Talon AD7200
routers for arbitrary application scenarios.
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The OpenWrt system image for the Talon AD7200 is available at:
https://github.com/seemoo-lab/lede-ad7200
a.3 nexmon firmware patching framework for arc
The Nexmon C-based firmware patching framework for Wi-Fi chips
enables to write firmware patches and integrate custom features. Our
repository hosts the adapted variant for ARC based Wi-Fi chips such
as the QCA9500. It allows, for example, extending the beam training
operation.
The Nexmon for ARC project is available at:
https://github.com/seemoo-lab/nexmon-arc
a.4 tpy : testbed experiment automation
The TPy project contains scripts to remotely control networked devices,
such as the Talon AD7200, to run custom experiments. It essentially
consists of two components, a generic node service and a central
controller. While the former is designed to run on the network devices,
the latter constitutes a central network orchestrator. The node is
modularized and supports generic testbeds devices with different
features (e.g., IEEE 802.11ad links) and software (e.g., measurement
tools such as iperf or ping and special operating systems such as
OpenWrt). The code requires Python3, and a working SSH connection
all the devices only.
The source code of TPy is available at:
https://www.seemoo.de/tpy
a.5 environment simulation with mmtrace
Our mmTrace simulation is a deterministic image-based ray tracing
framework for mm-wave propagation developed in MATLAB. It sup-
ports the design of mm-wave specific protocols and, in contrast to
common statistical models, deals with multiple transceivers. The
strengths of mmTrace constitute signal variations at different receivers
and interference of multiple transmitters, which are crucial in certain
situations. It generates channel impulse responses and determines
signal characteristics in arbitrary scenarios.
The source code of the mmTrace simulator is available at:
https://github.com/seemoo-lab/mmTrace
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a.6 antenna radiation patterns
We measured the beam patterns of the predefined sectors of a Talon
AD7200 router inside an anechoic chamber. The measured patterns
are provided for validation and integration in other projects. Please
note that these results might be device dependent and differ on other
hardware components or firmware versions.
The measured antenna radiation patterns are available at:
https://github.com/seemoo-lab/talon-sector-patterns
a.7 practical deployment traces
Measurements in a practical deployment of the atrium of our library
reveal the performance of custom beam patterns. Our traces contain
the Channel State Information (CSI) of individual links as well as the
received signal strength and throughput measurements with different
beam configurations in specific scenarios.
The measured link statistics are available at:
https://github.com/seemoo-lab/talon-library-measurements
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